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PERFORMANCE OF A PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL
AS CONSIDERATION:

2

DuTY

THE ACTUAL CRITERIA FOR THE

EFFICACY OF AN AGREEMENT ALTERING CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION

By

BURTON

F. BRODY*

INTRODUCTION

The rule that performance of, or a promise to perform, a preexisting duty cannot serve as consideration to bind a promise has
been the source of extensive comment.' Some writers have taken
the position that the rule is meritorious and have expressed concern that it is sometimes evaded. 2 Others have taken the opposite
position, condemned the rule, and condoned its abridgement, if
not its abrogation.' The major cause of these conflicting assessments is the seemingly inconsistent applications of the rule by the
courts.
The apparent contradiction in application is most dramatically demonstrated by two New York decisions in the early 19th
century. In the first opinion, Bartlett v. Wyman,' the Supreme
Court of New York denied recovery to a sailor who sought to be
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.S.C., 1959, De
Paul University College of Commerce; J.D., 1961, De Paul University College of Law.
I J. CALAMAm & J. PEmuLLo, CONTRACTS § 60 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as
CALAMARI & PERILLO]; 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171 et seq. (1963)
[hereinafter cited as CoIRIN]; Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of ConsiderationSenseless and
Illogical?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 423 (1913); Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918); Hudson, Doctrine of Considerationin Iowa Revisited
-Discharge or Modification of Duties, 5 DRAKE L. REv. 3 (1955); Williston, Successive
Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1897) in SELECTED READINGS ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 452 (1934); Comment, Modification of a Contract in New York:
Criteriafor Enforcement, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 173 (1967); Comment, Hard Cases Make Good
Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78 (1923). The rationale of the rule is that performance of contractual
duty is not consideration because it is neither a detriment nor a benefit.
2 Hudson, supra note 1, at 14; Williston, supra note 1.
' Comment, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78 (1923); Ballantine, supra
note 1.
1 14 Johns. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
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paid at a rate higher than he had originally contracted for. The
higher rate had been agreed to by the captain during the course
of the voyage. Recovery was denied because, "The promise to give
higher wages is void for the want of consideration." ' 5 However, in
the second opinion, Lattimore v. Harsen, the court found a sufficient consideration in a case where builders refused to fulfill their
original contract, but were induced to do so by a promise of higher
payments. Thus the same court, in the same month, within 70
pages of the same volume of the reports, seems to have reached
opposite decisions on similar facts.
The two opinions are more bewildering because the unsuccessful sailor appears to have had the better case on the facts. He
demanded more money after a rumor that Congress was about to
impose an embargo had caused many sailors to switch ships.7
Therefore, his remaining aboard was of some value to the captain.
On the other hand, the builders, with no such mitigating circumstances indicated, merely "became dissatisfied with their agreement, and determined to leave off the work . . . . ,, Yet the two
cases stand, and the enigmatic nature of the pre-existing duty
rule endures. The confusion is reinforced by cases holding that
performance of a pre-existing duty does constitute consideration
far more often than a simple statement of the rule would lead one
to believe. Therefore, an attempt to resolve the apparent conflict
is worthwhile.
Contemporary commercial society demands clarification of
the pre-existing duty rule. Increasing technology and the continuing sophistication and refinement of the techniques of doing business stretch the time required for the performance of contracts
over ever lengthening periods. These elongated performance periods result in a proportionate increase in the vulnerability of such
undertakings to the accelerating pace of change in modern society.9 And because of changed conditions, there is a greater need
Id. at 262.
14 Johns. 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
14 Johns. at 261.
14 Johns. at 330. It may be noted that the cases are distinguishable on the ground
that in Lattimore the original agreement contained a liquidated damages clause. On the
basis of the liquidated damages clause, the court reasoned, the defendant could have had
a remedy for the builder's refusal to perform the first contract; the builder then could be
viewed as having relied on the defendant's having foregone his remedy. The sailor's original contract had no similar clause. This paper develops the idea that a "liquidated damages analysis" is only a judicial technique for carrying out more fundamental principles.
I A. TOFFLER, FurURE SHOCK (1970).
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for, and frequency of, modification of original contracts.
In such a commercial climate, the enigmatic nature of the
pre-existing duty rule is a luxury. This paper proposes to resolve
the inconsistent applications of the rule, draw its boundaries, and
describe the right of the parties to an executory contract to modify the performances owed under it. Setting the boundaries of
the pre-existing duty rule will also shed light on the rules for
modification of executory bilateral contracts because the problems are essentially identical. They are actually only views of the
same situation from different perspectives. One is hesitant to
point out the selfsame natures for fear of insulting one's readers.
However, clarity takes priority over good manners and necessitates a brief explanation of the conceptual sameness of the problems of modification and the pre-existing duty rule.
If one party to an executory bilateral contract alters his performance with the full consent and agreement of both parties,
and the other party does nothing different than was originally
required of him by the contract, the party altering his performance can allege that his second promise (i.e., his altered performance) is without consideration and therefore unenforceable. The
effect of the modification is thus destroyed. The basis for such an
allegation is that the second party does nothing different; rather,
he is merely performing what was required of him by the original
contract. Traditional doctrine dictates that the performance of a
pre-existing duty cannot, for this reason, be consideration for a
promise. Thus, the pre-existing duty rule and modification of
contract are inextricably intertwined and analysis of one must
include the other.
This analysis of these intertwined problems will establish the
following:
First. One of the significant functions of the preexisting duty rule is the prevention of extortion, abusive
dealing, and economic coercion by denying enforcement
to modifications in situations where courts suspect such
practices.
Second. In modification cases, the pre-existing duty
rule begs the question. The issue is not whether there
is consideration for the second promise (the modification wherein one party agrees to pay more for the same
service): but rather, the issue is the justification of the
party receiving the promise of greater remuneration for
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refusing to perform the original contract. The efficacy
of a modification will, to a large extent, depend on the
propriety of the refusal to perform the duty created in
the original contract.
Third.. The legal bridge between the pre-existing duty
rule and an enforceable modification is the surrender,
by the party receiving the promise of greater remuneration, of a claim arising under the original contract. The
surrender of that claim, in traditional terms, constitutes
the consideration for the promise of greater remuneration. The claim surrendered by the party receiving increased remuneration need only be a claim in which he
has a reasonable and honest belief, as distinct from a
claim that is ultimately legally effective.
This paper is focused on the study of the pre-existing duty
rule as it applies to duties arising under executory contracts. It
is this area in which understanding offers the most benefit. The
other facets of the problem, for example, performance of official
duties as consideration and the payment of less than the full
amount owed, present distinct difficulties either of theory or policy, which, even if resolved, would contribute little to an understanding of modification.
Performance of official duties as consideration will not be
discussed in this paper because the rule prohibiting such consideration is a matter of policy which transcends contract theory.
Policemen, firemen, elected officials, and other public servants
cannot be permitted to peddle their services on a public commercial basis if any modicum of honesty is to be maintained in the
functioning of government. It seems prudent that this social policy decision should not enter into the analysis of contract doctrine.
Ironically, however, just such a commingling of social policy
and contract law may lie at the threshold of the seeming inconsistency of the pre-existing duty rule. An early case, Harris v.
Watson,10 concerned a sailor seeking to be paid at a rate higher
than he had originally signed aboard for. Lord Kenyon found
against the sailor and made the policy point quite clearly:
If this action was to be supported, it would materially affect the
navigation of this kingdom. It has been long since determined, that
M 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B. 1791).
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when the freight is lost, the wages are also lost. . . . This rule was
founded on a principle of policy, for if sailors were in all events to
have their wages, and in times of danger entitled to insist on an extra
charge on such a promise as this, they would in many cases suffer a
ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand
they might think proper to make.' 1

Less than 20 years later, still another decision involving a
sailor suing to enforce a promise of increased wages reached the
courts. In Stilk v. Myrick,"2 Lord Ellenborough with equal clarity
shifted the basis of denial of the claim from policy to contract by
saying:
I think Harris v. Watson . . .was rightly decided; but I doubt
whether the ground of public policy, upon which Lord Kenyon is
stated to have proceeded, be the true principle on which the decision
is to be supported. Here, I say, the agreement is void for want of
consideration. There was no consideration for the ulterior
pay prom3
ised to the mariners who remained with the ship.

Thus, while the performance of official duties being barred
as consideration for the private promise to pay for them is clearly
a matter of policy, there is some justification for an attempt to
rationalize the rule through contract theory. Today the principle
is so thoroughly established without the aid of contract theory
that any analysis based on contract law is superfluous. The significant point is that contract doctrine is one means of implementing social policy. That the social policy has shifted or that it has
been achieved by legislation rather than judicial decision does not
alter the fundamental fact that contract doctrine can serve to
accomplish goals and achieve goods not directly related to the
commercial concept of contract.
Also excluded from this analysis is the rule that payment of
a lesser amount cannot discharge a duty to pay a greater amount.
This rule, which is known as the Doctrine of Foakes v. Beer" or
the Rule in Pinnel's Case,'5 has itself been the subject of much
controversy. Because the doctrine has within it a series of inconsistencies and errors and was so contrary to the thinking of even
1 Id. This policy decision dealing with sailor's wages may be the basis for distinguishing the New York cases, Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (a sailor)
and Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (which did not involve a
seaman). However, there is not the slightest hint in either New York opinion that the court
considered maritime policy.
12 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (C.P. 1809).
,1Id. at 1169.
14 Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
1 Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602).
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the justices who articulated it in Foakes v. Beer,'" it cannot be
productively analyzed from a contract point of view. Rather, any
attempted analysis of it becomes enmeshed in the internal difficulties of the rule itself.
The first problem with the rule that payment of a lesser
amount is not discharge of a debt of a greater amount is that it
is not truly a contract rule.' 7 Pinnel's Case,'8 upon which the court
in Foakes relied, was an action in debt. Debt grew out of detinue,
a property writ, and required that the plaintiff seek to recover a
sum certain. There was no element of consideration, nor even a
concept akin to it, required in debt. Foakes was an action in
assumpsit (contract) and, therefore, Pinnel was a most inappropriate and confusing precedent. The problem is that although the
rule makes sense as a property rule, it is ludicrous as a contract
rule.
An even greater error in Foakes' reliance on Pinnel is that
Pinnel was decided on the pleadings. Therefore, Pinnel's discussion of consideration is clearly obiter dictum.
Further, Foakes placed great reliance on the fact that Lord
Coke was a reporter of Pinnel. Yet later, when Coke became a
judge, he drew with the greatest precision the line between satisfaction of a debt and consideration in contract when he said:
[Allso if a man be bound to another by a bill in [L1000] and he
pay unto him [L500] in discharge of this bill, the which he accepts
of accordingly, and doth upon this assume and promise to deliver
up unto him his said bill of [L1000] this [L500] is no satisfaction
of the [£1000] but yet this is good and sufficient to make a good
promise, and upon a good consideration, because he hath paid
mony, (s) five hundred pounds, and he hath -no remedy for this
again."

However, the gravest problem with the Doctrine of Foakes v.
Beer is its incompatibility with modern business practices. The
opinion of the House of Lords which created the doctrine demonstrates this problem. The opinion voices the doubts of the Justices as to the commercial wisdom of the rule, but such doubts
fell victim to precedent and Lord Coke's fame. This incompatibil* 9 App. Cas. at 622. There were four separate opinions in the case.
,*See Ames, Two Theories of Consideration,12 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1889); Ferson, The
Rule in Foakes v. Beer, 31 YALE L.J. 15 (1921); Gold, The Present Status of the Rule in
Pinnel's Case I, 30 Ky. L.J. 72, and II, 30 Ky. L.J. 187 (1941).
IS 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602).
Bagge v. Slade, 81 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1614) (emphasis added).
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ity with the then current commercial practice subjected the doctrine to early ridicule " and eventual oblivion, by way of either
direct legislation or judicial exception or overruling. 2'
Refusal22 or failure 3 to distinguish the duty to pay a sum
certain from strictly executory contractual duties has obscured
the pre-existing duty rule and prevented full understanding of the
criteria for modification of executory contracts. Cases coming
within the Doctrine of Foakes are, in accurate analysis, outside
the doctrine of consideration. Therefore, in order to achieve both
of the goals of this paper-an understanding of the pre-existing
duty rule and a demarcation of the criteria for modification-such cases will not be considered.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORY OF CONSIDERATION
In the analysis of this problem it will be useful to set forth
E.g., Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499, 21 So. 565 (1897). The court stated:
The absurdity and unreasonableness of the rule seem to be generally conceded, but there also seems to remain a wavering, shadowy belief in the fact,
falsely so called, that the agreement to accept and the actual acceptance of
a lesser sum in full satisfaction of a larger sum is without any consideration
to support it; that is, that the new agreement confers no benefit upon the
creditor. However it may have seemed 300 years ago in England, when trade
and commerce had not yet burst their swaddling bands, at this day, and in
this country, where almost every man is in some way or other engaged in
trade or commerce, it is as ridiculous as it is untrue to say that the payment
of a lesser part of an originally greater debt, cash in hand, without vexation,
costs, and delay, or the hazards of litigation in an effort to collect all, is not
often-nay, generally-greatly to the benefit of the creditor. Why shall not
money-the thing sought to be secured by new notes of third parties, notes
whose payment in money is designed to be secured by mortgage, and even
negotiable notes of the debtor himself-why shall not the actual payment of
money, cash in hand, be held to be as good consideration for a new agreement, as beneficial to the creditor, as any mere promises to pay the same
amount, by whomsoever made and whomsoever secured? . . . And a rule of
law which declares that under no circumstances, however favorable and
beneficial to the creditor, or however hard and full of sacrifice to the debtor,
can the payment of a less sum of money at the time and place stipulated in
the original obligation or afterwards, for a greater sum, though accepted by
the creditor in full satisfaction of the whole debt, ever amount in law to
satisfaction of the original debt, is absurd, irrational, unsupported by reason,
and not founded in authority, as has been declared by courts of the highest
respectability and of last resort, even when yielding reluctant assent to it.
Id. at 509-10, 21 So. at 569.
21 Gold, supra note 17, at 187.
E.g., 1A CoRBIN § 174 recognizes the distinction but does not choose to pursue it.
2 Coffee & McKeithan, The Requirement of Considerationfor the Dischargeof Contractual Obligationsin Texas, 33 TEx. L. Rav. 225 (1954); see Hudson, Doctrine of Consideration in Iowa Revisited-the Bargain Element, 5 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 68-70 (1956); Comment, Modification of a Contract in New York: Criteriafor Enforcement, 35 U. Cm. L.
REv. 173 (1967).
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briefly the traditional consideration theory justifying the preexisting duty rule because many, if not most, of the cases evading
the rule are set in the terms of the traditional doctrine. Typically,
the insufficiency of a pre-existing duty as consideration has been
explained through the detriment/benefit test of consideration. 4 A
concise contemporary articulation of this particular application
of the detriment/benefit test is:
On principle, the second agreement is invalid for the performance by the recalcitrant contractor or is no legal detriment to him
whether actually given or promised, since, at the time the second

agreement was entered into, he was already bound to do the work;
nor is the performance under the second agreement a legal benefit
to the promisor since he was already entitled to have the work
done .2

To date, analyses of cases dealing with the pre-existing duty rule
have focused on the reasoning of the detriment/benefit test. This
paper will go beyond consideration of the detriment/benefit test
in order to uncover the principles which underlie the test as applied to pre-existing duty cases. First, however, it will be advantageous to view the traditional doctrine in action.
III. TRADITIONAL THEORY AS APPLIED
Performanceof a Pre-ExistingDuty Not Consideration

A.

Because of the unique connection of the law of contracts with
the commercial development of the English-speaking nations, the
most accurate insight into any particular rule is through its application to commercial transactions. This section will include a
survey of cases where the pre-existing duty rule has been applied-in situations involving bailments, construction contracts,
installment loan contracts, leases, and brokerage contracts. In
these cases the implications of the pre-existing duty rule to commercial policy are apparent, and little comment is necessary.
Following the survey of the application of the rule, several cases
will be analyzed in depth in an attempt to disclose the true basis
of the rule.
1. Bailments
In De Cecchis v. Evers26 the pre-existing duty rule was ap24

See CALAMARI & PERtLuo § 61; 1A CORBIN § 172; 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 130

(3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]; Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat
Consideration?, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918); Williston, supra note 1.
1 WILLISTON § 130, at 532.

54 Del. 99, 174 A.2d 463 (Super. Ct. 1961).
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plied in a bailment situation. The plaintiff telephoned the defendant, a warehouseman, and inquired about the storage of furniture, rugs, and appliances. The plaintiff was informed about rates
and packing requirements, but at no time was she told of any
limits on the liability of the storage company. Plaintiff agreed to
the terms and instructed the defendant to pick up the goods,
which was quickly accomplished. A few days later the plaintiff
received warehouse receipts through the mail. Three and a half
years later, the plaintiff requested the goods and they were delivered; but before the defendant would release them, he demanded
that the plaintiff sign the receipts that had been mailed to her.
The receipt had printed upon it a clause limiting the defendant's
liability for damage to $50.00 per package. In the suit by the
plaintiff to recover for physical damage to the goods, the defendant sought to invoke the limitation. The court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff and refused to limit liability. The basis for the refusal was that a contract had been made orally and the limitation
of liability did not arise until days after, when the receipts were
first delivered to the plaintiff. As such, the limitation was viewed
as a modification of the original contract. The court found that
there was no consent to, nor consideration for, the modification.
2. Construction Contracts
Tri-City Concrete Co. v. A. L. A. Construction Co., 7 a construction contract case, is an excellent example of the conceptual
identity of the modification problem and the pre-existing duty
rule. Tri-City, the plaintiff, orally agreed to supply concrete as
ordered by A.L.A., the defendant, and to deliver the concrete to
the job site. Further, the oral agreement provided that each delivery was to be accompanied by a sales memorandum, to be signed
by A.L.A.'s agent.18 One clause of the memorandum provided
that the buyer was to be liable for any damage to the seller's truck
which occurred while the truck was on the job site. During one
such delivery, the truck tipped over and fell into an excavation
on the job site. The seller sued to recover for the damage. The
court denied recovery on the basis that the sales memorandum
could not serve as a modification of the original agreement (which
" 343 Mass. 425, 179 N.E.2d 319 (1962).
2 There was a question whether the employee signing the memorandum involved in
the litigation was in fact authorized to do so, and the court considered agency rationale.
However, the court disposed of the case on contract grounds.
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contained no such provision as to damage to equipment) because
such modifications must be supported by consideration.
Mainland v. Alfred Brown Co.,9 involving the subcontracting of electrical work, also demonstrates the operation of the rule.
The subcontractor agreed to supply materials and labor to the
contractor at the construction site. This agreement was silent as
to who bore the risk of loss on goods delivered to, but not installed
at, the site. Fire destroyed goods stored on the site. The subcontractor alleged a subsequent promise by the general contractor to
reimburse the subcontractor for the loss if the subcontractor
would finish the job. The subcontractor's suit on the promise to
pay for the loss was unsuccessful because the court found that he
bore the risk of loss unless there was a specific agreement to the
contrary. The court further found that the oral promise to reimburse could not serve as such an agreement to shift the risk of loss
because
[t]he oral assurance of reimbursement for that loss given by
the contractor did not constitute an enforceable promise. The subcontractor was obligated to complete his contract notwithstanding
such assurance. Consequently, that assurance, or promise, was given
without consideration. 0

The issue of the pre-existing duty rule most frequently appears in construction contracts in regard to determining the right
to receive payment for "extras."'"
3. Installment Contracts
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used to further the
law's policy of encouraging the extension of credit by protecting
lenders, especially purchase-money lenders. In In re Dahn31 a
husband and wife had become jointly liable on a conditional sales
agreement for the purchase price of a mobile home. After the
husband's death the wife attempted to have his estate pay the
balance of the contract. To implement this plan, she refused to
make any payments and turned the mobile home over to the
lender. After a period of time the lender sold the home and filed
suit for the deficiency. The wife counterclaimed for damages,
claiming the lender had promised to hold the home until her
"

85 Nev. 654, 461 P.2d 862 (1969).

Id. at 656, 461 P.2d at 864.
3, Watson Lumber Co. v. Guennewig, 79 Ill. App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270 (1967); see
Britton v. Gabriel, 2 N.C. App. 213, 162 S.E.2d 686 (1968).
32

204 Kan. 535, 464 P.2d 238 (1970).
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claim against the estate had been determined. The court found
for the lender on the ground that there was no consideration for
the lender's promise. There was no consideration because the wife
was obligated under the conditional sales agreement to deliver
the home to the lender when in arrears. Therefore, the fulfillment
of the conditional sales contract duty could not be consideration
for the lender's promise to hold the home pending the outcome
of the claim against the estate.
A similar result was achieved in Walden v. Backus.3 3 There,
the plaintiff had sold a motel to the defendant on an installment
contract. The defendant took possession and began making payments. After the defendant missed a payment, the plaintiff urged
him to keep the motel and continue payment. Finally, the defendant surrendered the premises and left the keys with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff resold the motel for a lower price and sued the
defendant for the balance. The defendant contended that the
surrender of the premises had been consideration for the plaintiff's promise to release the defendant. The court found that there
was no consideration for the alleged promise of release because
the defendant was obligated under the original installment contract to return the keys and surrender the premises to the plaintiff
in the event of default. Therefore, the surrender could not have
been consideration for the release.
The pre-existing duty rule has similarly been invoked to protect account creditors. 4
4. Leases
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used in lease situations to protect landlords. In Green v. Millman Brothers Inc.3" an
agreement by the landlord to accept a lower rent was held ineffective on the basis of the rule. After the lessee had rented and
occupied space in a shopping center, its business was not what
had been anticipated. The lessor therefore agreed to a reduction
in rent of $150.00 per month. After 1 year at the reduced rental
the lessor sued to recover the original higher rental except for the
1-year period. The Michigan court held that the lessor could recover because there was no consideration for the promise of the
3 81 Nev. 634, 408 P.2d 712 (1965).
m See International Shoe Co. v. Carmichael, 114 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
O'Brien v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 362 P.2d 455 (Wyo. 1961).
21 7 Mich. App. 450, 151 N.W.2d 860 (1967); ct Feldman v. Fax, 112 Ark. 223, 164
S.W. 766 (1914).
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reduced rental in that the lessee-defendant did only what was
required of it by the original lease-pay rent.
In a classic application, the rule was invoked in Little v.
Reddit 3 to void an option to renew a lease. The plaintiff's assignor had rented the premises to the defendant. Twenty-five
months after the commencement of the lease, the plaintiff's assignor, in further consideration of the rent, had granted to the defendant the right to renew for a period of 1 to 10 years after the
original 10-year term. The court declared the option void because
it was a modification of the original lease; as such, it required
consideration. The obligation to pay rent was held not to be consideration for the option because the obligation to pay had been
created by the original lease.
5. Brokerage Contracts
In Block v. Drucker37 the rule was applied to a brokerage
contract. The fact pattern hints at an underlying reason for the
apparently conflicting applications of the pre-existing duty rule.
The plaintiff was retained to find a buyer for the defendant's
house at a set figure. The plaintiff produced a buyer at a lower
price, and the defendant agreed to sell at this lower figure. The
defendant then insisted that the plaintiff accept a lower commission than had been provided for in their original agreement, and
the plaintiff acceded. The defendant subsequently sold the house
to another buyer at a higher figure.
The plaintiff sued for, and recovered, the higher commission.
The defendant argued on appeal that the verdict for the commission at the higher figure could not be upheld because of the subsequent agreement by the plaintiff to accept a lower commission.
The court rejected this argument, finding that, "This agreement
was not an effective novation [sic] (modification) of the original
agreement since it was not supported by consideration. ' 3 To assess this holding, it is necessary to recognize the plaintiff's plight
when the promise to accept a lower commission was extracted
from him. He had worked to find a buyer, and unless he agreed
to the lower commission, the fruits of his labor would have been
denied him.
" 264 Ala. 371, 88 So. 2d 354 (1956). See also Goldsbrough v. Gable, 140 Ill. 269, 29
N.E. 722 (1892).
212 So. 2d 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
" Id. at 891.
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Cases Revealing the True Operationand Application of the
Rule

The rationale underlying the application of the pre-existing
duty rule, and thus explaining the apparent contradictions in its
application, is candidly articulated in the case of Lingenfelder v.
Wainwright Brewing Co.39 That case involved a contract for the
construction of a brewery. The architect employed to do the work
also had an interest in a refrigeration manufacturing concern.
When the architect learned that the brewer had ordered refrigeration equipment from a competitor of the architect's firm, he refused to continue with the construction of the brewery. In his
pique, the architect, "took away his plans, called off his superintendent on the ground, and notified Mr. Wainwright that he
would have nothing more to do with the brewery." 4 ° Mr. Wainwright, the owner of the brewery, wanted the brewery completed
as soon as possible. Stymied and pressured by the work stoppage,
Wainwright agreed to pay the architect 5 percent on the cost of
the competing refrigeration equipment if the architect would resume construction. The architect completed the work but Wainwright refused to pay the 5 percent. This suit, by the architect's
executors, ensued.
The court held against the architect, denying his claim to the
5 percent on the refrigeration equipment. In its opinion the court
addressed itself to the two issues of major concern to this analysis.
The first point was the allegation by the plaintiff that the original
contract had been abrogated and a new one (i.e., a modification)
requiring the 5 percent premium, had replaced the original. The
court, on the basis of the facts, rejected this argument, stating,
"I find in the evidence no substitution of one contract for another."4
The court then turned its attention to whether there was
"any consideration for the promise of Wainwright to pay Jungenfeld [the deceased architect] 5 per cent. on the refrigerator
plant."4 2 Not surprisingly, the court found that there was no consideration because the architect had done only what he had been
already obligated to do by the first contract. Therefore, the law
regarded the second contract as a nudum pactum.
103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
Id. at 585, 15 S.W. at 846.
41 Id. at 586, 15 S.W. at 846.
12 Id. at 592, 15 S.W. at 847.
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The holding and analysis of Lingenfelder are similar to many
such cases reaching the same result. The candor of Justice Gantt
in explaining the holding, however, sets his opinion apart. He
discloses what moved the court to invoke the pre-existing duty
rule against the architect:
No amount of metaphysical reasoning can change the plain fact that
Jungenfeld took advantage of Wainwright's necessities, and
extorted the promise of 5 per cent. on the refrigerator plant as the
condition of his complying with his contract already entered into.
Nor was there even the flimsy pretext that Wainwright had violated
any of the conditions of the contract on his part ...
To permit plaintiff to recover under such circumstances would be
to offer a premium on bad faith, and to invite men to violate their
3
most sacred contracts that they may profit by their own wrong.

Further evidence that the court was motivated by fear of
extortion or abusive dealing is in Justice Gantt's statement:
"[Alnd [the law] will not lend its process to aid in the wrong."44
Relying on the insight provided by Justice Gantt's opinion,
it is the primary contention of this paper that the key to the
enigmatic nature of the pre-existing duty rule is a fear of misdealing. If a court suspects that the second contract-the modification-was extorted or otherwise unfairly extracted from the
promisor, it will employ the pre-existing duty rule to deny enforcement of the second contract. On the other hand, if the court
does not suspect abusive dealing, it will enforce the second contract by ignoring the consideration issue,45 by finding an exception to the pre-existing duty rule, or by devising a mechanical
route around it.
Numerous cases, old and new, support the theory that a
desire to prohibit misdealing is the key to the understanding of
Id. at 592-93, 15 S.W. at 848 (emphasis added). But see Austin Instrument Inc. v.
Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971), where instead of
asserting the pre-existing duty rule to defend against the coercing contractor's suit for the
extra money, the aggrieved, coerced party paid the money and sued for damages on the
theory of duress to force repayment of the sum wrongfully extracted from him.
103 Mo. at 595, 15 S.W. at 848.
See Savage Arms Corp. v. United States, 266 U.S. 217 (1924). The Court decided
that a review of the issue of consideration for modification of a government contract was
unnecessary; it upheld the modification and found in favor of the government:
Whether the agreement was made reluctantly, or appellant got the worst of
the bargain, are matters unnecessary to be considered. It is enough that,
without fraud or coercion, it did agree.
Id. at 221. Corbin recognizes the potential of such an analysis, but does not develop it.
1A CoRBIN § 183.
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the pre-existing duty rule. Although no opinion quite matches
Lingenfelder's candor in announcing this concern as the key to
the rule, examination of a few cases applying the rule will support
this theory.
Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico," a case with facts
similar to those of Lingenfelder, quotes the passage about extortion from that case. Men who had signed in San Francisco to work
the Alaskan salmon fishing season demanded and got a promise
of higher wages after their arrival in Pyramid Harbor. The court
denied enforcement of the promise of higher wages on the ground
of lack of consideration because of the pre-existing contractual
duty to provide these same services. The coextensive import of
Alaska Packers' and Lingenfelder is best demonstrated by the
facts seized upon by the court to support its holding:
The evidence showed, and the court below found that it was impossible for the appelant to get other men to take the places of the

libelants, the place being remote, the season short and just opening;
so that, after endeavoring for several days without success to induce
the libelants to proceed with their work in accordance with their
contracts, the company's superintendent . . .yielded to their
demands .... 1

It is clear that the court in Alaska Packers' was concerned with
economic extortion and misdealing, just as Justice Gantt was in
his condemnation of the architect.
In King Construction Co. v. W. M. Smith Electric Co.,4" the
concepts of economic coercion and the pre-existing duty rule are
neatly juxtaposed. King, a bidder on an Atomic Energy Commission contract, obtained an offer from Smith for the construction
of a crane required by the AEC. Smith bid $16,691, and King used
that figure in its bid to the AEC. King was awarded the contract
and was instructed to commence work immediately. The AEC
contract made time of the essence, and penalty provisions were
included. The day after the award, King entered into an oral
contract with Smith for the crane at $16,691. Less than a week
later, Smith informed King that it would not deliver the crane at
the agreed price. For about a month King attempted to find
another crane, but, as it turned out, Smith was the only practical
source. Therefore, King entered into a written contract with
41117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).

Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
"

350 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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Smith for a crane; but the price was $30,750, instead of the prior
lower price.
Smith sued King for the balance on the contract as modified.
King counterclaimed for payments made in excess of the price set
by the original contract. The majority of the court held for King
on both claims finding that the modification4 9 was not fully
agreed to by King. The court held that King had signed the
second agreement under duress and therefore was not bound by
it. The court equated economic coercion with duress.
The concurring opinion, on the other hand, chose as the central issue the lack of consideration for the second promise. King
raised as one of its points on appeal:
[Tihe parties having entered into a valid oral contract ... for the
sale and purchase of the crane specified for $16,691.00, there was no
consideration for the later
written agreement for ...
the sum of
50
$30,750.00 for the crane.

Seizing on this, the concurring opinion denied the validity of
the modification, not on the basis of duress, but on the basis that
there was "no real or true consideration for the making of the new
5
contract." '
Here again the almost identical natures of the pre-existing
duty rule and the right to modify an executory bilateral contract
can be seen. The majority opinion made clear that the right to
modify a contract is limited by the extent to which the modification is arrived at freely. The concurring opinion reflected the
same thinking, but chose to express it through the pre-existing
duty rule and the absence of consideration.
Another recent case offering insight into the relationship of
the pre-existing duty rule and modification demonstrates the
same concern with abusive business practices as do the other
52
cases where the rule is invoked. Nicholas v. Harger-Haldeman
dealt with the purchase of an automobile "on time" in Southern
11The Texas court refers to the second agreement as a "novation," that is, substituting one obligation for another. Id. at 943. That statement is no doubt correct under Texas
law. For consistency with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209 and for clarity, however, this
paper treats such an agreement as a modification, restricting the term novation to the
meaning given in RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRcrs § 424 (1932), that is, a modification involving a new party as well as a new obligation.
350 S.W.2d at 945.
"
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Id. at 947.

196 Cal. App. 2d 77, 16 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1961).
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California and involved pervasive misdealing reflective of current
commercial and consumer problems.
Nicholas, the plaintiff-buyer, was not an American by birth
and had difficulty with the English language. He went to
defendant-seller's automobile sales room to purchase a new car.
The salesman "switched" him up to a more expensive model by
offering him a most attractive deal. The deal, which in typical
fashion required manager approval, set the price of the $5,000
model at $4,100. This price was to be paid by a trade-in credit
on Nicholas' old car of $950 plus a cash down payment of $300;
the balance was to be paid in monthly payments, commencing
August 1st, of just over $100.
The necessary managerial approval was given in 6 minutes.
Nicholas and the salesman signed some papers and Nicholas
made a $20 cash deposit and signed over the title to the car he
traded in. It was agreed that Nicholas would bring in the $280
balance of the down payment the next day and pick up his new
car. Nicholas returned as scheduled and made the payment, but
was told that still another day was necessary before delivery of
his new car.
When Nicholas returned the third day to get the car he was
vaguely informed of some difficulties and was told that an additional $200 was needed on the down payment plus an undisclosed
amount for insurance. The salesman began writing up a new contract for the extra $200 and $139 for insurance. Nicholas said he
would not sign and that the deal was off. The salesman refused,
saying that the deal was closed and Nicholas' old car could not
be returned to him. The salesman then said that the added $200
could be put in the balance to increase the monthly payments.
Papers were presented to Nicholas for his signature. He signed
and was told copies would be mailed to him. He finally got his
new car.
Two weeks later Nicholas received a contract calling for $200
to be paid July 7th. He did not make that payment, but did make
the first payment as scheduled by the original contract. The new
car was repossessed and Nicholas was told that the repossession
was caused by his failure to make the $200 pickup payment which
had been due on July 7th. Nicholas then offered to pay the $200
immediately. The defendant-seller's credit manager refused to
accept the money and advised Nicholas to see the insurance man.
Nicholas saw the insurance man, who advised him to take
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out more insurance. Nicholas refused, returned to the creditmanager, and demanded his car. The credit manager refused to
return the car unless Nicholas would pay the $200 plus $1,000 for
the repossession service and the balance due. Nicholas declined
and filed suit for the conversion of personal property in the car
and for punitive damages.
In their defense the sellers argued that the second contract
superseded all prior negotiations and that therefore Nicholas'
breach of the second agreement justified the repossession of the
car. Thus, the defense maintained, there could have been no
conversion. The trial court held that there was no breach by
Nicholas and that the second contract was not valid, or if it was,
that the seller-defendant had waived strict compliance with it.
The appellate court affirmed the decision for the buyer. It
grounded its decision on the lack of consideration for the second
agreement because of coercion, stating:
Apparently believing that he was forced to sign a new contract
to save his downpayment and Dodge car, plaintiff signed Exhibit K
[the second contract or modification], the conditional sales contract of June 26. There was no further consideration for the execution of a new agreement. It was all for the benefit of the defendant.
The basic doctrine generally required by the several states is that a
promise to pay an additional or greater amount than that which the
promisee is already under contractual obligation to the promisor to
pay is without consideration.Y

C. Forms of Misdealing Prevented by the Rule
Alaska Packers, King Construction, and Nicholas clearly
demonstrate the use of the pre-existing duty rule by courts to
avoid sanctioning agreements that have resulted from extortion
or economic coercion. In most of the cases reviewed in the remainder of this article, courts have been concerned with the potential
for economic extortion arising from the interdependence of parties to a contract once performance has begun. The rule, however,
has been applied to prevent numerous other forms of misdealing.
In Moehling v. W. E. O'Neil Construction Co.54 the Illinois Supreme Court used the pre-existing duty rule to deny a
disloyal agent the benefits of her double dealing. The plaintiff,
a licensed real estate broker, was retained by the defendant to
acquire land for it. The defendant needed land from which fill
Id. at 88, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
20 Ill. 2d 255, 170 N.E.2d 100 (1960).
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could be taken for use in a road construction project the defendant had undertaken. The plaintiff found land that met the
defendant's needs and began the steps necessary to acquire it for
the company. However, the plaintiff alleged that she then entered
into an oral contract with the defendant whereby the defendant
agreed that the plaintiff could acquire 10 acres of the tract for
herself. These 10 acres were not appropriate for the defendant's
use, but had great commercial value for other uses. The defendant refused to convey the 10 acres to the plaintiff, and she sued
to obtain specific performance of the oral contract.
The court found for the defendant, that there was serious
doubt whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the oral contract. The court emphasized that even if the plaintiff had proved
the existence of the oral contract, she could not enforce it because
there was no consideration for the promise to let the plaintiff have
the 10-acre parcel. The plaintiff claimed that the consideration
for the oral promise of the 10 acres was her acquisition of the land
for the defendant. The court invoked the pre-existing duty rule,
stating rather bluntly:
In short, plaintiff performed no act and rendered no service to defendant with respect to the ...

land other than what she was already

required and obligated to do by reason of the legal relationship of
principal and agent existing between them. 5

The court was most clear in its condemnation of the plaintiffs conduct of her agency. It pointed to two particularly treacherous acts of the broker. She had negotiated a deal which postponed for 2 years the right to remove fill, an arrangement patently contrary to the defendant's needs. Further, she had not
consulted with her client as to the terms of the option she did
acquire. The court summed up the thinking behind its resort to
the pre-existing duty rule, saying that
[hier failure to do so, as well as her entire course of conduct, leads
us to the conclusion that she abandoned the interests of her principal and sought only to advance her own."

Another case used the rule against a suspected forgery.57 The
seller and buyer entered into a lease of the seller's stock in a
corporation. However, immediately after executing the instruments requisite for the lease, the seller informed the buyer that
Id. at 266, 170 N.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 268-69, 170 N.E.2d at 108.
Johnson v. Tanner, 59 Wash. 2d 606, 369 P.2d 307 (1962).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

the terms of the lease violated company policy pertaining to such
agreements. The parties then converted their arrangement to a
sale, with a loan of $3,250 from the seller to the buyer. The buyer
went to work for the company; and, as was the custom in the area,
an amount in keeping with his loan commitment to the seller was
deducted from his earnings and paid to the seller. In this fashion
the buyer fulfilled his obligations.
However, the seller alleged that a subsequent agreement calling for a purchase price of $15,000 had been executed by the
parties. The Supreme Court of Washington stated that there was
evidence that the parties had never discussed such a contract
before it was signed, that there was no witness willing to testify
that he had seen the buyer sign it, that the buyer denied signing
it, that the alleged signature on the $15,000 contract was in a
different form than that which the buyer customarily signed, and
that the handwriting was dissimilar. The trial court had found
that the signature was not that of the buyer. The supreme court
affirmed that finding of fact, but went further in its discussion of
the law.
It held that even if the trial court had found the signature
genuine, it should still have found for the buyer. This result
would have been dictated by the lack of consideration for the
buyer's promise to pay $15,000, since the seller was already obligated to sell the stock to the buyer for $3,250.
In Murphy v. Royal American Industries, Inc.58 the rule was
invoked to thwart an evasion of the Securities Act. The plaintiffs
agreed to exchange some stock for stock in the defendant company. The defendant agreed that the stock it would give in exchange would be registered and freely transferable. Additionally,
the defendant agreed that if it somehow failed to deliver registered stock, it would repurchase the stock it did deliver to the
plaintiffs at a price of $2.50 per share. Later, it was discovered
that the stock that had been earmarked for transfer to the plaintiffs had not been registered and that a registration would have
to be undertaken unless the shares were restricted to investment
purposes. In order to obviate the necessity of a registration and
still be able to complete the original contract, the defendants
placed on the certificates a legend to the effect that the shares
188 So. 2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 465, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 953 (1967).
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were for investment purposes, had not been registered, and could
not be transferred unless registered. Further, at the closing the
plaintiffs signed an investment letter which also acknowledged
that they took the shares for investment purposes and had no
intention of selling them.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs made a demand on the defendant to repurchase the shares at $2.50 per share as required by
their agreement. The defendant refused, and the plaintiff sued to
enforce the agreement. The defendant alleged that the investment letter and the legend on the stock had modified the original
agreement, thereby waiving the registration provision. The court
found for the plaintiffs, saying that the plaintiffs' recital of the
intention not to dispose of the stock was executed at the request
of the defendants in an effort to avoid violation of the federal law.
The court then turned to the question of the pre-existing duty
rule:
Such receipt [of the investment letter] did not constitute a modification of the contract in that there was no consideration for a change
An estoppel did not arise in that by signing
or modification ....
the investment letter plaintiffs received no benefit but merely acknowledged a known fact that they might not be able to sell their
stock until registered, and such action by the plaintiffs was not to
the detriment of the defendants. . . . The same did not constitute
a waiver of the provisions of the contract in that there was no showing of the intentional relinquishment of a known right."

Although the court clearly was concerned with the efficacy of the
modification, its concern with the protection afforded by the Securities Act is equally clear. The court permitted completion of
the sale of the unregistered stock, but did not permit the defendants to bypass the alternative protection the plaintiffs had
obtained.
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used to monitor the
work of fiduciaries. In Carpenterv. Taylor ° the rule was used to
prevent an assignee for the benefit of creditors from taking advantage of his position. The plaintiff, as assignee for the benefit of
creditors, after inventorying the assets of the debtor felt a surplus
could be had. Therefore, he entered into an agreement with the
debtor-assignor whereby the debtor would pay him (the assignee)
a commission on any surplus realized, in recognition of his astute
0

Id. at 886-87.
0 164 N.Y. 171, 58 N.E. 52 (1900).
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management. A surplus was achieved, but the debtor would not
pay the commission, and the assignee sued. The court found for
the debtor on the theory that the assignment for benefit of creditors had obligated the assignee to manage to the best of his ability. Therefore, his promise to do so in return for a commission
could not be consideration for the promise to pay a commission
because it was a promise to perform a pre-existing duty.
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used to frustrate
attempts to make a testamentary disposition without conforming
to the wills act and simultaneously to prevent the circumvention
of community property law. In In re Bray's Estate6 the testator
hired his son by a former marriage to work for him. After the son
had been employed in the testator's business for 6 years, the
testator began taking funds from the business and depositing
them in a joint account with the son. The son knew of the existence of the joint account, but knew nothing about the amounts
deposited. After the testator's death his widow claimed half of the
joint account as community property. The son alleged it was
salary. The court expressed its concern about the testator's secrecy, the invasion of community property, and the attempted
evasion of the Statute of Wills. It ruled in favor of the widow on
the ground that the son had already been bound to work under
his employment contract, and that therefore there was no consideration for the joint bank account.
A similar theory was employed in In re Creal2 to deny efficacy
to an alleged waiver of the debt owing from a son to the testator.
The pre-existing duty rule has also been used in situations
where the integrity of government officials might be in question.
It has certainly been used to maintain the integrity of competitive
bidding for government work. In Board of Education v. Barracks"
a taxpayer filed suit to enjoin payment by the board of education
to a contractor who had built a school and who sought payment
of an extra $24,500 pursuant to an oral modification agreed to by
the board. The facts were that the contractor was the low bidder
and was awarded the contract. He supplied a performance bond.
After work began the contractor said costs had risen because of
World War I and that he could not complete the work unless he
61
62

230 Cal. App. 2d 136, 40 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1964).
27 N.Y.2d 339, 266 N.E.2d 815, 318 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1971).

235 Ill. App. 35 (1924). See also, Gragg v. James, 452 P.2d 579 (Okla. 1969);
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 607, 139 A.2d 347 (1958).
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was paid an extra $33,500. There was an unofficial meeting of the
school board, attended by a majority of the members (including
the president and secretary), the architect, and the contractor. At
this unofficial meeting it was agreed that the contractor should
continue construction and that the board would protect him from
loss on the contract. Later, at a regular meeting of the board, the
contractor's extra compensation was limited to $24,500 because
that figure would raise the contractor's remuneration to what the
next lowest bid had been.
The court granted the injunction enjoining the extra payment to the contractor. The pre-existing duty rule was the basis
of the decision. A major factor in the court's reasoning was that
the contractor had supplied a bond; therefore, if the contractor
had in fact refused to complete the school, the board could have
had the work done by someone else and charged any increased
costs to the bondsman." The court also specially noted that there
had been other bidders who could have been called on if the
contractor had abandoned the work. The court dwelt at length on
the questionable nature of the informal board meeting at which
the modification had been made. It pointed out that state law
required a recording of votes on expenditures and that there had
been none. Further, state law required all business of the board
to be conducted at regular or special meetings, with minutes
kept. This meeting was neither a regular nor a special meeting;
and although the secretary was present, no minutes were taken.
The court's feelings about the informal meeting at which the
alleged modification was made are best summed up in its own
words:
The board later did not pretend to settle on this basis [the agreement to pay his extra costs] but allowed Schwartz [the contractor]
the amount of the second lowest bid, and the substance of all the
testimony is, that some members favored meeting Schwartz's loss
and others did not favor such a plan, but that it all occurred by
individual suggestions from members of the board and no vote was
taken. Informal and uncertain action of this kind by various members of the Board of Education cannot be the basis of official action
under which the school district is to be burdened with an indebtedness of $24,500, and in the opinion of this court, the district by such
action never assumed any legal liability.u
Because of the bond the court refused to apply the changed circumstances exception. See text accompanying notes 66-94 infra. It felt that one of the purposes of the bond
was to hedge against just such an occurrence; i.e., the contractor, through its bondsman,
assumed the risk of change.
Id. at 48-49 (1924).
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From these cases it is clear that the pre-existing duty rule is
an example of the employment of a rule of law to implement a
social or economic policy independent from contract law. Courts
look at the facts surrounding the making of the second promise.
If there is evidence of economic extortion or misdealing, courts
apply the pre-existing duty rule and deny enforcement to the
second contract. In cases where courts are satisfied that there is
no misdealing, they do not apply the rule.
The subject of the remainder of this investigation is the various legal techniques used to escape the pre-existing duty rule. In
a case where the second promise results from a change in circumstances, courts frequently apply what will here be called the
changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the preexisting duty rule. In some cases courts avoid the rule entirely
rather than find an exception to it. They may so avoid the rule
by finding that a party has in fact performed a different duty, not
a pre-existing duty. Or a court may avoid the rule by finding that
the original contract was mutually rescinded and a new contract
formed. Another means of escaping the internal technicalities of
the rule and its exception is to enforce the modification on a
theory that one party has relied on the modification to his detriment. And in some cases courts may completely avoid any problem with the rule by simply holding that no consideration is required to support a second promise.
IV.

THE CHANGED OR UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO
THE RULE

The changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the
pre-existing duty rule is applicable when unforeseen or extreme
changes in circumstances occur between the formation and the
performance of a contract. Courts refrain from applying the preexisting duty rule because the changed circumstances demonstrate that the second contract was based on fair rather than
abusive dealing. The legal analysis for the exception is this: the
changed circumstances subject the pre-existing duty to doubt or
to an honest and reasonable dispute; or they create an honest and
reasonable belief in one party that he is discharged from his duty
by the defense of impossibility. The settlement of the dispute or
the giving up of the defense of impossibility is consideration for
the altered promise.
This exception to the pre-existing duty rule typically appears
in construction contracts. It is often held that if changed or un-
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foreseen circumstances arise during the construction of a building, which make completion of the structure substantially more
difficult than the parties had originally thought, an agreement to
pay the contractor a greater price for his efforts is enforceable. 6
Linz v. Schuck7 is a classic example of the operation of the
exception. The plaintiff, a contractor, agreed to dig a cellar under
the defendant's house for $1,500. After work began, it was discovered that the house stood on a hard crust of earth approximately
3 feet thick. However, beneath the crust was a quagmire of soft
wet mud to such a depth that it was impossible to put in the cellar
as contemplated. The contractor stopped work, but the owner of
the house still desired a cellar and kept after the contractor to see
if anything could be done. Finally, the contractor agreed to construct a small cellar by extensive draining and the use of concrete
and cement footings if the owner would pay or reimburse the
additional costs involved.
The court enforced the contractor's right to receive payment
under the subsequent agreement, saying,
When two parties make a contract, based on supposed facts which
they afterwards ascertain to be incorrect, and which would not have
been entered into by the one party if he had known the actual
conditions which the contract required him to meet, not only courts
of justice but all right thinking people must believe the fair course
for the other party to the contract to pursue is either to relieve the
contractor of going on with his contract or to pay him additional
compensation. If the difficulties be unforeseen, and such as neither
party contemplated, or could have from the appearance of the thing
to be dealt with anticipated, it would be an extremely harsh rule of
law to hold that there was no legal way of binding the owner of
property to fulfill a promise made by him to pay the contractor such
additional sum as such unforeseen difficulties cost him."

The opinion lacks precision in the technical points of contract because it relied solely on the moral and ethical reasons to
enforce the subsequent promise to pay more. However, Linz relied heavily on King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway,69
in which the Minnesota Supreme Court, in its own syllabus of its
opinion, made very clear that the changed or unforeseen circum" 1A CoRBiN § 184; 1 WIUISTON § 130; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 136, 138 (1942); Annot.,
55 A.L.R. 1333 (1928); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1450, 1459 (1923).
- 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907).
Id. at 230, 67 A. at 288.

11 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
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stances in that case related directly to the consideration question,
and specifically to the pre-existing duty rule:
Held that, where one party to a contract refuses to perform it unless
promised some further pay or benefit than the contract provides,
and the promise is made . . . the promise is without consideration,
unless the refusal was induced by substantial and unforeseen difficulties in the performance, which would cast upon the party additional burdens not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
made.70

A.

The Rationale of the Exception

Not only does King make clear why changed or unforeseen
circumstances trigger an exception to the pre-existing duty rule,
but it also clarifies the relationship of the pre-existing duty rule
and the fear of extortion. While King articulates the changed or
unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule,
the court held that King's difficulty did not come within the
exception.
King was a contractor who entered into a contract with the
railway to construct a roadbed through a part of the Missabe
Mountains. The contract was made in January of 1893, and performance began almost immediately. In late February unforeseen
difficulties were encountered which increased the cost of construction by $40,000. Consequently, King notified the railway
that he could not proceed. The railway agreed to modify the
original contract and pay for the added costs so that King would
not be compelled to the work at a loss. On the basis of this subsequent promise, King completed the job and filed suit to collect
the added costs. The railway claimed that there was no consideration for the alleged promise to pay extra for the work, relying on
the pre-existing duty rule.
In stating the criteria for the unforeseen circumstances which
would create an exception to the rule, the court explained that
the reason for the exception is that the changed circumstances
dispel any suspicions of misdealing. The court described the circumstances as follows:
They must be substantial, unforeseen, and not within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. They need not
be such as would legally justify the party in his refusal to perform
his contract, unless promised extra pay, or to justify a court of equity
in relieving him from the contract; for they are sufficient if they are
70 Id.

at 482, 63 N.W. at 1105.
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of such a characteras to render the party's demand for extra pay
manifestly fair, so as to rebut all inference that he is seeking to be
relieved from an unsatisfactory contract, or to take advantage of the
necessities of the opposite party to coerce from him a promise for
further compensation. Inadequacy of the contract price which is the
result of an error of judgment, and not of some excusable mistake
of fact, is not sufficient.7 '

The court found against King on this point and held the
exception inapplicable because frozen ground in the Missabes in
late February was neither so unusual nor so unforeseeable as to
prevent its being anticipated by the parties.7" Therefore, King
entered into the contract knowing full well the difficulty ahead.
As to the pre-existing duty rule, the court held that King elicited
the second promise only to relieve himself of a losing bargain and
thus did not come within the exception.73
King clearly illustrates the major thesis espoused in this
paper, that courts invoke the pre-existing duty rule rather than
being put in the position of placing an imprimatur of legality on
agreements extorted or coerced from one of the parties. At one
point in the opinion Chief Justice Start stated
where the refusal to perform and the promise to pay extra compensation are one transaction, and there are no exceptional circumstances
making it equitable that an increased compensation should be demanded and paid, no amount of astute reasoning can change the
plain fact that the party who refuses to perform, and thereby coerces
a promise from the other party to the contract to pay him an increased compensation for doing that which he is legally bound to do,
takes an unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other
party.7"
Id. at 488, 63 N.W. at 1107 (emphasis added).
Id. at 488-89, 63 N.W. at 1107, where the court says:
Do the allegations of fact contained in the plaintiff's [King's] first alleged
cause of action bring his case within the exception? Clearly not; for eliminating all conclusions, and considering only the facts alleged, there is nothing
to make the case exceptional, other than the general statement that the
season was so extraordinary that in order to do the stipulated work it would
expense. ...
require great and unusual ...
The fact that the court was denying King the benefits of the exception might well
have required that the court very clearly state the criteria to come within it in order that
the disappointed litigant fully understands the basis of the denial.
11 However, the court found for King on a separate count, on the ground that the
railway had broken the original contract by changing the proposed line to such an extent
that it caused delay which justified King in refusing to proceed with the work under the
first contract.
7' 61 Minn. at 486, 63 N.W. at 1106.
7
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The existence of new and unforeseen conditions, explained
Justice Start, rebuts the inference of extortion:
But where the party refusing to complete his contract does so by
reason of some unforeseen and substantial difficulties in the performance of the contract, which were not known or anticipated by
the parties when the contract was entered into, and which cast upon
him an additional burden not contemplated by the parties, and the
opposite party promises him extra pay or benefits if he will complete
his contract, and he so promises, the promise to pay is supported by
a valid consideration.In such a case the natural inference arising
from the transaction,if unmodified by any equitable considerations,
is rebutted . . ..

From this examination of King and its handling of the exception to the pre-existing duty rule, it is clear that the circumstances surrounding a denial of obligation under the original contract
will markedly influence the court's suspicions and, thus, its eventual determination about abusive dealing. Close scrutiny of the
original contract duty is vital to resolving the seemingly contradictory applications of the pre-existing duty rule and to establishing thereby the boundaries of the right to modify an executory
bilateral contract. This close scrutiny is required to determine the
reasonableness of the refusal to perform the original contract duty
by the party seeking the greater amount under the modification.
The reasonableness of that refusal to fulfill the original duty is a
crucial factor in any determination as to abusive dealing. Therefore, it is contended that the consideration for the second promise
is not the relevant issue; rather, the pertinent issue is the justification for refusing to perform the original duty. The degree of
justification for that refusal dictates the application of the preexisting duty rule. In this way, as has been stated, reconciliation
of the contradictory applications of the pre-existing duty rule
demands exploration beyond the superficial questions of contract
theory which surround the second contract. Only thorough assessment of the original contract relation will produce a sufficient
understanding of the second.
The Relationship of Restatement 76 and the Changed
Circumstances Exception to the Pre-ExistingDuty Rule
The Restatement of Contracts, section 76(a), provides that
a pre-existing duty that is neither doubtful nor subject to honest
and reasonable dispute is not sufficient consideration; and secB.

,1 Id. at 487, 63 N.W. at 1107 (emphasis added).
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tion 76(b) provides that the surrender of an invalid claim by one
who does not have an honest, reasonable belief in its possible
validity is not consideration. These two rules provide a legal
bridge for the changed circumstances exception to the preexisting duty rule. The change in circumstances raises doubt as
to the continued obligation to perform a pre-existing duty or creates an honest and reasonable belief that one party could use the
defense of impossibility. In the language of the Restatement, the
performance of the disputed duty or the surrender of a claim
honestly and reasonably believed to be valid is consideration for
the other party's altered obligation. Therefore, the changed circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule not only appeals to one's sense of justice and fairness, as Linz v. Schuck"
maintained, but also has a firm foundation in legal theory. 7
King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway,7 8 the case
which dramatized the reason for the exception, specified that the
changed or unforeseen circumstances which would constitute a
sufficient basis for an exception to the pre-existing duty rule need
not be of the same degree required for actual discharge by impossibility.7 9 This distinction between the requirements for an exception to the pre-existing duty rule and for discharge is explained
in an earlier opinion of the same court, Michaud v. McGregor. 0
Michaud was a contractor who had contracted to build a
store for McGregor on McGregor's lot in Duluth. While excavating for the purpose of putting in the foundation, Michaud discovered a large quantity of rocks on the land. The rocks had been
placed on the land by the city at an earlier date and had sunk
into the soft subsoil so that it was impossible to drive the pilings.
Neither party knew of the rocks at the time of entering into the
construction contract. McGregor maintained that removal of the
rocks was covered by the contract, but Michaud denied that as76 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907). See also Healy v. Brewster, 251 Cal. App. 2d 541,

59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967).
" 1 WILLISTON § 130 at 532 recognizes the relationship, but limits it to matters of
interpretation of the original contract.
61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
Id. at 488, 63 N.W. at 1107, where the court describing the changed circumstances
sufficient to permit an exception to the pre-existing duty rule, said:
They need not be such as would legally justify the party in his refusal to
perform his contract. . . or to justify a court of equity in relieving him from
the contract. ...
61 Minn. 198, 63 N.W. 479 (1895).
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sertion. The parties entered into an oral agreement calling for
McGregor to reimburse Michaud for the actual costs of removal
of the rock. After McGregor's refusal to reimburse, Michaud filed
suit to collect the costs of removing the rock.
McGregor pleaded that there was no consideration for the
promise to reimburse, adverting to the pre-existing contractual
duty to build the store. The court, Chief Justice Start again writing the opinion, discussed the pre-existing duty rule and abusive
dealing in passing. In this case, the court had applied the exception discussed in King and went deeper into the underlying legal
rationale. It articulated as the basis for upholding the modification the dispute caused by the unforeseen circumstances.
The court reasoned that the discovery of the rock was an
unforeseen circumstance. Each party maintained that the other
was responsible for removal and the contractor refused to proceed
unless reimbursed. This controversy was compromised by the
subsequent oral agreement by McGregor to pay the cost of removing the rock if Michaud would return to work. The court said:
"These facts disclose a valid consideration to support the contract. A bona fide controversy was settled." 81
The changed circumstances necessary to bring a case within
the exception to the pre-existing duty rule need not be such as to
form the basis for discharge; they need only be such as to create
a reasonable and honest belief that the original duty is discharged.
Another case demonstrating that the changed circumstances
exception to the pre-existing duty rule is well grounded in the law
surrounding settlement of disputes is United Steel Co. v. Casey. 2
There, Casey contracted to construct furnaces for the steel company at a set unit price. The agreement provided that any modifications had to be in writing. Subsequently the parties orally
agreed to a change in computing the cost, so that upon completion Casey claimed that it was entitled to an extra $100,000. The
court of appeals first disposed of the question of the oral modification on the basis of the jury's finding in favor of Casey, 3 and then
moved on to what it deemed the more important issue, United
Steel's claim that there was no consideration for the oral agreement.
"

13

Id. at 202, 63 N.W. at 480-81 (emphasis added).
262 F. 889 (6th Cir. 1920).
Id. at 890, 891.
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In its discussion of the consideration question, the court
pointed out that United had delayed the project by failing to
deliver plans, by making at least two changes in location, and by
misjudging the amount of excavation that would be necessary. As
a result of these errors on United's part, Casey was forced to do
the work in the winter when it was far more difficult. The court
found for Casey on the ground that the oral agreement settled
Casey's claims under the written agreement. They said:
In this case there is substantial evidence that the Steel Company
had so delayed, hindered, and embarrassed Casey Company in the
performance of its contract that it would at least have had a bona
fide claim for damages, regardless of the amount that it might have
recovered in a suit based on such a claim.
• . . If the Casey Company, after making this contract, had
brought action for damages occasioned by the delays incident to
change of location and failure of the Steel Company to furnish plans
it would have been met with the answer that any claims for damages
it may have had were waived and compensated by the provisions of
the new contract, regardless of whether it had, in terms, waived such
damages."

Thus, the pre-existing duty rule was overcome by a finding that
the consideration for the second contract-the modification-was
the surrender of a reasonable and honest claim arising out of the
first contract. The court specifically distinguished this case from
Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co.85 and similar holdings
which invoke the pre-existing duty rule against modifications by
saying:
In that case Lingenfelder, [sic] (Jungenfeld, the architect) at the
time the oral contract was made to pay him 5 per cent. on the
refrigerator plant as the condition of his complying with his contract
relating to other matters, had no claim for damages whatever
against the owner, nor was there any reasonable excuse for his refusal to perform work covered by that contract according to its
terms."

A similar result was achieved in a case where the dispute
arose as to the contractor's duty to repair or insure his work after
it had been completed but before the entire project had been
finished. In Baldwin Contracting Co. v. Buck Building Co.87 the
contractor was retained to install sewers in the defendant's proId. at 893.
103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
262 F. at 892 (emphasis added).
206 Cal. App. 2d 171, 23 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1962).
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ject. After the sewers were in and "accepted" by the defendant,
they were damaged by another contractor. The plaintiff refused
to repair his original work unless paid, and the defendant agreed
to pay. The plaintiff repaired the work, but the defendant refused
to pay. At the trial the defendant asserted that the plaintiff was
obligated by the original contract to repair the damage and further, that the plaintiff was obligated to insure his work until the
project was fully completed. Therefore, according to the defendant, the promise to pay for the repairs was unenforceable because it was not supported by consideration. The court specifically rejected the defendant's consideration arguments, finding
that there had been an honest dispute as to the plaintiff's obligation to insure. The court found that the second promise to pay
was in settlement of that dispute and so was supported by consideration.
This "settlement-of-a-dispute" analysis has also been used
to uphold agreements between spouses. Holsomback v.
Caldwell,88 a suit between the executors of a deceased couple, is
a good example. The husband and wife had separated, and the
wife was about to file for divorce. The husband promised her that
if she returned to him, he would leave her all his property when
he died. The husband predeceased the wife and did not leave his
property to her. Upon suit the husband's estate claimed that
there was no consideration for his promise because the wife had
been obligated to return to her husband because of the marriage
relationship. The court, however, found for the wife because she
had had grounds for divorce. They found that her return had been
in settlement of her valid claims against her husband and hence
had been consideration for his promise to leave her the property.
The case that conclusively demonstrates the relationship of
the theory of Restatement section 76 and the pre-existing duty
rule is Crown v. Cole.89 In that case, the court did not find a
reasonable and honest dispute and therefore invoked the preexisting duty rule to deny efficacy to the second contract. The
plaintiff had agreed to purchase the defendant's house. The price
was set, and the buyer made the initial payment of $1,500, which
was comprised of $1,000 in cash and a note for $500. After the
agreement was made, the plaintiff alleged another agreement to
the effect that the purchase by him of the seller's home was
218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962).
211 Pa. Super. 388, 236 A.2d 532 (1967).
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conditional on the plaintiff's ability to sell his own home. The
plaintiff alleged that the consideration for the modification was
the surrender of the legal right to withhold payment of the note
and to contest its validity. The court found that there was no
consideration for the modification and denied the plaintiff's suit
to recover the money paid, saying:
[T]he prinThis is an ingenious but unacceptable argument ....
ciple [is] that the promise for a forebearance from prosecuting a
lawful claim may be a sufficient consideration for an oral promise.
However, it does not support the principle that forebearance from
contesting a valid claim constitutes consideration. A contract cannot be based on a promise to do a thing to which a party is already
bound, except where the existence of the duty is subject to a reasonable dispute. .

.

. Forebearance to assert an invalid claim, or to

interpose an invalid defense to a valid claim, by one who does not
have an honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity is not
considered sufficient consideration."

It is also interesting to note that the opinion in Crown first
disposed of a question of fraud before it dealt with the consideration issue and invoked the pre-existing duty rule against the
plaintiff. Although the court specifically found that the seller was
not guilty of fraud, it was obviously concerned that the seller had
not dealt fairly. This concern is apparent in the court's addressing
the question of fraud even though the appellee-buyer had not
pursued the fraud issue on appeal."
C.

Increasing Frequency of the Exception

There has been increasing liberality in the application of the
doctrines of impossibility and frustration. 2 The application of
these doctrines, which attempt to accommodate within contractual relationships the effect of a change in circumstances outside
the relationship, will increase dramatically in an era in which
change itself has become perhaps the most important social
phenomenon.9 3 The impact of these doctrines has been profound
Id. at 392, 236 A.2d at 534.
However, the fraud theory is not pressed in this appeal. It is appellees'
present contention that the written contract was modified by a subsequent
oral agreement which made the sale of their property a condition to the
completion of the sale covered by the written agreement. A written agreement can be modified by a subsequent oral agreement provided the latter is
based upon a valid consideration and is proved by evidence which is clear,
precise and convincing.

Id.
"

6 CoRaiN

§ 1320.

" A. ToFFLER, Furtma SHOCK (1970).
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despite the fact they are comparatively new. 4 Not surprisingly,
there are serious disagreements among jurisdictions as to the effect of particular types of changes. Such lack of unanimity is
typical of developing theories, especially as their import spreads
into other areas of legal thinking.
One might expect the expanding liberality in the application
of the doctrines of impossibility and frustration to cause a reduction in the requirements for the changed circumstances exception and to create increasing reliance on the exception. Increased
liberality in application of the changed circumstances exception
would naturally result from the expansion of the doctrines of
impossibility and frustration because the changed circumstances
required for invoking the exception need not be of the degree
required for discharge. The change in circumstances need only
dispel the taint of abusive dealing and give rise to a reasonable
and honest dispute or give grounds for a reasonable belief that one
is discharged. The difference in legal impact is the difference
between the total discharge of a contract and the amendment of
it.
V.

THE MASSACHUSETTS VIEW

The pre-existing duty rule has not been a substantial barrier
to contract modification in Massachusetts because of an early
case which held that a party to a contract had an almost absolute
right to refuse to perform that contract and accept the consequences of that decision, i.e., a suit for damages. Massachusetts
had no problem with the rule because surrender of the "right" to
break the first contract was consideration for the second agree5
ment. In Monroe v. Perkins1
the plaintiff had promised to build
a hotel for the defendant for a certain sum. There were some
changes in the plans, and it was alleged that the defendants
promised to make good any extra costs the plaintiffs incurred.
The suit for the added amount met the defense of no consideration under the pre-existing duty rule. The court found for the
plaintiff, saying:
The parol promise, it is contended, was without consideration.
This depends entirely on the question, whether the first contract was
" The doctrine of impossibility is generally thought to have begun with Taylor v.
Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863), and that of frustration with Krell v. Henry,
[1903] 2 K.B. 740. It is not the purpose here to confirm or refute the significance of either
opinion; rather, it is to accept them simply as fairly recent developments in the millenium
of the common law era.
," 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 298 (1830). Compare Jack R. Allen & Co. v. Farris & Co., 372
S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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waived. The plaintiff having refused to perform that contract, as he
might do, subjecting himself to such damages as the other parties
might show they were entitled to recover, he afterward went on upon
the faith of the new promise and finished the work. This was a
sufficient consideration."

This thinking has not been limited exclusively to Massachusetts,97 although the courts of that jurisdiction have adhered to it
with the greatest devotion." The chief spokesman of this view of
the limited effectiveness of contract has been Mr. Justice
Holmes. In his Common Law he described the legal effect of
contract as follows:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that
the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does
not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break
his contract if he chooses."

Later, Holmes repeated this rather pejorative assessment of contract: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you may pay damages if you do not keep it-and
nothing else."'' '
This so-called right to break a contract was not well received
by theorists. Barbour disputed Holmes on three grounds.'0 ' First,
specific relief was as old, if not older, a remedy than an action
for damages. Secondly, medieval lawyers tended to think exclusively in terms of remedies, not rights. This tendency was especially prevalent in breach of contract because of assumpsit's tort
heritage where damages were exclusive. Barbour added that this
devotion to form might well have been nurtured by the competition between law and equity. Law courts promoted damages in
an attempt to keep the equitable contract remedies to a minimum and thus enlarge their own docket. Thirdly, and most significantly, the Holmes theory did not hold up under the scrutiny
"

26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 305.

'7

See, e.g., Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N.H. 358, 68 A. 325 (1907); Watkins & Son v. Carrig,

91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941). Other cases have discussed the theory, but courts have
found stronger bases for their decisions. See, e.g., Bishop v. Busse, 69 Ill. 403 (1873);

Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W.284 (1882).
" See, e.g., Simons v. American Dry Ginger Ale Co., 335 Mass. 521, 140 N.E.2d 649
(1967). But see Michael Chevrolet, Inc. v. Institutions for Say., 321 Mass. 215, 72 N.E.2d
514 (1947).

0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (1963).
'" Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAuv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
10' Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract, 16 MICH. L. REV. 106, 107-09 (1917),
in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS 500 (1931).
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of Barbour's Hohfeldian analysis. Barbour maintained that modern practice in both equity and law permitted enforcement in
kind through either specific performance or restitution. Therefore, he concluded, the primary right of a promisee is the right to
performance. Any other rights are secondary. The correlative to
a right is a duty; therefore, Barbour asserted, promisors have the
duty to perform. The ability not to perform and to suffer damages
is not a right, but rather a power.'02 He concluded:
It is submitted, therefore, that neither the history of the common law nor logic sustains the proposition that there is no legal
obligation to perform a contract or, conversely, that there is a right
10 3
to break a contract.

Others have joined Barbour in disputing Holmes and the socalled Massachusetts view.'"4 However, the most penetrating
analysis of the flaws of the "right to break a contract" theory is
contained in King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway,' 5
where the Minnesota court said about such an assertion of power:
In such a case the obvious inference is that the party so refusing to
perform his contract is seeking to take advantage of the necessities
of the other party to force from him a promise to pay a further sum
for that which he is already legally entitled to receive. Surely it
would be a travesty on justice to hold that the party so making the
,02In fairness to the Holmes' view of "the right to break a contract" it must be noted
that when taken to its full conclusion, this view will achieve as fair a resolution of the
underlying problems as the pre-existing duty rule analysis of this paper. Like the preexisting duty rule, the "right to break a contract" analysis if pursued to completion, also
denies the fruits of abusive dealing.
The Holmes' position in The Common Law was that there was a right to break a
contract subject to the payment of damages. If a party exercising "the right to break a
contract" is forced to answer in damages, abusive dealing is equally effectively stopped.
For instance, suppose A enters into a valid contract to construct a brewery for B for X
dollars. After performance begins, A exercises his "right to break a contract" and forces
B to promise to pay X plus Y dollars for the same brewery.
Under the pre-existing duty rule analysis of this paper, it is clear that A could not
enforce the promise of extra compensation because there was no consideration for it. Thus
B would have the brewery for X dollars.
Under the "right to break a contract" analysis, A could enforce the promise of extra
compensation (X plus Y dollars) because the first contract did not bind him; and therefore, his second performance was not the performance of a pre-existing duty. However,
A's "right to breach," according to Holmes, was subject to the payment of damages. B's
damages resulting from A's exercise of the "right to break the contract" would be Y dollars
(the difference between the cost of substituted performance-the second contract-and
the "rightfully" broken one). Thus, B would have, as justice demands, the brewery for X
dollars.
1*3

Barbour, supra note 101, 16 MIcH. L. REv. at 109, SELECTED READINGs at 503.

1o Beale, Notes on Consideration, 17 HARV. L. REv. 71, 80 (1903); Corbin, Does a PreExisting Duty Defeat Consideration?, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918); Williston, supra note 1.
105

61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1106 (1895).
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promise for extra pay was estopped from asserting that the promise
was without consideration. A party [the promisee] cannot lay the
foundation of an estoppel by his own wrong.'"

Thus, the flaw of the Massachusetts rule is that it begs the issue;
in doing so, it permits the exact injustice the pre-existing duty
rule is geared to prevent. Suffice it to say that even Massachusetts has recognized these weaknesses and has limited the doctrine. 07
VI. Two Techniques of Avoiding the Common Law
Pre-Existing Duty Rule
The facts of particular modifications have often presented
courts with an opportunity to escape altogether the perceived
boundaries of the pre-existing duty rule when they are assured
that a case involves no extortion or misdealing. Where appropriate, courts have found that the second contract actually called for
additional or different acts, and that the performance of the second contract was therefore not the performance of a pre-existing
duty. The other technique is to find a mutual rescission of the
original contract and a simultaneous entry into the second. The
first of these techniques, finding different or additional acts, is
often an accurate interpretation of the facts and therefore has a
sound legal basis."" The other technique is questionable because
too often it is not well grounded in the facts.
A.

Additional or Different Acts

In D. L. Godbey & Sons Construction Co. v. Deane'019 the
plaintiff agreed to do the cement work for the foundation and
retaining walls on the defendant's building. Their original contract called for the plaintiff to be paid at a rate of 76 cents per
cubic foot of cement as determined by the measurement of the
forms. Because of difficulties arising from such a computation
,0 Id. at 487, 63 N.W. at 1106, 1107.
101Bailey v. First Realty Co., 305 Mass. 306, 25 N.E.2d 712 (1940); Fienberg v.
Adelman, 260 Mass. 143, 156 N.E. 896 (1927); Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 22, 149 N.E.
618 (1925); Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911).
101According to RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 84 (1932) (emphasis added), consideration is not insufficient because of the fact
(c) that the party giving the consideration is then bound by a duty owed
to the promisor . . . to render some performance similar to that given or
promised, if the act or forbearance given or promised as consideration differs
in any way from what was previously due...
IN 39 Cal. 2d 429, 246 P.2d 946 (1952). See other construction cases finding different
acts, e.g., Smith v. Gray, 316 Ill. 488, 147 N.E. 459 (1925); Gannon v. Emtman, 66 Wash.
2d 755, 405 P.2d 254 (1965).
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and because the plans called for a good deal of cement to be
poured outside of the forms, the parties agreed to change the
method of computing payments due the plaintiff. Under the modification the plaintiff was to be paid 76 cents per cubic foot for
the cubic feet actually poured rather than as determined by measurement of the forms. After completion, the plaintiff filed suit
to recover under the terms of the modification.
The defendant pleaded that there was no consideration for
the modification. The court found consideration based on the
changes in performance. The changes in the method of computation created different rights and duties. Further, the plaintiff had
promised daily reports of cubic feet poured, and both parties were
relieved of the burden of measuring the forms.
A similar situation arose in Jenkins v. Watson- Wilson Transportation System, Inc., 1tO
where the plaintiff agreed to haul goods
in his own truck for the defendant. Somewhat later, a special
government project involving the hauling of dangerous materials
was undertaken by the defendant. The plaintiff's equipment was
inadequate for the dangerous work, so he agreed to use a special
trailer and do the work at a lower rate than called for by his
original contract with the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff
sued to collect as provided for by the original agreement. The
court found for the defendant because the trips on the dangerous
project were not within the original contract.
Another application of this technique appears in Greenfield
v. Millman."' Greenfield was an attorney representing a purchaser of Millman's hotel. As payment Millman agreed to take
notes secured by a purchase money mortgage. Further, Millman
orally agreed that if the third mortgage (his, it would appear) was
reduced to $15,000 and the first two mortgages were consolidated,
he would subordinate his mortgage to the others in order to facilitate refinancing of the first two. At a second meeting, Greenfield
offered a subordination agreement for Millman's signature. Millman refused, and Greenfield said he would personally guarantee
the payment if Millman signed. Millman did and sued on the
guaranty.
Greenfield contended there was no consideration for the
guaranty because Millman was already obligated to subordinate
110183

Neb. 634, 163 N.W.2d 123 (1968).
"1 111 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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his mortgage. The court, in finding that there was consideration
for Greenfield's second promise, pointed out that the second subordination agreement differed substantially from the first. The
second did not require the reduction of the third mortgage, nor
did it require the consolidation of the first two mortgages. Further, it permitted a substantial increase in the interest rates on
refinancing. Because of these substantial differences, the court
reasoned that the second promise to subordinate was not a promise to perform a pre-existing duty.
In Connersville Country Club v. F. N. Bunzendahl, Inc."' a
contractor sued to collect extra compensation because changes in
the plans upon which he had based his bid had greatly increased
the amount of work to be done. The defendant countered that the
plaintiff was not entitled to payment for its alleged extra work
because the original contract required plaintiff to build a golf
course; and, despite the changes, the plaintiff still had only built
a golf course (albeit a different one!). The court clearly stated the
rationale behind the additional work theory, but then mixed it
with the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to reach
a confused, but nonetheless just, conclusion. It said:
If we were to accept appellant's position and argument, the
appellant could theoretically be entitled to a golf course which could
run from Connersville to Indianapolis [in excess of 50 miles], and
at a price not to exceed the maximum stated in the contract. This
is an absurd deduction, but where do we draw the line? We do not
intend to state a hard and fast rule which can be applied in every
case, for each case has its special circumstances, but it is clear that
in this case where the appellant has made substantial deviations of
a nature which were unforeseen and unanticipated by the appellee;
and, also, where the magnitude of deviation does not normally arise
in such contracts, then we have no choice but to strike down the
maximum price provision [of the original contract]. To hold otherwise would not only be unjust, but also unconscionable, and such a
result, this court cannot countenance."'

B.

Mutual Rescission

A second major way that courts avoid the pre-existing duty
rule is by the mutual rescission technique. In a situation where
parties have entered into a contract and then subsequently modified it, altering the performance of one of the parties, a court may
conclude, without thorough analytical development, that the parties mutually rescinded the first contract and substituted the
140 Ind. App. 215, 222 N.E.2d 417 (1966).
Id. at 228, 222 N.E.2d at 426.
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second in its place. At the outset, this technique must be distinguished from the Massachusetts view. The Massachusetts view is
not a mutual rescission analysis; it is that one party had the right
to refuse to perform and suffer a suit for damages. Under the
Massachusetts view the consideration for the second contract is
the forbearance from the right to answer only in damages. Mutual
rescission, on the other hand, is a voluntary act of both parties;
the consideration is either the mutual releases or the second set
of obligations.
The best example of the mutual rescission technique is
Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch,Inc., ' which dealt with a modification of an employment contract. Schwartzreich, a talented
designer, contracted in writing to work for Bauman-Basch commencing in November of 1917 at a salary of $90 per week for a
period of 1 year. In October, Schwartzreich was offered more
money to work for someone else. He discussed the offer with
Bauman-Basch; and, as a result of the talk, a new written contract was drawn calling for a salary of $100 per week. At that time
Schwartzreich gave his copy of the first contract to Bauman, and
there was some testimony that the signatures were torn off the
first contract. Schwartzreich worked under the second agreement
until December, when he was fired.
Schwartzreich filed suit for damages because of the breach
of the second contract. The defense was that there was no consideration for the second contract because Schwartzreich had merely
promised to perform a pre-existing duty. The court found for
Schwartzreich by finding a mutual rescission and hence no preexisting duty. The rescission analysis has some merit in
Schwartzreich because the facts as to the handing back of the
original contract and the tearing off of the signatures provide
some evidence upon which to base a finding of mutual rescission.
Too often, however, cases resorting to the mutual rescission
analysis do not have quite so firm a footing in the facts. A good
example is Sasso v. K. G. & G. Realty & Construction Co.," 5
where the plaintiff was prevented from fulfilling a contract to
install tile in the defendant's building because of an unforeseen
scarcity of tile and a dramatic rise in its price."' The parties
114

231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
Conn. 571, 120 A. 158 (1923).

115 98

.. This appears to have been a perfect case for application of the unforeseen circumstances exception analysis based on problems arising from the entry into World War I.
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subsequently agreed that the defendant would reimburse the
plaintiff for the amount of the increased cost of tile. Confirming
this understanding, the defendant wrote the plaintiff:
"On February 10, 1920, you entered into a contract with our company. . . . You have been delayed in your work on account of the
scarcity of tile and in the meantime the price of materials has advanced. We are, therefore, willing in order to assist you in completing your contract, to agree to pay you the difference in the cost of
materials over and above the prices submitted in a schedule that
you sent us ... "117

In the suit by the plaintiff to enforce this modification, the defendant pleaded that there had been no consideration for it. The
court found the consideration question not to be material because
what actually had happened was an abandonment or rescission
of the original contract. The consideration for the defendant's
promise to pay the increased cost had been the plaintiff's promise
to do the work.
The difficulty with the decision is not the result, but the
finding of a mutual rescission. Upon what facts is the finding
based? Here, there was no handing back of the copies of the
original agreement nor any testimony about tearing off signatures, which had justified the finding in Schwartzreich. Further,
the defendant's letter specifically spoke in terms of completing
the contract, not of abandoning it as the court found.
Critics of the mutual rescission analysis have condemned it
because of its total disregard of reality."' Frequently there is not
even the slightest hint that the parties feel themselves totally
relieved from their contractual obligations. At no point do the
parties believe that either of them may abandon the contract with
impunity. The most incisive reprobation of the mutual rescission
analysis is contained in Comment b of section 89D of The Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
The same result called for by paragraph (a) [i.e., effective modification] is sometimes reached on the ground that the original contract
was "rescinded" by mutual agreement and that new promises were
then made which furnished consideration for each other. That
theory is rejected-here because it is fictitious when the "rescission"
and new agreement are simultaneous, and because if logically carHowever, the court did not touch on it, and it must be assumed that counsel did not offer
it. That the court was open to such analysis is demonstrated by its later opinion in
Blakeslee v. Board of Water Comm'rs., 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106 (1927).
98 Conn. at 574, 120 A. at 159 (emphasis added).
1,8
1A CORBIN § 186; 1 WILLISTON § 130A.
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ried out it might uphold unfair and inequitable modifications.1 9

In King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway 2° Justice
Start criticized cases using the mutual rescission doctrine: "The
doctrine in these cases as it is frequently applied does not commend itself either to our judgment or our sense of justice ... "2

VII.

RELIANCE ON THE MODIFICATION

Another way courts may avoid the pre-existing duty rule and
enforce contract modifications is by finding that a party has relied on an otherwise unenforceable modification. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 89D provides that reliance on a
modification makes that modification enforceable. Lord Denning
included reliance on a modification as the basis for its enforcement in his article, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of
Consideration.22 However novel such a theory may have been for
contemporary England, reliance as a basis for enforcement of
modifications was well established in American case law at a
much earlier time. Wadsworth v. Thompson,2 3 an early Illinois
case, clearly found that reliance by the promisee was consideration for a contract modification.
There, Thompson secured the repayment of a loan to him
from Wadsworth by delivering possession of certain items of personal property to Wadsworth. The parties understood that the
personal property was to be forfeited if Thompson failed to repay
at the due date of the loan. A short time prior to the time for
repayment, Thompson told Wadsworth that he would be unable
to repay on time and asked that the notes be renewed. Wadsworth
refused to renew the notes, but agreed to extend the time for
repayment by 3 weeks.
Prior to the expiration of the 3-week extension, Thompson
tendered the repayment. Wadsworth informed him that he was
willing to accept the money, but a part of the personal property
"I RESTATEMENT
1-7, 1973).

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 89D, comment b at 212 (Tent. Draft Nos.

11 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
21 Id. at 486, 63 N.W. at 1106.
"2 15 MODERN L. REV. 1 (1952). Contra, Bennson, Want of Consideration,16 MODERN
L. REV. 441 (1953).

'- 8 Ill. 423 (1846). See also, Beach v. Covillard, 4 Cal. 316 (1854); American Food
Co. v. Halstead, 165 Ind. 633, 76 N.E. 251 (1905); Pratt v. Morrow, 45 Mo. 404, 100 Am.
Dec. 381 (1870); Arbogast v. Mylius, 55 W. Va. 101, 46 S.E. 809 (1904). Contra, Fichter
v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753, 382 Ill.
91, 46 N.E.2d 921 (1943). However, the
reliance on the alleged modification was beneficial rather than detrimental.

1975
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had been sold at auction, and those items could not be returned.
Instead, Wadsworth offered to credit Thompson's account with
the money received from the sale. Thompson refused and sued
Wadsworth for trover and conversion of the goods sold.
On appeal, Wadsworth raised the question of consideration
for the extension. In finding for the plaintiff, Justice Koerner,
said:
Neither a court of Law, or a court of Chancery, can permit fraud or
circumvention to be perpetrated in this manner. I do not mean to
say that there was actually a fraud intended in this case, but the
failure to keep the promise had identically the same effect as if
wilful deceit and imposition had been practised. If the promise of
extension had not been made, it is [sic] is it not reasonable to
suppose that Thomson [sic] would have strained every nerve to
rescue goods, considered by him worth $1,000 [the loan was for
$305.00], from impending sacrifice? He had several days left to
make arrangements for the redemption of his property, but by the
act of the defendants he was lulled into a false and dangerous security. He suspended his efforts, and when he proposed paying the
money within the time, he had been told that his property would not
be considered as forfeited, he had found to his great surprise, that
part of it had already been disposed of under the auctioneer's hammer, and at great loss. We cannot now, in justice, admit of such a
defence as this: "True, we extended the time, and told you that he
[sic] (we) would not claim the goods as our own, but as you did not
pay us a cent, or hand over a pepper-corn, we were not bound by
our promise, and you must submit to the loss." Even if the promise
of the defendants had been wholly gratuitous, we would still hold
that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the extension of
2
time would be binding upon the defendants.' '

The detailed analysis of the facts, the recognition of the import
of those facts, and most significantly, the concern with Thompson's reactions to Wadsworth's promise to extend the time indicate that the court adopted the reliance theory as a means of
enforcing the modification. But Thompson is by no means an
125
atypical analysis.
124 8 Ill. at 430-31. Compare Wadsworth with Central London Property Trust Ltd. v.
High Trees House Ltd. [1956] 1 K.B. 130, where Lord Denning maintained that reliance
on a modification was a recent development in England. The changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception also could have been applied to the High Trees case. See also
Kelley v. R.F. Jones Co., 22 Cal. App. 113, 77 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1969); King Constr. Co. v.
W.M. Smith Elec. Co., 350 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); cf. De Blois v. Boylston &
Tremont Corp., 281 Mass. 498, 183 N.E. 823 (1933).
121See, e.g., Strahn v. Johnson, 197 Iowa 1324, 196 N.W. 731 (1924); Blaess v. Nichols
& Shepard Co., 115 Iowa 373, 88 N.W. 829 (1902); Maxwell v. Graves, 59 Iowa 613, 13
N.W. 758 (1882).
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In Carter Realty Co. v. Carlisle ' a purchaser of land gave
the seller notes for the land. The purchaser made part payment,
and the parties then agreed that he would reconvey the land to
the seller and take back the notes. Under the modified agreement
the seller was to keep the cash that had been paid by the purchaser and return only the notes. The purchaser reconveyed the
land, but the seller could not return the notes because he had
negotiated them to a bank. However, the seller assured the buyer
that the notes would be cancelled. The court described the purchaser's subsequent conduct in a way that made clear what the
decision had to be. It said, "[R]elying upon and depending upon
this agreement, [to return only the notes], [he] bought another
home at a great expense to himself and thereby placed himself
in a position where he had no need for the lot originally purchased
. . " 7 The court, of course, found for the purchaser and enforced the modification of the contract. In so doing, the court
cited Moses v. Woodward'8 as authority and fell in line with a
series of Florida cases. 1"9
The best indication of Florida's devotion to reliance as a
means of enforcement of modifications appears in a federal case
interpreting and applying the Florida rule. The case is Canada v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 130 in which the court infers the existence
of a modification upon which the company could rely. Canada
was an agent for the company. His employment contract specifically provided that he was entitled to compensation only during
the term of employment; he would receive no commission on
policies he had written during his employment which were renewed after he had left the company. The contract also required
written notice of termination. Canada was asked to resign, but
refused. He was then informed orally that he was fired. Thereafter, he conducted himself as if his employment had been terminated; i.e., he turned in his supplies, accepted termination pay,
and withdrew from the Allstate benefit programs.
The majority of the court found, based on the conduct of the
parties, that an oral modification of the employment contract had
128

113 Fla. 143, 151 So. 498 (1933).

Id. at 145, 151 So. at 499.
28 109 Fla. 348, 147 So. 690 (1933).
2 90 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1956); Harris v. Air Conditioning Corp., 76 So. 2d 877 (Fla.
1955); Tussing v. Smith, 125 Fla. 578, 171 So. 238 (1936).
1- 411 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1969).
"
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taken place, permitting oral notice of termination.' 3 ' Allstate relied on the modification by paying the commissions on the policy
renewals to Canada's successor, thus making the oral termination
under the modification enforceable.
Another case, St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Lewis, ,31 is both tragic and charming. It demonstrates that facts
which lend themselves to the enforcement of a modification on
the basis of reliance can also lend themselves to a finding of
consideration. Lewis owned a horse named Magnolia Dandy on
which he carried an insurance policy with the defendant. He sold
Magnolia Dandy and purchased Kaplan Twist. Lewis contacted
the defendant's local agent, complied with the company's demands for verification of the animal's health, and succeeded in
obtaining the company's assurance that the coverage had been
switched to the new horse. Soon thereafter, Kaplan Twist died.
Investigation disclosed that the animal's intestine had become
twisted on its spine, causing gas to back up into its stomach.
Eventually, the stomach burst; its contents clogged the lungs,
33
causing death.'
The insurance company defended against Lewis' claim by
contending there was no consideration for the change of coverage,3
i.e., the modification. On this issue the court found for Lewis.1 1
It observed that when Lewis cancelled the insurance on Magnolia
Dandy, a refund was due him under the policy. Foregoing his
right to that refund was sufficient consideration for the different
coverage. However, had it chosen to, the court could have reasoned that Lewis' foregoing his right to the refund and not seeking
alternative coverage was reliance on the company's assurance of
the change of coverage. Such reasoning would have been an exact
duplication 35 of the Illinois court's analysis in Wadsworth v.
Thompson.
"' The dissent disagreed that Canada's actions subsequent to oral notice could constitute assent to the modification. Rather, Judge Codbold argued that Canada's conduct
was as consistent with his obligation to mitigate and perfect his rights as it was with assent
to modification.
1312230 So. 2d 580 (Miss. 1970).
"I Those who are prone to disrespect the dead might observe that Kaplan Twist had
literally drowned in his own bile.
134The case was remanded to the trial court for a better determination of Kaplan
Twist's value.
'- 8 Ill. 423 (1846). For other examples of passive reliance in the belief that insurance
was in force, see Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 164 Miss. 693, 145
So. 623 (1933); Kukuska v. Home Mutual Hail Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W.
403 (1931).
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Thus, it is clear that reliance by the parties on a modification
of an executory bilateral contract can constitute the basis for the
legal efficacy of the modification. Such a use of the concept of
reliance overcomes some of the difficulties of the pre-existing
duty rule. However, one shortcoming of the reliance theory is that
it does not necessarily satisfy the need to demonstrate freedom
from misdealing. The extracted or extorted promise that concerned the court in Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co. 3 6 can
easily turn into extorted performance. Thus, although the reliance analysis may avoid the pre-existing duty rule, it may well
also lose the benefit of it.
VIII. MODIFICATION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
Partly in response to the apparent contradictions in the preexisting duty rule (especially as it has been aggravated by the
distaste for the Doctrine of Foakes v. Beer),' 7 and partly in response to the needs and business practices of fast-moving entrepreneurs, attempts have been made to remove consideration as a
requirement for effective modification.' 3 The leading example of
such an attempt is section 2-209(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code.3 9 Comment 1 states the purpose of the section:
[T]o protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which
at present hamper such adjustments. 0

The "technicalities" to which the comment refers must be the
pre-existing duty rule. Also note that Comment 1 limits itself to
"necessary" and "desirable" modification.
131 103

Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).

1379 App. Cas. 605 (1884). See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.

138See Gateway Co. v. Charlotte Theatres, Inc. 297 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961) (dictum);
Lunsford v. Wilson, 113 Ga. App. 602, 149 S.E.2d 515 (1966) (dictum); Andrews v. Wilkie,
181 Neb. 398, 148 N.W.2d 924 (1967).
'39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209. Subsection (2) of 2-209 permits a private
Statute of Frauds to be included in the original contract, thus limiting any modification
to a writing. This formal validation technique as an alternative to the informal one of
consideration is no doubt fundamental to the Code's approach to the problem of modification. See Comment 3 to 2-209. There is the distinct possibility that the parties may orally
waive the clause which requires a written modification and then modify the contract; see
C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 214 A.2d 620 (1965). Nonetheless, the formal validation technique, as opposed to the informal one, presents problems all its own, and does
not necessarily overcome the difficulties implicit in the pre-existing duty analysis. For an
excellent analysis of New York's difficulties with its formal modification device as a
substitute for a consideration analysis, see Comment, Modification of a Contract in New
York: Criteriafor Enforcement, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 173 (1967).
'" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 1.
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Some clarification of what is meant by "necessary" and
"desirable" is given in Comment 2, which states:
However, modifications made thereunder must meet the test of
good faith imposed by this Act. The effective use of bad faith to
escape performance on the original contract terms is barred, and the
extortion of a "modification" without legitimate commercial reason
is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. Nor can a mere
technical consideration support a modification made in bad faith.
The test of "good faith" between merchants or as against merchants includes "observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade . . ." and may in some situations require

an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. But
such matters as a market shift which makes performance come to
involve a loss may provide such a reason even though there is no
such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from
performance ....

"

When read with Comment 2, section 2-209(1) does not seem as
radical a departure from the common law requirement of consideration as it might appear to be from its words, "needs no consideration to be binding." On the contrary, read with Comment 2,
section 2-209(1) is quite in accord with what has been demonstrated in this article to be the common law approach to modifications through the pre-existing duty rule.
Clearly, Comment 2 states that 2-209(1) will not be used to
permit extortion, exactly the concern of the court in Lingenfelder
v. Wainwright Brewery Co. I Moreover, the comment falls in line
with this article's analysis of the pre-existing duty rule by pointing out that the existence of a legitimate commercial reason dispels any inference of extortion.'43 The similarity of 2-209(1) and
this analysis of the pre-existing duty rule is reinforced by the
statement in Comment 2 that the good faith test may in some
situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for the
modification.' And in noting that market shifts causing loss to
one party may be the basis of a modification even if the shifts are
insufficient to excuse performance under the Code's equivalent of
impossibility, Comment 2 is in total agreement with the point
made earlier that surrender of a reasonable and honest belief in
a claim to discharge from the first contract is consideration for a
45
second contract.
14 Id., Comment 2.
lZ

",
'"
",

103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891). See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
See text accompanying notes 76-90 supra.
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The similarity of this analysis of the pre-existing duty rule
and the approach of finding modifications enforceable without
consideration can also be seen in cases. In CarpenterPaper Co.
v. Kearney Hub Publishing Co., 4 ' a pre-Code case applying the
no-consideration rule subsequently enacted by 2-209(1), the validity of a modification of a contract to supply newsprint was
questioned. The modification consisted of an increased price to
which the buyer objected on the grounds of economic coercion.
The court invoked the rule that an executory contract may be
changed by a subsequent agreement which does not require any
new consideration. It went on, however, to report in detail the
relations between the parties and the state of the paper business.
The court satisfied itself that the seller's conduct was fair and
reasonable in the light of all that had transpired in the industry
over the years. Further, it found that the seller treated the buyer
in the same manner it had treated all its customers. In all, the
court found nothing reprehensible in the seller's conduct and was
satisfied that the seller had not been guilty of any misdealing.
Thus satisfied, the court, in keeping with 2-209, Comment 2, held
that no consideration was necessary for the modification. '47
Another case invoking the rule that consideration is unnecessary for modification also lends itself to the analysis of the preexisting duty rule set forth earlier. The case, citing 2-209(1) as its
basis, is Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc.' The plaintiff
sought the return of an airplane he had purchased from the defendants. Under their original contract, the plaintiff was to make 24
monthly payments of $200 each and a 25th payment of $353.34.
Before the due date of the first payment, the plane developed
engine trouble. It was discovered that the plane required a new
engine costing $1,400. The plaintiff could not afford to purchase
both the new engine and the airplane, so he offered to return the
plane to the seller. The defendant-seller decided that it would
alleviate the buyer's financial burden by reducing the first year's
163 Neb. 145, 78 N.W.2d 80 (1956).
Had the court been in a jurisdiction which required consideration for effective
modification and had the buyer then raised the pre-existing duty rule, the court could
have applied the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception. The original supply
contract had been made in 1942 and the modification in 1947. World War II could have
been found to have caused sufficient changes in market conditions to justify application
of the exception; see Blakeslee v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106
(1927).
"1 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
'"

"
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payments to $100 per month. After about 6 months, the defendant informed the plaintiff that $200 per month would be necessary. Eventually the defendant repossessed the plane, giving rise
to the suit for its return.
The defendant maintained that the alleged modification was
unenforceable because it lacked consideration. The court found
for the plaintiff on the basis of section 2-209(1). However, had the
Code not been in force, an identical result could have been
achieved under this article's analysis of the pre-existing duty
rule.
The defendant would have alleged that there had been no
consideration for the modification because the plaintiff, by promising to pay $100 per month, was merely promising to perform a
pre-existing duty in that the original contract already required
plaintiff to pay $200. The court could have found consideration
by means of the following analysis:
1. The faulty engine constituted a breach of the sales contract. At least it gave the plaintiff a reasonable and honest belief
in a claim for breach, or in his right to declare the contract at an
end;
2. The consideration for the reduced payment was the
plaintiff's forbearance from assertion of that claim.
Thus, both in the comments to 2-209(1) and in the outcome
of the cases, the pre-existing duty rule and the right to modification are opposite sides of the same coin. Any modification that
would be unenforceable because of the pre-existing duty rule
would also fall short of the Code tests of good faith and reasonable
commercial standard of fair dealing.
Section 89D of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflects the same attitude.'49 It places the modification of executory
contracts in the portion of the Restatement entitled, "Contracts
Without Consideration." However, the Restatement Second's
approach is slightly different from the Code's.
It requires for effective modifications without consideration,
that they be "fair and equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made."'' 0 Comment b following the section, directed at the pre-existing duty
aspect of modification, explains that the fair and equitable test
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

IId. at § 89D(a).

§ 89D (Tent. Draft No. 1-7, 1973).
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goes beyond the mere absence of coercion. It requires an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. The
Restatement view is thus consistent with the assertion in this
article that an understanding of the pre-existing duty rule requires investigation beyond the superficial contract questions
surrounding the making of the second contract. 5 ' It is also consistent with the assertion that the application of the pre-existing
duty rule is really determined by the justification for refusing to
perform the original contract.15
However, the second substantive implication of Comment b
to section 89D is not in such perfect accord with this analysis. It
maintains that "[t]he reason for modification must rest in circumstances not 'anticipated' as part of the context in which the
contract was made ... " 3 This would appear to limit avoidance of the pre-existing duty rule to the changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception. Such a limitation, if it is in fact intended, is somewhat restrictive in view of the other techniques for
avoiding the rule covered in this analysis. However, read together
with the "fair and equitable" requirement of the section itself,
there is no such limitation. This paper's analysis of the preexisting duty rule, therefore, remains essentially compatible with
the views of the drafters of the new Restatement who, to overcome
the burden of the pre-existing duty rule, eliminated consideration
as a requirement for modification.
It should be no surprise that the Restatement theory that
just modifications of executory contracts are effective without
consideration is in fundamental agreement with this paper's
analysis of the rule. This article has shown that the seemingly
inconsistent applications of the pre-existing duty rule result from
courts' using the rule to prevent abusive dealing. A rule doing
away with the requirement of consideration for modifications, but
requiring such modifications to meet standards of fairness, reasonableness, and freedom of assent, is in complete accord with
the traditional use of the pre-existing duty rule as articulated in
this analysis. To the extent that UCC 2-209(1) and Restatement
(Second) section 89D bring standards of fairness more to the analytical forefront in resolving the question of enforceability of modSee text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
See text accompanying notes 39-53 supra.
"5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D, Comment b at 211 (Tent. Draft No.
1-7, 1973).
151
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ifications than did the judicial reliance on the pre-existing duty
rule, these contemporary statements of the principles are a significant improvement. They are better because they make the criteria for enforcement patent, and thus serve to minimize confusion resulting from seemingly contradictory applications of the
pre-existing duty rule.

IX.

FACT PATTERNS WHICH DISPEL
DEALING

SUSPICIONS

OF ABUSIVE

When courts have satisfied themselves that there is an absence of abusive dealing, they have found a means of enforcing
the new agreement either by applying the changed circumstances
exception to the pre-existing duty rule or by avoiding the rule
entirely by employing one of the other techniques. An earlier
section surveyed cases where courts applied the pre-existing duty
rule to prevent abusive dealing.'54 Here will be surveyed various
kinds of fact patterns which induce courts not to apply the rule.
The cases illustrate the various ways courts escape the preexisting duty rule.
A.

Misperception of the Subject Matter

In numerous instances the parties to a contract have seriously misjudged the subject matter of their contract and then, on
the basis of that misjudgment, seriously miscalculated the work
to be done. In such cases courts have determined the validity of
the second contract which takes into account the changed conditions on the basis of one of the following: (1) consideration arising
from settlement of an honest dispute; (2) a significant change in
the work to be done, so that doing the additional work is not
performance of a pre-existing duty; or (3) allocation of the responsibility for the misjudgment. Most of the court opinions reflect,
to differing degrees, each of these techniques.
A case fully in accord with the analysis presented here is
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Farnsworth& Chambers Co.'55
The court discussed the changed circumstances exception and
used the "settlement-of-disputes analysis," but only as alternatives. It never mentioned the relationship of the doctrines. 5 ,
Pittsburgh agreed to test the concrete installed by Farn'

See text accompanying notes 54-65 supra.

155 251 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1958).
"

Id. at 79.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

sworth on the runways of an airport Farnsworth was constructing
as general contractor. Farnsworth estimated that the work would
take 7 months and agreed to pay Pittsburgh $24,450 for the testing during that time. However, the estimate of time was based
on Farnsworth's belief that 600,000 tons of dirt would have to be
moved. As it turned out twice that amount of dirt was moved, and
the construction was delayed accordingly. Pittsburgh refused to
honor the lump sum contract, the parties renegotiated, and a new
contract was created. When Farnsworth refused to honor the second contract, Pittsburgh sued to enforce it.
The court found consideration on either of two grounds.
First, the changed circumstances took the case outside the preexisting duty rule. And second, there was a valid dispute over the
original contract. The time limit in the original contract was 7
months; Pittsburgh's performance was clearly pushed beyond
that limit. Therefore, the second contract was viewed as a settlement of the valid time dispute arising from the original contract.
The court, while it chose the two theories of major concern to this
analysis, implicitly also expressed concern that the miscalculation of the dirt to be moved was entirely Farnsworth's responsibility; and, as a result, Pittsburgh was required to do more work
than had been contemplated by the original contract.'57 Pursuing
this reasoning, the court could have completely avoided the preexisting duty rule and found that the additional work actually
constituted a different duty.
A similar result obtained in a California case, Healy v.
Brewster,' where a subcontractor relied on earth core samples
taken and supplied by the county. The core samples were taken
in an unprofessional manner and failed to disclose a layer of
hardpan (a rocklike stratum) through which the contractor had
to bore. This required additional work and the defendant-general
contractor's representative authorized the subcontractor to go
ahead with the work. The defendant's representative also assured
him that he would be compensated for the extra expense by the
county. Upon failure of the general contractor to pay for the extra
efforts, the subcontractor brought suit. The defendant, among
ISCompare Pittsburgh Testing Lab. with Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21
A.2d 591 (1941), where the court gives the reader a choice between a mutual rescission
analysis or a gift analysis.
Im 251 Cal. App. 2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967). See also Bailey v. Breetwor, 206
Cal. App. 2d 287, 23 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1962); Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206
Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1955).
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other things, pleaded that there was no consideration for the
modification.
The court held that the subcontractor could recover for the
extra work and expenses on the basis that the county's core samples were misleading and constituted a breach of an implied warranty of their correctness. Further, the court found consideration
because the existence of the hardpan constituted a mutual mistake of fact sufficient to justify the subcontractor in seeking to
rescind the original contract. Therefore, pursuing the work for the
promise of additional compensation was simply forebearance by
the subcontractor from asserting a valid legal claim to discharge
and, as such, was consideration for the general contractor's subsequent promise.
The California court spelled out the relationship of: (1) the
pre-existing duty rule, (2) the changed circumstances exception
to it, and (3) the causal connection of a change in circumstances
to the creation and subsequent settlement of a valid legal dispute.
Lastly, the decision made clear the dependence of the efficacy of
a modification of an executory bilateral contract on those three
concepts.
Another case involving misjudgment is Grand Trunk R. Co.
v. H. W. Nelson Co. 5 ' In that case the defendant railroad misjudged the intentions of its neighbors. The plaintiff was retained
to construct some track for the railroad. Construction was delayed and the proposed route was changed twice because persons
in the vicinity of each of the first two routes threatened to enforce
negative easements against the property in order to keep the railroad out. The defendant promised to reimburse the plaintiff for
the extra expenses resulting from the delay, but later reneged on
that promise. The court enforced the promise of extra compensation on the basis that the extra work was a result of the changed
circumstances (i.e., the fact that enforcement of the easement
was threatened).
Typical of the "change in duty" analysis is Gannon v.
Emtman,6 0 where the plaintiff agreed to prepare the defendant's
land for irrigation farming for $6,000. The written contract contemplated leveling and grading. It further provided that if rock
removal became necessary, it would be done for $16.50 per hour.
159
116

F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1941).
1 66 Wash. 2d 755, 405 P.2d 254 (1965).
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After work began, rock removal became necessary and, additionally, a need arose to move fill from another area to the area from
which the rocks had been removed. The defendant orally agreed
to pay the $16.50 hourly rate for moving fill.
After the defendant failed to pay for moving the fill, the
plaintiff sued. The defendant asserted the pre-existing duty rule.
The court found consideration and decided the case in the plaintiff's favor. The court pointed out that the doing of an act neither
expressly nor implicitly part of the existing contract, nor
contemplated by that contract, falls outside the pre-existing duty
rule. The parties had never contemplated the need to move fill
from one area of the land to another. Therefore, moving it was not
performance of a pre-existing contractual duty.'
However, the court in Gannon recognized that the underlying concern was abusive dealing. It observed that when the need
to move fill arose, the parties had four alternatives. They could
have lowered the overall grade; they could have decided to borrow
dirt from the area being leveled; they could have decided to bring
fill from an adjacent area; or they could have determined to abandon the project. The court concluded its observation by finding
that the alternative selected was not unreasonable.
The court's allocation of responsibility for the misjudgment
or miscalculation can be seen in two cases. In Simpson Timber
Co. v. Palmberg Construction Co. I the court found that the contractor was not entitled to extra compensation simply because of
greater difficulty in meeting its contractual obligation. The court
was convinced that the contractor could have discovered the
greater difficulty by reasonable inspection. And in James A. Haggerty Lumber & Mill Work, Inc. v. Thompson Starrett Construction Co. 63 a buyer was not permitted to enforce the seller's subsequent promise to renegotiate on the basis of a claim by the buyer
that the orders (29 in number) had been hastily given without
attention to price.
B.

Unforeseen Natural Phenomena
Goebel v. Linn"4 is a classic example of the unforeseen cir-

''
See also Smith v. Gray, 316 Ill. 488, 147 N.E. 459 (1925); Baldwin's Steel Erection
Co. v. Champy Constr. Co., 353 Mass. 711, 234 N.E.2d 763 (1968).
192377 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1967).
183 22 App. Div. 2d 509, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1965).
164 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882). It is interesting to note that in Lingenfelder v.

Wainwright Brewery Co., 103 Mo. 578, 155 S.W. 844 (1891), Justice Gantt misconstrued
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cumstances exception where the unforeseen circumstances were
in natural phenomena. The plaintiff's assignor " ' entered into a
contract to supply ice to the defendant's brewery from November
1879 through December 1881. The amount of ice was to be dictated by the defendant's needs. The price was to be $1.75 per ton,
and in the event of a shortage during the 1880 season, the price
would be $2.00 per ton (in contemporary analysis, it would be said
that the ice company had assumed the risk of a mild winter
beyond any shortage driving the price above $2.00 per ton). Ice
was supplied under the contract until May of 1880, at which time
the defendants were notified by the ice company that no more ice
could be supplied under the contract because the exceedingly
mild winter had severely reduced the ice crop. Negotiations took
place seeking to reach an agreement at a higher price. The defendant was in a precarious position because, without an adequate
supply of ice, the brewing process could not continue and the
inventory and work in progress would be a total loss. The parties
finally agreed to a price of $3.50 per ton, and notes were issued
for this amount. All the notes were paid except the one in controversy. The defendant sought to assert the payments on previous
notes as a set off against the plaintiff's suit on the note in question, because, in the defendant's view, those payments of the
notes constituted overpayment on the original ice supply contract.
Goebel, confusing the concept of a duty to pay a sum certain with strictly executory
contractual duties. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra. In Lingenfelder Justice
Gantt stated:
It is true that as eminent a jurist as Judge Cooley, in Goebel v. Linn
• . . held that an ice company which had agreed to furnish a brewery with
all the ice they might need for their business from November 8, 1879 until
January 8, 1881, at $1.75 per ton, and afterwards, in May, 1880, declined to
deliver any more ice unless the brewery would give it $3 per ton, could
recover on a promissory note given for the increased price. Profound as is our
respect for the distinguished judge who delivered that opinion, we are still
of the opinion that his decision is not in accord with the almost universally
accepted doctrine, and is not convincing, and certainly so much of the opinion as held that the payment by a debtor of a part of the debt then due would
constitute a defense to a suit for the remainder is not the law of this state,
nor do we think of any other where the common law prevails.
Id. at 594, 155 S.W. at 848. Contrary to Justice Gantt's interpretation of Goebel, that case
is in basic agreement with the Lingenfelder analysis. Both cases illustrate the relationship
of the fear of abusive dealings and the enforcement of contract modifications. In
Lingenfelder the court found no reasonable basis for altering the original agreement. In
Goebel the court found the plaintiffs insistence on a higher price reasonable.
'" Although the subject of the litigation was a note, presumably a negotiable one, the
plaintiff was treated as an assignee rather than as a holder in due course, apparently
because the note was transferred to him after it had become due.
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The defendant alleged that there was no consideration for the
promise to pay the higher amount and that the promise had been
obtained by duress. The court disputed the defendant's consideration argument, finding that there was consideration in that ice
had in fact been supplied. The court framed the issue in terms of
the pre-existing duty rule when it summarized the defendant's
position: "What the defendants disputed is, the justice of compelling them to pay the sum stipulated in the note when according
to their previous contract they ought to have received the ice for
66
a sum much smaller."'
In finding for the ice company's assignee, the court reflected
the same concern with abusive dealing that Lingenfelder had:
If the ice company had the ability to perform their contract, but took
advantage of the circumstances to extort a higher price from the
necessities of the defendants, its conduct was reprehensible, and it
would perhaps have been in the interest of good morals if defendants
had temporarily submitted to the loss and brought suit against the
ice company on their contract. 7

However, in finding that the ice company's conduct was not in
fact reprehensible, the court found that the unusually mild winter
brought the case within what King v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Railway' later designated as the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception. The Michigan court described the effect
of the mild winter as follows:
Unexpected and extraordinary circumstances had rendered the contract worthless; and they must either make a new arrangement, or,
in insisting on holding the ice company to the existing contract, they
would ruin the ice company and thereby at the same time ruin
themselves. It would be very strange if under such a condition of
things the existing contract, which unexpected events had rendered
of no value, could stand in the way of a new arrangement, and
constitute a bar to any new contract which should provide for a price
that would enable both parties to safe their interests. 9

A U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Cook, 70 also
indicates the effect of unforeseen natural phenomena on the preexisting duty rule. In this case, the unforeseen phenomenon was
the San Francisco Earthquake. The plaintiff was the executor of
the estate of the architect for a federal building to be erected in
" 47 Mich. at 492, 11 N.W. at 285.
167

Id.
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61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895).
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47 Mich. at 493, 11 N.W. at 285-86.
257 U.S. 523 (1922).
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San Francisco. The architect's contract called for him to be paid
a fee of 5 percent of the actual cost of construction. The earthquake and fire delayed construction 3 years and drove the cost of
labor and materials to a premium. Congress authorized that the
contractor be reimbursed his additional costs and expenses
caused by the delay and increased prices. Under this congressional authorization the contractor was paid an additional
$101,907.66.
The architect's estate sued to recover 5 percent of the additional cost awarded to the contractor, some $5,095.38. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Claims' finding for the architect
on the ground that the congressional change of the original agreement was justified and that the increased costs were, therefore, a
valid part of the actual costs which formed the basis of the architect's fee.
Another case showing the influence of unforeseen natural
phenomena is Tussing v. Smith. 7 ' There a mortgagor renegotiated his loan with the mortgagee because 3 successive years of
violent storms had reduced the value of the land to far below the
amount of the mortgage. In the suit by the mortgagee to enforce
the terms of the original mortgage, the mortgagor argued the
modification. On the first hearing, the court found that the modification was not binding because of the pre-existing duty rule.
However, on rehearing, the court reappraised the situation and
enforced the oral modification of the mortgage. In its opinion on
rehearing 7 2 the court emphasized the effect of the 3 years of
storms and found consideration for the modification in making
extensive repairs to the premises.
C.

PoliticalActs

The leading case permitting the changed circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule to apply to political acts is
Blakeslee v. Board of Water Commissioners.713 It dealt with the
economic impact of World War I on a construction contract.
Blakeslee agreed to construct a dam for the City of Hartford
within 33 months. At the time of entering into the contract, both
1'125
172

Fla. 578, 171 So. 238 (1936).

Id.

"1 106 Conn. 642, 139 A. 106 (1927). Compare Blakeslee with Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., [1956] 1 K.B. 256, where the court used a
reliance theory, rather than the unforeseen circumstances exception. See note 124 infra.
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parties understood that great amounts of earth and rock would

have to be moved, which would require large quantities of high
explosives. Further, the parties understood that great amounts of
coal would be necessary to operate heavy equipment and that
much steel, concrete, and pipe would be required to complete the
job. Moreover, it was understood that much skilled and unskilled
labor would be employed. Shortly thereafter the United States
became involved in the war. The result of the national preparation for an eventual entry into the conflict was an extreme shortage of labor and materials. Additionally, embargoes on transportation prevented shipment of goods that were available. As a
practical matter, construction became impossible.
Consequently, Blakeslee and the defendant negotiated a second agreement. The defendant agreed to waive the original contract's liguidated damages clause if Blakeslee would proceed with
the construction. The defendant also promised to seek legislation
which would permit it to pay Blakeslee the additional costs resulting from the war's interference (such a bill was subsequently
passed, without the defendant's aid). The dam was eventually
completed, but at a cost of $159,000 more than had been agreed
to in the original contract. When the defendant refused to pay the
added amount, Blakeslee sued.
The defendant demurred to the complaint, asserting, among
other things, that there had been no consideration for the alleged
contract for increased compensation because the plaintiffs had,
"performed no services or furnished no material except those required under that contract [the original one]."'"4
The Connecticut court found that the plaintiff had indeed
stated a cause of action because consideration could be found.
The court specifically brought the case within the changed or
unforeseen circumstances exception, relying on King v. Duluth,
5

Missabe & Northern Railway.'1

Another example of the effect of war involved the Commodity Credit Corporation. Although Mid-State Products Co. v.
Commodity Credit Corp.7 6 takes a radically different analytical
approach to modification, it is in essence in accord with tradi1,4

106 Conn. at 647, 139 A. at 108.

61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895). Compare King with Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 725 (D.D.C. 1965); Commercial Car Line v. Anderson, 224 Ill. App. 187 (1922).
176 196 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1952).
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tional doctrine. At the urging of Commodity Credit the plaintiff
entered the egg powdering business. Commodity Credit agreed to
pay a fixed price for the eggs the plaintiff powdered. Subsequently, the price of eggs dropped dramatically so that Commodity Credit (a so-called federal corporation, i.e., the United States
government) was forced to subsidize the falling egg prices and, at
the same time, also pay the high fixed price to the plaintiff. The
defendant forced renegotiation and reduced the price paid to the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued for the difference in price, alleging it had
no choice but to go along with the defendant's demands for a
lower price because the defendant was its only customer. The
court found for the defendant, upholding the modification. However, the court avoided the consideration problem by saying no
new consideration was required for the modification. On the other
hand, the court revealed at least some allegiance to standard
doctrine when it cited the existing emergency wartime conditions
as justifying the forced renegotiation, because the defendant was
required to act in the public interest.
The point is that although the court articulated its holding
by saying no consideration was required for the modification, it
also could easily have reconciled its analysis with the traditional
doctrine of the pre-existing duty rule by means of the changed
circumstances exception. ,77
D.

Labor Strife

Some courts have found a strike or similar labor difficulty to
be a sufficient change in circumstances or unforeseen event to
come within the exception. An early such case was Guaranty Iron
& Steel Co. v. Leyden.'Ts The plaintiff agreed to do iron work for
the defendant's building. A strike occurred which delayed work
that had to be completed before the plaintiff could do his iron
work. When the plaintiff could finally commence work, costs were
considerably higher than had been anticipated so he slowed his
work on the defendant's building by diverting his energies to
later-acquired jobs which were profitable. The defendant promised to pay more for the completion of the work on his building if
the plaintiff would proceed without interruption.
' See also Stovall v. Williams, 100 Ariz. 1, 409 P.2d 711 (1966), where the government's economic influence as a major purchaser forced a contract modification which was
subsequently upheld in favor of an attaching creditor.
"1 235 Ill. App. 191 (1924), cert. denied, 236 Ill. App. 631 (1925).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

The plaintiff sued to collect the higher amount and was met
by the plea of no consideration (i.e., the pre-existing duty rule).
The court found for the plaintiff. It reasoned that the delay in the
plaintiff's starting work, caused by the strike, justified the plaintiffs withdrawal. Therefore, his going ahead with the work, despite a right to withdraw, constituted consideration for the defendant's promise.
A similar result was reached in Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co. 7 ' There, the plaintiff offered to construct radomes for the defendant at a cost of $14,000 for materials only or
for $25,500 if the plaintiff supplied labor as well as materials. The
defendant accepted the labor and material formula and a written
contract was drawn. Two days after the work began, the plaintiff's employees refused to cross a picket line at the job site.
According to the plaintiff, the parties orally modified their agreement by switching to the $14,000 contract for materials only.
In the plaintiffs suit to enforce the modification, the defendant asserted that there had been no consideration for the modification. The court found for the plaintiff, saying that a mutual
partial rescission of a bilateral executory contract is always supported by consideration in that each party forgoes its rights
against the other.
Another case recognizing the impact of labor difficulties, but
granting relief on grounds of mutual rescission rather than under
the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception was the subject of some severe criticism. 80 The case is Siebring Manufactur358 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
See Hudson, supra note 1. Referring to Siebring and other Iowa cases it is said that
[tihe Iowa court, at least in result, has considerably weakened, if not killed
the doctrine of consideration in cases involving the discharge or modification
of existing duties. It is suggested, however, that although there may be
agreement as to the justice of the result as individual cases referred to herein,
a proposition in some doubt, the bending of doctrines, the inconsistency and
lack of correlation and citation between cases where basically the same functional problem is presented, and the lack of specific articulation of the
court's policy reasons for reaching results in certain cases, makes it more
difficult for the practitioner or member of the public to predict what the
court will do with the case in the future.
Id. at 14. The impact of this criticism is tempered by the author's treatment of modification of a contract and discharge of a liquidated debt by the payment of a lesser amount
as interchangeable, concepts, or, to use his words, "basically the same functional problem." He thus indulges in the confusion alluded to in the introduction to this article.
Hudson correctly criticizes the circuitous reasoning of the rescission analysis at other
points in his work, but he could not be more inaccurate in his condemnation of the Iowa
court for pursuing individual justice over consistency. The Siebring case is just, well
174
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ing Co. v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co. "I There the plaintiff contracted to sell corn crib roofs to the defendant at prices of $60 per
roof or $44 per roof depending on the size. The plaintiff alleged
that 2 weeks later there was another contract between the parties,
raising the prices to $72 and $50 per roof. Between the two contracts a serious steel strike had developed, and the plaintiff was
forced to buy steel at black market prices. The plaintiff and defendant had discussed the new market situation, and it was asserted that the defendant agreed to pay the higher prices and pass
them along to its customers.
In the plaintiff's suit to collect the higher price, the defendant pleaded that there was no consideration for the second contract. The court found for the plaintiff, reasoning that there was
no need for new consideration where a former contract was merely
modified. The mutual releases of the old contract were sufficient
to bind each party to the new contract.'82
E.

Economic Fluctuation

The landmark case in finding drastically altered market conditions sufficient to bring a case within the changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule deals directly with a changed market and also comes close to dealing with
unforeseen circumstances of classic proportion. The case, Bishop
v. Busse, 13 deals with a contract entered into a few days after the
founded in doctrine (the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the preexisting duty rule, not the rescission analysis), and leads to a high degree of predictability.
This article hopes to demonstrate incidentally that justice, legality, and consistency
of decision need not be mutually exclusive goals. It is this writer's belief that quite the
contrary is more likely the case and that law and justice are twin concepts.
" 246 Iowa 923, 70 N.W.2d 149 (1955).
2 Compare Kovacich v. Metals Bank & Trust Co., 139 Mont., 449, 365 P.2d 639
(1961) and Siebring with Western Lithograph Co. v. Vanomar Producers, 185 Cal. 366,
197 P. 103 (1921), where increased cost of labor and materials did not relieve the promisor:
Whether the rule of these cases [referring to Michaud v. McGregor, 61 Minn.
198, 63 N.W. 479 (1895) and King v. Duluth M. & N. Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63
N.W. 1105 (1895)] be correct or not, it has no application to a case where
the increased costs of the contractor are due merely to fluctuations in the
market price of labor and materials. The risk of such fluctuation is a burden
which he necessarily contemplates and assumes when he makes the contract.
185 Cal. at 370-71, 197 P. at 105. To see how courts have dealt with remarkable cost
changes, compare Sasso v. K.G. & G. Realty & Constr. Co., 98 Conn. 571, 120 A. 158 (1923)
(rescission analysis); Frank C. Clemens Plumbing Co. v. H.C. Huber Constr. Co., 73 Ohio
L. Abs. 7, 136 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); San Gabriel Valley Ready-Mixt v.
Casillas, 142 Cal. App. 2d 137, 298 P.2d 76 (1956); and W.D. Miller Constr. Co. v. J.G.
Watts Constr. Co., 223 Ore. 504, 355 P.2d 215 (1960).
-- 69 Il. 403 (1873).
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great Chicago Fire of October 9, 1871. The contract was for the
construction of a house, and the price for each kind of work was
set out with specificity. After the work was under way, prices rose
sharply. The builder alleged a second contract in which the owner
promised to pay any additional amounts the rising market demanded. In the suit by the builder, the modified contract was
attacked as lacking consideration. The Illinois Supreme Court
found consideration. Its reasoning deserves a full report:
In this case, brick had risen from $15 in the wall to $22 or $23,
and labor and materials had also advanced in the same proportion.
And the evidence shows that if appellees had completed the building
at the prcies first agreed upon, they would have lost about $8,000;
that, on appellees failing to perform the contract, appellant could
have recovered the damages occasioned by the breach. But this he
may have considered of less advantage to him than the completion
of the building, and if so, that of itself would have been a sufficient
consideration to support the new agreement. It is held that one
promise is sufficient to support another, and that where a party will
derive a benefit from the performance of a contract, that is a consideration for a promise to pay for such benefit.
Again, the rise in the price of materials for building to so large
an extent was, no doubt, according to the law of demand and supply,
occasioned by the scarcity of buildings or a much larger demand
than the supply, and if so, rents must have been enhanced to an
extent equal to the rise in labor and materials. And if this was true,
then we could see a strong inducement to change the contract rather
than not have the building erected. If he had not agreed to the
change, he was notified that appellees would not erect the building,
and he would have been left to his legal remedy for the recovery of
damages for the breach of contract, and he would have been deprived of the profits derived from enhanced rents, if there were such.
But whether there were such increased rents or not, the mutual
promises formed a sufficient consideration to support the new contract. 1

Clearly, the court was motivated by the changed market conditions. The court neatly argued the consideration question. Notice, however, the court's concern with the owner's inducement
to enter into the second contract. It is this concern that the second contract was freely given that brings Bishop in line with the
other cases and again demonstrates the true thrust of the preexisting duty rule as a weapon against abusive dealing.
A second case, Barr v. Snyder,"5 shows a slightly different
facet of the pre-existing duty rule's relationship with the concept
Id. at 407-08.
18

294 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1956).
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of fair dealing. Barr agreed to purchase an apartment building
and some furniture located therein from Snyder. Soon after, the
parties amended their agreement to permit Snyder to sell some
of the furniture independently. He sold it and at the closing credited the buyer, Barr, with the proceeds of the sale. However, Barr
refused to accept the closing statement, allegedly because the
furniture had been sold for less than full value. Instead, Barr filed
suit for conversion of the money and note that had been placed
in escrow as provided in the original contract.
As the conversion suit made its way through the courts, the
value of the building increased greatly. And almost 5 years after
the date of the contract, the buyer, Barr, was permitted to file an
amended petition abandoning her conversion claim and seeking
specific performance instead.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a lower court's denial of specific performance to Mrs. Barr on the merits of the
claim. It found that she was not entitled to specific performance
because she herself had refused to honor the amended contract.
The court specifically withheld its opinion on the propriety of the
plaintiff's amending her suit after having pursued it so long on
6
the conversion theory. 1
The court found consideration for the modification in that
the obligations of both parties had been affected. In effect, the
court used the mutual rescission analysis. However, one cannot
help but notice the court's concern with the relationship between
the sharp increase in the value of the building and the plaintiff's
decision to amend the cause of action so she could keep the now
valuable building. The court seemed to choose the mutual rescission analysis as a convenient means of enforcing the second contract, and preventing the plaintiff from profiting from her own
intransigence.
Another case opting for the rescission analysis also demonstrates that the exigencies of a free market economy will influence
the application of the pre-existing duty rule. The case is Williams
v. Cassidy,5 7 and it deals with the sale of real estate by contract.
In October of 1928, the defendant agreed to sell land to the plaintiff for $1,600, payable at the rate of $20 down and $20 per month.
I' at 11.
Id.
237 Iowa 1042, 23 N.W.2d 423 (1946). For the influence of the Great Depression of
1929, see Ewing v. Benson, 281 N.W. 197 (Iowa 1938).
's
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The plaintiff took possession and paid $676 by March, 1933. At
that time the parties entered into a second agreement which
called for the plaintiff to pay, in addition to the $676 already
paid, only $500 more at the reduced rate of $5 down and $5 per
month. The plaintiff adhered to the terms of the second contract
and fulfilled them. After this full performance, the plaintiff sued
to force the defendant to execute a deed.
The defendant alleged that there was no consideration for the
second contract because of the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed a decree in favor of the plaintiff. It
is clear that economic conditions entered into the court's analysis. The court, at the threshold of its opinion, took judicial notice
of the depression and the resulting diminution of real estate values. The court showed how the depressed economic conditions
directed its analysis and at the same time fell in line with the
concern in Lingenfelder with freedom from abusive dealing, when
it said:
There is no evidence on either side as to what the value of the home
was in 1933 but even a superficial recognition of the conditions then
existing persuades us to the view that there may have been
impelling reasons on both sides for the supplemental contract
Is"

Thus again, the relationship of the changed or unforeseen
circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule is observed
in its function of assuring a court that the second agreement was
freely given-at least to the extent that the promisor was compelled by market realities rather than the promisee's abusive tactics.
A leading opinion taking the position that economic change
cannot justify avoiding the pre-existing duty deals with the enforceability of an agreement to reduce rent.'8 9 The case, Levine v.
Blumenthal, 0 adheres to the conventional view of contract in a
"1237 Iowa at 1048, 23 N.W.2d at 427 (emphasis added). Contra, Westland Constr.
Co. v. Chris Berg, Inc., 35 Wash. 2d 824, 215 P.2d 683 (1950).
"I The duty to pay rent is more akin to the duty to pay a sum certain than it is to
the typical executory bilateral contract, which is the major concern of this analysis. This
is especially true in view of the traditional treatment of lease provisions as independent.
The case is included here not to perpetuate the confusion of the concepts consistently
decried. Rather, it is used because it succinctly and clearly states its position. For analysis
consistent with the analysis of executory bilateral contract duties in a lease situation, see
Priddie v. Goudchaux, 112 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Liebreich v. Tyler State
Bank & Trust Co., 100 S.W. 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
-1- 117 N.J.L. 23, 186 A. 457 (1936), aff'd 117 N.J.L. 426, 189 A. 54 (1937).
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free market economy. It cites earlier cases enforcing modifications responding to economic crises, but disagrees with those decisions. However, the disagreement is patently a matter of policy.
The landlord's position was that the agreement to reduce rent was
unenforceable for lack of consideration. The court found for the
landlord, saying:
They [referring to cases applying the changed circumstances exception to such facts] exhibit the modern tendency, especially in the
matter of rent reductions, to depart from the strictness of the basic
common-law rule and give effect to what has been termed a "reasonable" modification of the primary contract.
So tested, the secondary agreement at issue is not supported by
a valid consideration; and it therefore created no legal obligation.
General economic adversity, however disastrous it may be in its
individual consequences, is never a warrant for judicial abrogation
of this primary principle of the law of contracts.''

Even if one takes the view that courts should not use contract
law to make economic policy, one must recognize that such judicial regulation occurs. Here, the changed or unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule became the vehicle
by which courts could express their beliefs as to the proper distribution of the impact of the depression. Courts believing the
promisor should bear the risk applied the pre-existing duty rule;
courts believing the opposite applied the exception.
The point is, again, that inquiry beyond the questions of
contract theory into the facts surrounding the second contract is
necessary to determine the legality of a modification. Such inquiry reveals that changed or unforeseen circumstances affecting
the performance of the original contract can control the applicability of the pre-existing duty rule and thus eventually determine
the enforceabiltiy of a modification of the original contract.
CONCLUSION

It is worth observing that even the most obscure technical
legal theory is bottomed on principles of fairness and justice. The
primary objective of this analysis has been to resolve the apparently inconsistent applications of the pre-existing duty rule. The
seemingly contradictory decisions are resolved with the discovery
that courts use the pre-existing duty rule to prevent abusive dealing. Few courts reveal their true purpose in invoking the rule to
deny enforcement of a particular agreement. And thus, the pre"' 117 N.J.L. at 29, 186 A. at 459 (citations omitted).
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existing duty rule has been misunderstood and undeservedly condemned. This disapproval culminated in UCC 2-209(1) and The
Restatement (Second) section 89D dispensing with the requirement of consideration for modifications. The drafter's comments
to both these, works make clear that the changes permitting modification without consideration are to overcome the pre-existing
duty rule.'
Without question, this particular reform fostered by the
Code and Restatement is valuable. It serves to bring the law into
conformity with what is deemed good contemporary commercial
practice. Further, the language of the section 89D and the comments to 2-209 indicate that questions of fair dealing are the
primary criteria of modification. The reforms, however, do not go
far enough. More exact language in the Code and Restatement
could have clarified the pre-existing duty rule, and with it, the
general doctrine of consideration. Such explicit redrafting would
have served the commercial world as well. Entrepreneurs would
have been given clearer guidelines by which to conduct their dealings. Instead, the drafters chose to avoid the problems and accomplish their goal by eliminating consideration as a requirement
for enforceable modifications. In this regard they have repeated
the errors of the past.
Whether or not additional revisions are undertaken is of secondary concern. What is important is that the pre-existing duty
rule and the right to modify executory contracts be understood.
These fellow concepts may be better understood if the rules are
stated:
Performance of, or a promise to perform an existing
contractual duty is consideration for a promise of extra
compensation for its performance if:
1) there was no abusive dealing in eliciting the
promise of extra compensation;
(2) the promisee of the promise of extra compensation relied on the promise. Changed or unforeseen circumstances discovered or arising after formation of the
original contract and which make the performance of
the duty under the original contract subject to a reasonable doubt, rebut any natural inference of abusive dealing which surrounds the promise of extra compensation.
192

CODE § 2-209, Comment 1; RESTATEMENT
comment a at 211 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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INTRODUCTION

Noncompetition covenants are agreements whereby one
party, the covenantor, agrees not to compete with another party,
the covenantee, in a particular line of business for a specified
period of time and in a specified area.' A noncompetition agreement is a restraint of trade which is normally illegal both at
common law and under state and federal antitrust statutes.'
However, limited noncompetition covenants are sometimes lawful if they are ancillary to an otherwise legitimate agreement.
Thus, a noncompetition covenant by an employee not to compete
with his employer or by a seller of a business not to compete with
the buyer may be enforceable.' The common law rule in Colorado
is that a reasonable noncompetition agreement will be enforced
if it is necessary for the protection of the covenantee, imposes no
undue hardship on the covenantor, and does not injure the general public.' However, the tendency in this state has been simply
*Associate, Seawell, Cohen & Sachs, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1963, Harvard University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1967, North
Texas State University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
6A A. CoRnIN, CORIN ON CONTRACT §§ 1385-95 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN];
14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CONTRACTS §§ 1637-44 (3d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]. Restrictive covenants are especially useful in businesses
where trade secrets or customer goodwill are important. See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§ 3.02 (12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1974). See generally WILLISTON §§ 1640-41; Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Blake]; Wetzell, Employment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements, 1969 U. ILL.
L. FORuM 61.
See CORBIN §§ 1387-1403; WILLISTON §§ 1645A-64B.
WILLSTON § 1641. See generally Blake at 646-87.
For cases which interpret Colorado common law on covenants not to compete, see
Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v.
Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972); Jim
Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970); Zeff,
Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Knoebel Mercantile
Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968); Fuller v. Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d
18 (1966); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961);
Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550,
232 P.2d 184 (1951); Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948); Whittenberg
v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943); Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108
Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932
(1929); Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co., 81 Colo. 254, 254 P. 990 (1927); Gadf v.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

to enforce such agreements in accordance with their express
terms, with little attention paid to the balancing requirements of
the rule.5 This judicial tendency has caused concern, particularly
for the rights of employees who are often required to execute
potentially harsh covenants as a condition to employment.' Consequently, the Colorado Legislature in 1973 amended Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 8-2-113 (1973), to void all covenants which limit
future employment except those related to the sale of a business,
the protection of trade secrets, the recovery of training expenses,
or the restraint of certain key personnel.7
Although a number of other states have attempted statutory
reform in this area, the recent Colorado statutory amendment is
of particular interest because it seeks to eliminate only a narrowly
defined class of covenants without disturbing the common law
rules applicable to most noncompetition covenants.' This article
evaluates the statute by reviewing the general background of the
law of restrictive covenants, the development of the common law
in Colorado, the nature of the statutory amendment recently enacted, and current problems and prospects in light of the new
statute.
I. BACKGROUND
Agreements not to compete have been known to the common
law for more than 500 years.' The first recorded use of noncompeWeitzman, 72 Colo. 136, 209 P. 809 (1922); Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432,
131 P. 430 (1913); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909); Colorado Urological Assocs., P.C. v. Grossman, 529 P.2d 625 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Taff v. Brayman, 518
P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972); Short v. Fahrney, 502 P.2d 982 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo.
App. 95, 491 P.2d 87 (1971); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Kappers, 488 P.2d 96
(Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd., 473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Jewel
Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719 (1915).
5 See, e.g., Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d
216 (1970); Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969);
Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943).
1 Hearings on H.B. No. 1215 Before the ColoradoHouse JudiciaryComm., 49th Gen.
Assembly, 1st Sess., Mar. 15, 1973, Channel E, Tape Top Meter 14-46-24; Hearings on
H.B. No. 1215 Before the Colorado Senate Judiciary Comm., 49th Gen. Assembly, 1st
Sess., May 6, 1973, Channel B/C, Tape Top Meter 12-55-42.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973). For complete statutory language, see text
accompanying note 108 infra.
I See notes 110-15 infra for a list of states which have enacted legislation on covenants
not to compete.
I Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414) is the first reported case
involving a noncompetition agreement.
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tition covenants was by master craftsmen who attempted unsuccessfully to enforce agreements which prevented their apprentices
from entering into post-employment competition.' 0 Later, similar
restrictive covenants were utilized in connection with other commercial agreements, such as leases," sales agreements," and franchises.'
Although in some early cases liquidated damages were established by requiring the covenantor to post a bond forfeitable upon
breach'4 (and some modern courts still award damages in unusual
circumstances),'" today the usual remedy is the entry of an appropriate injunction against the covenantor in accordance with the
terms of the covenant.'" Equitable rules therefore govern most
restrictive agreement cases, and the successful plaintiff must establish the necessary grounds for the issuance of an injunction."
It has been said that the common law viewed restrictive covenants with disfavor and therefore refused to enforce them.' 8 Although this statement may not be completely true,'9 it does correctly represent the reluctance of most courts to grant injunctive
relief which may severely restrict the economic freedom of the
covenantor and deprive the public of the benefits of competition.",
On the other hand, courts have long recognized that equity
may require the enforcement of limited restrictions on the facts
of a particular case. This is true, for instance, when an established business or professional practice is sold and the seller cove10 Blake at 632. The authors have relied heavily on Professor Blake's excellent study
in preparing this background section.
* See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
* See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4 (1964) and Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956) for
modem cases.
13 Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 746 (1973).
I,Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
'5 See cases cited note 81 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 91-100 infra for a discussion of the doctrine of partial
enforcement, whereby an injunction in terms less broad than those of the covenant may
be granted.
J See CoaIN §§ 1380, 1390; WILUSTON §§ 1630A, 1635-36, 1649B.
IS See Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
" Blake at 632-37.
20 There are strong public policies against any kind of restriction on competition.
Such covenants are distasteful to Anglo-American law as restraints on the freedom of
covenantors and as infringements on the public interest in economic competition. Any
kind of restrictive agreement is probably void except to the extent it is ancillary to a
legitimate agreement such as an employment contract or contract of sale. WILUSTON §
1635. See also Wetzell, supra note 1.
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nants not to compete with the buyer. One of the principal assets
purchased in such a transaction is the established goodwill of the
business, which is often little more than the seller's personal reputation and relationships with customers. If the seller is free to
violate the n*oncompetition agreement he can, in effect, virtually
render valueless the property rights which he has sold.'
Restrictive covenants in employment agreements may also
serve very valid purposes. For example, an employee might have
access to confidential information which does not merit trade
secret protection but which, nonetheless, could be used effectively and unfairly to compete with the employer.2 Additionally,
the employer may have made a substantial investment in the
employee's training, which he should not be permitted to use in
competition with the employer. 23 The customer relationships and
reputation which an employee develops are business assets, and
it is at least arguably unfair for the employee to divert such assets
to his own use by entering into a competitive business.24 Finally,
there is perhaps an underlying concept that if the employee deliberately and disloyally schemes to set up his own business while
being paid by the employer, equity ought to permit some reasonable restraint on his activities.
In wrestling with these considerations, the early English
courts differentiated between general and particular restraints,
holding that a restraint extending throughout the entire kingdom
was always void but that a more limited restraint might be enforceable under the proper circumstances.25 This rule was later
See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
A common law action for unfair competition may exist regardless of the existence
of a contractual restriction. Therefore, an ex-employee is always subject to legal action if
he unfairly entices other employees to resign, interferes with the former employer's contractual relations, or utilizes his trade secrets. However, as a practical matter it is often
difficult to prove an unfair competition case, and of course the procedure is less certain
of success than a simple action on a restrictive covenant. See, e.g., Suburban Gas of Grand
Junction, Inc. v. Bockelman, 157 Colo. 78, 401 P.2d 268 (1965). With respect to use of
customer lists, see generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969).
11 Both the Louisiana and Colorado statutes applicable to restrictive agreements
permit covenants in connection with the employment of individuals who have received
the benefit of training or education from their employers. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2113(2)(c) (1973); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964).
24 Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951) (the court, in
upholding an injunction pursuant to a restrictive covenant, pointed out that since the
employee had been paid to develop clientele for the employer, he should not be permitted
to divert customer goodwill for his personal benefit); CoRmN § 1394.
" See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), which cited earlier
cases for support.
"

NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS IN COLORADO

refined to apply to "reasonable" restraints, permitting covenants
which extended far enough to protect the covenantee but not so
far as to injure the general public. This rule was stated as follows
in Homer v. Graves:"5
[Wie do not see how a better test can be applied to the question
whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint
is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party
in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the
necessary protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it
can only be oppressive; and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law,
unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is
void, on the grounds of public policy."

Most American cases and later English cases added one more
factor to the rule of Horner v. Graves, the necessity of weighing
the hardship on the covenantor against the benefit to the covenantee.2 8 Accordingly, the majority rule in both the United States
and the United Kingdom today is reasonableness, which is determined by balancing, on the facts of each case, the following interests: (1) the legitimate needs of the covenantee for protection; (2)
the interest of society in preventing monopolies or other excessive
restrictions on competition; and (3) the burden placed on the
covenantor. 9
Because the modern rule is difficult to apply evenhandedly
on the facts of individual cases, a vast amount of litigation has
arisen in this area2 The courts have been particularly troubled
by the difficulty of applying the rule with respect to employment
contracts or other situations in which the parties have greatly
disproportionate bargaining positions. At least in the employment contract context it often appears that the covenantor has
little choice but to sign the restrictive agreement and often receives no clearly identifiable consideration in exchange. ' , An additional problem arises when the covenantor is uncertain whether
26

131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).

Id. at 287.
See, e.g., Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N.J. Eq. 184, 7 A. 37 (1886); Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887); Herreshoff v. Boutinea, 17 R.I. 3, 19 A.
712 (1890); Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] A.C. 688; Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724.
See RESTATEMENT OF CoNrC s § 515 (1932).
See, e.g., annotations cited in notes 12, 13 supra.
" For example, covenants have sometimes been enforced against employees where
they were entered into after the employment contract so that employment was clearly not
consideration for the covenant. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973).
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the covenant is reasonable and lacks the courage or the resources
to engage in a legal battle over its validity. Consequently, even
those covenants which are never the subject of legal dispute may
have a severe dampening effect, both on the individual covenantor's freedom and on the public interest in competition.32
As a result of these problems, a number of states have taken
legislative action to declare certain kinds of covenants void or
illegal.33 The statutes in this area usually declare restrictive covenants void with certain specified exceptions. Those within the
exempted classifications, such as covenants in consideration of
the purchase of a business, remain subject to the judicial rules of
reasonableness.
This type of drastic legislative action has not been widely
adopted, and some states, having passed such statutes, have subsequently modified them to permit restrictive covenants in at
least some types of employment agreements. 4 This reluctance to
prohibit all restrictive covenants ancillary to employment contracts presumably results from a recognition that at least some
of these covenants are reasonable and desirable.
The recent amendment to the Colorado statutes" represents
a different legislative approach to the problem of noncompetition
agreements. The Colorado law voids only those covenants which
restrict future employment, thereby permitting restrictions on a
covenantor's right to set up his own competitive business. The
statute further expressly exempts covenants, including those affecting subsequent employment, where the covenant is related to
the purchase and sale of a business, the protection of trade secrets, the recovery of training expenses by an employer, or the
employment of certain key personnel. Accordingly, the Colorado
32 These considerations have led some courts and commentators to conclude that

noncompetition agreements ancillary to employment contracts should be governed by
different rules than covenants ancillary to, for example, purchase agreements. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535; WELISTON at §
1643. However, it would seem more precise to formulate the distinction in terms of the
relative bargaining powers of the parties and the presence of adequate consideration,
which may be problems more apt to occur in an employment context but which will not
be characteristic of every employment contract and which may occur occasionally in other
types of agreements.
13 See text accompanying notes 110-15 infra for a discussion of various statutes.
14 Id. Alabama. and Louisiana have both amended statutes to permit at least partial
enforcement of employment contract covenants. ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 22-24 (1959). LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964).
'5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973), quoted in text accompanying note 108.
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statute is of interest as a legislative effort to distinguish between
a narrowly defined class of covenants which are declared void and
all others which continue to be governed by the common law test
of reasonableness. In order to evaluate the Colorado statute it is
necessary to examine the common law framework against which
it was enacted.
II.

A.

COLORADO COMMON LAW

Establishing the Rule

1. The Early Cases
The first case considered by a Colorado appellate court involving a noncompetition agreement was Freudenthalv. Espey.3 6
In that case, the plaintiff, a well-established physician in Trinidad, hired a young doctor under an employment agreement which
provided that upon termination of his employment the employee
would not engage in "'the practice of medicine, surgery or obstetrics, or the branches of either in the City of Trinidad . . . for the
full period of five years.' -3 The younger doctor subsequently
terminated his employment and soon thereafter started a competitive medical practice in the Trinidad area.
In a thorough review of the applicable precedents and policy
considerations, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that restrictive covenants had been viewed with disfavor at common law, but
that the modern trend was to uphold such covenants provided
that they were "reasonable." The court approvingly quoted
Horner v. Graves38 in what came to be viewed as the rule of
Freudenthal: a covenant will be enforced if it is necessary to
protect the covenantee and does not interfere with the interests
of the public." Considering the public interest in encouraging a
successful medical practitioner to train and assist a younger doctor, the court determined that the covenant was reasonable and
should be enforced. The opinion concluded with an unusually
strong statement that equity compelled the enforcement of such
a contract:
Here there is an express covenant, with full performance by one,
and certain mischief arising from its breach by the other. The mischief cannot be repaired, nor can it well be estimated. The damages
are continuing and accruing from day to day. The reasonable and
45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
11 Id. at 490, 102 P. at 281.
131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
3,Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 502, 102 P. 281, 285 (1909).
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fair protection to which the plaintiff is entitled can only be obtained
by the parties conforming expressly and exactly to the terms of the
contract. The defendant is in the wrong. He is deliberately doing
what he plainly agreed not to do. The equities are with the plaintiff
and the decree is accordingly affirmed.40

Four years later, in Barrows v. McMurtry Manufacturing
Co.4' the Colorado Supreme Court expanded the Freudenthalrule
to uphold a covenant of noncompetition ancillary to a contract of
sale. Stanley M. Barrows, his brother, and his sister sold substantially all of the assets of their plate glass company, including
goodwill, to plaintiffs. The sellers agreed not to participate "'in
any company or corporation which in any way carries on in the
state of Colorado any class of business similar to that heretofore
carried on by . . .'" the purchasers.2 Within 2 weeks after the
sale, Mr. Barrows caused the incorporation of a new plate glass
company in Colorado. In affirming the issuance of an injunction
against Barrows, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that restrictive covenants given in consideration of the purchase of the goodwill of a business were almost universally enforced and cited the
Colorado rule established in Freudenthal
. 3 The court then analyzed in detail the public interest, evidencing particular concern
with Barrows' contention that enforcement of the covenant would
tend toward monopoly. Prior to the sale Barrows had been selling
plate glass at a lower price than his competitors, and plate glass
prices had risen in Colorado subsequent to the purchase of his
business. While acknowledging these facts, the court determined
that Barrows had operated at a loss, that this was detrimental to
competition, and that the public interest would be better served
by the higher prices and greater economic stability which existed
subsequent to his sale."
Id. at 506-07, 102 P. at 286.
41

42

54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913).
Id. at 434, 131 P. at 431.

Id. at 441, 131 P. at 433-34.
While it is doubtless true that competition is the life of trade, it is also
equally true that competition of a certain sort almost inevitably leads to
disaster, not alone to those immediately concerned, but to the public as well.
It is safe to say that the general welfare is best served by healthy competition, which allows business enterprise, when conducted with energy and
skill, to gather fair returns upon the ability, industry and capital employed.
While ruinous competition, which demoralizes an industry and business, and
prevents reasonable returns on the investment, may sometimes bring temporary gain to the public, must (sic), in the very nature of things, finally result
in general and permanent loss and disaster.
Id. at 448, 131 P. at 436.

1975

NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS IN COLORADO

The Barrows court also intensified the crusade for contractual sanctity declared in Freudenthal. It declared that public
policy demanded that noncompetition covenants be upheld
whenever possible:
It may not be amiss to here suggest that there can be no sound
and wholesome public policy, which operates in the slightest degree
to lend approval to the open disregard and violation of personal
contracts entered into in good faith, upon good consideration. It is
quite as important, as a matter of public interest and welfare, that
individuals are not allowed, with impunity, to transgress their solemn undertakings, advisedly entered upon, as it is that the public
have protection in other respects. Where one is so lost to a sense of
moral obligation as to accept the full consideration for his stock in
trade and good-will, upon express condition that he refrain from
again entering that business for a limited time, within a certain
territory, and then immediately, having pocketed the fruits of the
agreement, deliberately and wilfully ignores the controlling condition thereof, courts should certainly not hunt for legal excuse to
uphold him in such moral delinquency. On the contrary, in the
interest of the general public, and to discourage bad faith conduct
of that sort, wherever, without violation of legal principles and public policy, it may be done, contracts like the one under discussion
should be rigidly upheld and enforced. 5

The rule of Freudenthaland Barrows was simple: a noncompetition agreement would be enforced if it was reasonable, was
necessary to protect a valid interest of the covenantee, and imposed no undue hardship on society at large.46 This is a stern rule,
with no consideration for the degree of hardship imposed on covenantors. When only the interests of the covenantee and the public are weighed, and the public is deemed adequately served by
such covenants, most covenants will be enforced. When one adds
to this the strong language of both Freudenthaland Barrows for
enforcing covenants whenever possible, it is clear that Colorado
law has favored the covenantee.
2. Defining "Reasonable"
The key word in the Colorado rule is "reasonable." Having
made this the pivotal point in Barrows, the Colorado courts then
had to decide how to determine reasonableness. It appears that
the courts tend toward a two-step approach to reasonableness.
Id. at 447, 131 P. at 436.
Although Freudenthalmentions that the covenant should not be oppressive to the
covenantor and discusses whether there is adequacy of consideration and mutuality, reasonableness to the covenantor is not incorporated in its rule. 45 Colo. at 502, 102 P. at
285.
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First, they decide whether any covenant is reasonably necessary
to protect the legitimate needs of the covenantee. Second, they
determine whether the particularcovenant before them is reasonable with respect to time, space, and type of activity.4 7
In determining the reasonableness of a noncompetition covenant, the Colorado courts consider whether: (i) the covenantor
had frequent contacts with the customers or clients of the covenantee;4 8 (ii) the covenantee's business relied to a substantial degree on trade secrets to which the covenantor had access;49 (iii)
the covenantee provided training to the covenantor; 0 (iv) the
covenantee's business was highly technical or complex;5 (v) the
covenantee's business was highly competitive;5 2 (vi) the covenantor, while employed by the covenantee, was a key employee, for
example, in a managerial position; 53 (vii) the covenantor provided
unique services while employed by the covenantee.54 The courts
then turn their attention to whether or not the particular covenant being considered is reasonable; that is, does it exceed with
respect to time, space, and type of activity what is reasonably
required to give the covenantee the protection to which he is
entitled.
No covenant has ever been found unreasonable in Colorado
on the basis of a time restriction although covenants reviewed
have ranged from a term of 6 months to perpetuity.5 A number
" For an articulation of this reasoning, see Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477
P.2d 489, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
11 Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968); Electrical
Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn
& Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
" Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Knoebel
Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968); Addressograph-Multigraph
Corp. v. Kelley, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Kappers, 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
50 Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970);
Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943).
1' Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Barrows v.
McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488,
102 P. 280 (1909).
52 Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964); Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941).
11Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc.,
342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972); Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439
P.2d 355 (1968).
14 Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968).
" See, e.g., Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co., 81 Colo. 254, 254 P. 990 (1927)
(employment contract-6 mos.); Jewel Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719
(1915) (employment contract-1 yr.); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental
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of covenants have, however, been found unreasonable because of
the scope of the geographic area involved.5" The courts have provided little explanation of the basis for such determinations. On
the other hand, in one case, a Utah federal district court applying
Colorado law enforced a nationwide territorial restriction. The
court found that (1) the plaintiff-employer had provided national
exposure to the defendant-employee by reproducing his sales
presentations at sales clinics throughout the country and inviting
him to speak at a national sales convention; (2) the employee,
who had been in a managerial position, had been trained by the
agency and had had numerous customer contacts which would
have enabled him to set up a competing business easily; (3) the
competitive activity to be restrained was only the relatively narrow activity of selling flat-rate account collection letters; and (4)
the former employee could apply his sales expertise in other noncompetitive activities without great hardship. 5
The courts have never modified the terms of a covenant with
respect to the type of activity restrained, although in one case the
court narrowly construed its terms. Where a salesman agreed not
Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972) (employment contract-2 yrs.); Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969)
(employment contract-3 yrs.); Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948)
(sale of a business-5 yrs.); Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972) (sale of a business-5 yrs.); Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184 (1951) (sale
of a business-50 yrs.); Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929)
(sale of a business-in perpetuity). But see Taff v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974) in which the trial court determined that a 2-year restriction was excessive but the
appellate court reversed apparently because the defendant failed to show that the period
was excessive. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955) for a discussion of reasonable
time as defined by other jurisdictions.
" See, e.g., Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489, 490 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970) (territorial restriction reduced from "within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles of
SNELLING'S office, or within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles of any city in which a
'Snelling and Snelling' office is located" to within 10 miles from the boundaries of Denver); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd., 473 P.2d 179, 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970)
(territorial restriction reduced from "within fifty (50) miles of any city in which Agency
is doing business" to within 50 miles of Denver); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418,
419, 135 P.2d 228 (1943) (worldwide territorial restriction reduced to "that portion of
Colorado south of the northern boundary of the City and County of Denver and east of
the Rocky Mountains"). Covenants were enforced in Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co.,
81 Colo. 254, 254 P. 990 (1927) (territorial restriction of City and County of Denver); Jewel
Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719 (1915) (territory that employee worked);
Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 500, 232 P.2d 184 (1951) (50-mile radius); Barrows v. McMurtry
Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913) (State of Colorado); Trans-American Collections,
Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972)
(entire United States). See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955).
1, Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc.,
342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972).
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to compete in soliciting, taking, and delivering orders for "teas,
coffees, baking powder, extracts, spices, cocoa or other
merchandise,""' the court stated that if "other merchandise" included all other merchandise, the activity restraint might be too
broad. Therefore, the court read "other merchandise" to mean
other merchandise of the same or similar type and upheld the
covenant on the grounds that a covenant, when ambiguous,
should be interpreted to make it reasonable. 9 The result has
been, then, a determination of reasonableness on the facts of each
case.
B.

Balancing Conflicting Interests

The general rule has sometimes been stated that a "reasonable" covenant is one that gives the protected party its due without unfair harm to others, including society as a whole.'" This is
not, however, the formulation which has been applied in Colorado. The very first Colorado case stated that, aside from the
issue of reasonableness, the court must analyze the interests of
the covenantee and the concerns of the general public."' Although
two Colorado cases have discussed the public interest in specific
noncompetition covenants 2 and many cases have declared that
the public has an interest in seeing contracts enforced as written,63 no covenant in this state has ever been rejected as offending
public policy. It therefore appears that the concerns of society at
large have had little real effect on noncompetition decisions in
Colorado.
The early statements of Colorado law were later brought into
closer accord with the generally accepted modern rule. In
Jewel Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 495, 145 P. 719, 720 (1915).
In a few rare cases the covenant itself has restricted activity to a narrow area. See
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Kappers, 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) in which
the employee was merely prohibited from selling certain specified insurance policies to
customers with whom he dealt while in the employ of the covenantee.
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932); Blake at 648-49.
" Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
82 Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913) (the public would
be served by the raising of plate glass prices); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P.
280 (1909) (it would be useful to the public to have a young doctor excluded from practice
in Trinidad). See text accompanying notes 36-46 supra.
83 Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970);
Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Mabray v.
Williams, 132 Colo.523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135
P.2d 228 (1941); Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913); Freudenthai v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909); Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo. App. 95, 491
P.2d 87 (1971); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd., 473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
"
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Whittenberg v. Williams 4 the court recognized that consideration
should also be given to hardship of the covenantor:
Such restrictions to be valid must be reasonable, not impose undue
hardship, be no wider than necessary to afford the required protection, and that each case must stand upon its own facts."'

The reference to hardship in the Whittenberg opinion is dictum;
the court proceeded to grant partial enforcement of the covenant
without reference to the effect this might have on the covenantor.
The Whittenberg case quoted the Barrows language to the effect
that there was a duty to enforce contracts against those who
signed them as if this were the principal basis of the decision."
However, the recognition of the interests of covenantors has remained and although it has sometimes been followed, it seems
more honored in the breach than in the observance."
In at least two cases, Goldammer v. Fay6" and Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders,6" courts have weighed the hardship on the
covenantor against the benefit to the covenantee and then decided against enforcement. These cases deserve careful attention
as illustrations of how the Colorado rule works when thoroughly
applied. In Goldammer the various plaintiffs had sold a franchise
to the Fays to operate a Dairy Queen business in Colorado
Springs. The franchise agreement contained a 2-year restrictive
covenant whereby Mr. and Mrs. Fay agreed not to "directly or
indirectly engage in any competitive business" 0 in the Colorado
Springs area. The franchise operation was unsuccessful, the Fays
110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943).
o Id. at 420, 135 P.2d at 229. The court said that this statement, which was put forth
by the defendant, "is unquestionably the law." Id. This rule was first discussed in Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941). However, subsequent
cases refer to it as "the rule of Whittenberg."
110 Colo. at 422, 135 P.2d at 229.
*' See Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964) (covenant not enforced because of undue harm to covenantor); Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439
P.2d 355 (1968) (covenant not enforced because of undue harm to salesman who would
have to leave region or forego life-time work); cf. Trans-American Collections, Inc. v.
Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972) (covenant
enforced because, among other considerations, no undue harm to salesman would result);
Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941) (summary judgment in favor of defendant reversed because undue hardship is a question of fact).
Contrast these cases with the puzzling dictum in Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d
424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972): "Under these circumstances, the fact that hardship will result
from enforcement of the covenant is not a defense to a willful and deliberate violation of
a reasonable covenant." Id. at 426.
326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964).
165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968).
70 326 F.2d at 268.
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terminated the franchise, and they converted the facilities, which
they owned, to an establishment known as "Fays Drive-In." The
business was operated primarily as a coffee shop, but ice cream
was sold along with other products.
The trial court refused to issue an injunction, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that an injunction is to be granted
only when necessity is clearly established.7 The court found that
the Fays terminated the franchise because it was not profitable;
that they had attempted in good faith to differentiate their new
operation from Dairy Queen; that they had a substantial investment in the new business; that the competition which they presented to Dairy Queen was no different in kind from that of many
other establishments in Colorado Springs; and that consequently,
to grant an injunction would be an undue hardship on the Fays
with no comparable benefit to the Goldammers.
Four years later in Knoebel the Colorado Supreme Court
used similar reasoning. Siders had executed a restrictive covenant with the Knoebel Mercantile Co., agreeing not to compete
for a period of 2 years
in the institutional food, paper and supply business, bakery supply
business, and janitorial supply business, or any part thereof in all
or any part of the State of Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, New
Mexico, Nebraska, Kansas, So. Dakota, and any other State in
which Employer transacts its business at any time up to the date of
such employment termination."2

The court emphasized that it was not until Siders reported for
work at Knoebel that he realized his job was conditional upon
signing the noncompetition agreement. After working for Knoebel
in the Colorado Springs area for over 2 years, Siders terminated
his employment and went to work for another company which
was at least partially competitive with Knoebel. The undisputed
evidence showed that in his new job Siders solicited some Knoebel customers but that there was nothing unique either about the
services he rendered while working for Knoebel or the customer
and merchandise information he acquired at Knoebel. The trial
court determined, and the supreme court agreed, that the contractual restriction on Siders was unreasonable under all the pertinent circumstances and cited language from Goldammer that
an injunction would not benefit the plaintiff and would be a
Id. at 270.
2

165 Colo. at 395, 439 P.2d at 356.
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serious detriment to the defendant. 73
The Knoebel decision represents a sound statement of the
general rules applicable to restrictive covenants. It does not, however, seem perfectly compatible with such cases as
Addressograph-MultigraphCorp. v. Kelley 7 and Whittenberg v.
Williams 7 which had preceded it. The Knoebel court, for example, ignored earlier statements that covenants should be enforced
wherever possible simply as a matter of public policy and morality. 7 The application of the rules in Knoebel may therefore be
subject to criticism both as being too lenient to the employee and
as being less than totally consistent with prior decisions under
Colorado law. Both Knoebel and Goldammer demonstrate, however, an attempt to balance the hardship to the covenantor
against the legitimate needs of the covenantee in determining
whether or not an injunction should issue. It must be emphasized
that Knoebel and Goldammer are unique both in the results
reached and in the careful balancing analyses of the competing
interests of the covenantor and covenantee. While they cannot be
relied on as the final word, they do illustrate the potential for
fairness which exists in the Colorado common law rule.
C.

Enforcement of Covenants

Knoebel and Goldammer notwithstanding, the definite tendency in Colorado has been to enforce a noncompetition covenant
by granting an appropriate injunction. Colorado courts have
ruled that a covenant should be construed in the manner most
likely to make it enforceable, 7 that assignees may enforce covenants not to compete, 78 that the burden of proof in establishing
unreasonableness rests on the covenantor, 79 and that the existence of a noncompetition covenant may be shown through parol
evidence. 0 Two particular problems in the area of enforcement
11Id.

at 398, 439 P.2d at 359.
7, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961) (enforcing covenant ancillary to employment
contract prohibiting competition in exterminating business for 5 years).
11 110 Colo. 418, 362 P.2d 184 (1961) (enforcing covenant ancillary to salesman's
employment contract prohibiting competition within 100 miles of Denver for 1 year).
"' See, e.g., discussion of Barrows in text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
" See Jewel Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719 (1915).
"hSee Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948); Flower Haven, Inc. v.
Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"' Taft v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); see Jim Sprague's Aetna
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970).
" See Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948).
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warrant special attention: the grounds for which a court may
issue an injunction and the circumstances in which a court may
partially enforce a covenant. 8'
1. Basis for Injunctive Relief
One of the most marked developments in Colorado law has
been the tendency to grant an injunction almost automatically
once a valid covenant is established. This approach is set forth
most explicitly in Ditus v. Beahm, 2 an action brought by partners to enforce a noncompetition agreement entered into by their
ex-partner in connection with his sale of partnership assets to
them. The court properly cited the general rule:
Where an established business has been sold with its goodwill and
there is a valid covenant not to compete, a breach is regarded as the
controlling factor and injunctive relief follows almost as a matter of
course. In such cases, the damage is presumed to be irreparable and
the remedy at law is considered inadequate. It is not necessary that
the buyer first prove special pecuniary damages or show an actual
loss of customers who might in any event have discontinued their
patronage. Injunctive relief may be given, even though only nominal
damages are shown, or although no actual damage is shown.Y

Thus, if a valid covenant is established, an injunction follows as
a matter of course, without further inquiry into irreparable harm
or other equitable considerations. While this may be entirely reasonable where the covenant has been bargained for and consideration has been given, as in a covenant ancillary to a contract of
sale, it is not defensible in the typical employment contract situation where the employee does not have full understanding or adequate bargaining power and where no consideration is given for
the covenant. Nonetheless, the same rule has often been followed
in employment contract cases.84
S, Damages for breach of a noncompetition covenant have been sought in 12 of the
26 Colorado cases and have been awarded only in Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd.,
473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970), Colorado Urological Assocs., P.C. v. Grossman, 529
P.2d 625 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), and in Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental
Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972).
12 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184 (1951).
Id. at 551-52, 232 P.2d at 185, quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 84 at 566-67 (1945).
The court does not refer to Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909), in which
it was determined that an injunction does not automatically follow a finding that the
covenant at issue is reasonable, but Freudenthal is arguably distinguishable because it
involved a covenant ancillary to an employment agreement.
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961);
Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110
Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943). These courts, however, did not cite Ditus as authority for
their action. Rather, they apparently relied on the language of Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg.
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This approach was modified by the Tenth Circuit in
Goldammer v. Fay, 5 in which the court refused to grant an injunction absent a showing of irreparable harm, and distinguished
the Colorado cases on the ground that the equitable considerations were different. The Colorado state courts, though, have ignored Goldammer, returning in Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer6 to
the Ditus rule."
The Ditus rule, however, may be rationalized. In determining whether a covenant not to compete is reasonably necessary to
protect the covenantee, the court takes into account the same
factual considerations necessary to conclude that the covenantee
has an inadequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm
if the injunction does not issue.8 Similarly, when the court balances the needs of the covenantee and the public against those
of the covenantor, it is merely balancing the equities. 9 Hence, it
may be argued that in finding that a covenant is reasonable or
valid, a court simultaneously determines that an equitable remedy is appropriate. A separate consideration of the validity of the
covenant and the availability of an equitable remedy is then unnecessary since both often involve the same considerations. However, some Colorado decisions appear to take a short cut by simply assuming that if the restrictive agreement was validly entered
into, it is valid, hence reasonable, and hence enforceable. 0
2. Partial Enforcement
The Colorado courts have on occasion reduced the geographic area of a noncompetition covenant because the larger
area was unnecessary to protect the legitimate needs of the covenCo., 54 Colo. 432, 448-94, 131 P. 430, 436 (1913). See text accompanying note 45 supra.
In fairness, there were defensible grounds for granting an injunction on the facts of
each of the cases which used the Ditus approach. Thus, in Addressographthe defendants
admitted doing business with persons they had dealt with while employed by plaintiff; in
Mabray the appellate court was merely affirming a trial court injunction and observed
that the record was insufficient to require a reversal of that injunction.
- 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964) (an action by a franchisor to enforce a covenant
against a franchisee).
502 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
87 See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
See Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184 (1951); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45
Colo. 488, 102 P. 208 (1909). See also cases cited in note 84 supra.
11 For a general discussion of equitable considerations relevant to the issuance of an
injunction, see D. DoBss, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4, .5 (1973).
O See, e.g., Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d
216 (1970); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 288 (1943).
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antee.1' The court in Barrows, for example, observed that even
though a contract is unreasonable as to its terms, the contract
should be enforced "wherever it is possible to so divide it as to
declare it binding over such territory as is necessary for the protection of the purchaser."9 2 Commonly known as the "blue pencil
doctrine," this approach can be used only if the unreasonable
restrictions are severable from the reasonable restrictions. Corbin
describes the doctrine as follows:
[I]f the promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can be
eliminated by crossing out a few of the words with a blue pencil
while at the same time the remaining words constitute a complete
3
and valid contract, the contract as blue penciled will be enforced.

In subsequent cases the "blue pencil" language was dropped
by the Colorado courts and the doctrine of partial enforcement,
which would enforce contracts to the extent that they were reasonable regardless of the terms, was adopted. 4 Thus, in
Whittenberg and several subsequent cases" the court in effect
11Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943) (limited contract
specifying no territorial limitation to that portion of Colorado south of the northern boundary of the City & County of Denver and east of the Rocky Mountains); Gulick v. A. Robert
Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (limited contract which precluded
competition within 35 miles of any city in which Snelling & Snelling office is located to
within 10 miles from the boundary of Denver); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd.,
473 P.2d 179, 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (limited contract prohibiting competition within
"50 miles of any city in which agency was doing business" to within 50 miles of agency's
location in downtown Denver).
92 Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 438, 131 P. 430, 432 (1913), quoting
A.

EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS

§ 681 (1901).

CoRBIN § 1390 at 67.
" This view has been advocated by leading commentators, id.; WIuSTON at §§
1647A-47B; Wetzell, supra note 1, at 66; Comment, Contracts - PartialEnforcement of
Restrictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1972); it has also been adopted by a growing
minority of states. See McQuown v. Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1971); Hopkins
v. Crantz, 334 Mich. 300, 54 N.W.2d 671 (1952); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 108
Ohio App. 8, 146 N.E.2d 447 (1957); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp.,
427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967).
,1 See cases cited note 91, supra. Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489
(Colo. Ct. App. 1970) is the only Colorado case to cite authority for its partial enforcement.
Gulick refers to Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968) and Kelite Prod.,
Inc. v. Brandt, 206 Ore. 636, 294 P.2d 320 (1956). In Wood, the court quoted heavily from
Williston and Corbin as follows:
Professor Corbin, in approving the latter test, says:
An agreement restricting competition may be perfectly reasonable
as to a part of the territory included within the restriction but
unreasonable as to the rest. Will the courts enforce such an agreement in part while holding the remainder invalid? It renders no
service to say that the answer depends upon whether or not the
'
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reformed the contract to cover a lesser area than that provided
for in the restrictive covenant.
The argument often presented against partial enforcement is
that it encourages employers in particular to write overly broad
covenants secure in the knowledge that the courts will enforce
them to the maximum degree considered justifiable. This has a
dampening effect on covenantors, especially those who cannot
afford a legal fight, and it places the courts in the position of
having to rewrite contracts for the parties.9" On the other hand,
it is argued that so long as a valid covenant does exist between
the parties, the court should grant relief based on what the court
contract is "divisible." "Divisibility" is a term that has no general
and invariable definition; instead the term varies so much with the
subject-matter involved and the purposes in view that its use either as an aid to decision or in the statement of results tends to
befog the real issue.
With respect to partial illegality, the real issue is whether
partial enforcement is possible without injury to the public and
without injustice to the parties themselves. It is believed that such
enforcement is quite possible in the great majority of cases. If a
seller whose business and good will do not extend beyond the city
limits of Trenton promises not to open a competing business anywhere within the state of New Jersey, the restriction is much
greater than is reasonable. This is a good reason for refusing to
enjoin the seller from doing business in Newark; but it is not a good
reason for permitting him to open up a competing store within the
same block in Trenton. 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1390 at 66 (1962).
And, at 104:
As in the case of contracts restraining the seller of a business with
its good will, the fact that the restriction on an employee goes too
far to be valid as a whole does not prevent a court from enforcing
it in part insofar as it is reasonable and not oppressive. The injunction may be made operative only as to reasonable space and time;
*** 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1394 (1962).
Professor Williston's comments on the subject are as follows:
If a sharply defined line separated a restraint which is excessive
territorially from such restraint as is permissible, there seems no
reason why effect should not be given to a restrictive promise indivisible in terms, to the extent that it is lawful. If it be said that
the attempt to impose an excessive restraint invalidates the whole
promise, a similar attempt should invalidate a whole contract,
though the promises are in terms divisible. Questions involving
legality of contracts should not depend on form. Public policy
surely is not concerned to distinguish differences of wording in
agreements of identical meaning. 5 Williston, Contracts § 1660
(rev. ed. 1937).
73 Wash. 2d 307, 313-14, 438 P.2d 587, 591 (1968).
"SEhlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Iowa 1971) (Becker, J., dissenting); Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164 (1967); Comment,
Contracts-PartialEnforcement of Restrictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1972).
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determines is just under the circumstances, thereby preventing a
party from totally abandoning his contractual obligation. 7
The most striking aspect of the Colorado treatment of partial
enforcement is the failure of the state's highest court to follow the
doctrine in Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 11 a situation in
which it seemed ideally appropriate. In that case, Siders took a
job in the Colorado Springs area, signed a noncompetition agreement with Knoebel which covered virtually the entire Rocky
Mountain area and then left to join a Colorado Springs competitor." Partial enforcement in Colorado Springs would have fully
protected Knoebel and considerably lessened the potential hardship on Siders, but it appears that the court simply decided that
no covenant was justified under the circumstances, no matter
how reasonable its terms.'"' This case then suggests the possibility
that Colorado courts may practice a kind of selective partial enforcement so that in a close case an overly broad covenant may
result in no enforcement at all.
D.

Critique of Colorado Common Law

°' decided a
In Zeff, Farrington& Associates v. Farrington,1
few months after Knoebel, the court backed away from the balancing approach of Knoebel and Goldammer'0° and returned to
its practice of enforcing restrictive covenants with little attention
to competing interests. The court stated:

The rule is well-settled in Colorado that reasonable covenants
not to compete will be enforced and that what is reasonable depends
g7 Corbin, A Comment on Beit v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 43 (1949); Williston, A Note on
Beit v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40 (1949); see Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133,
70 NW.2d 585 (1955).
" 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1968). See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
" NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of Employer's hiring Employee and for other good and valuable consideration, Employee promises
and agrees that in the event of the termination of his said employment for
any reason whatsoever, for a period of two years from and after the date of
such termination he will not, directly or indirectly, either as an owner, officer, employee, agent or otherwise, engage in the institutional food, paper and
supply business, bakery supply business, and janitorial supply business, or
any part thereof in all or any part of the State of Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, Nebraska, Kansas, So. Dakota, and any other State in
which Employer transacts its business at any time up to the date of such
employment termination. ...
165 Colo. at 394-95, 439 P.2d at 356.
'0* Cf. Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) where
the court used similar analysis.

101168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969).
"02See text accompanying notes 68-80 supra.
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upon the facts of each case. We deem it significant that in 9 out of
10 cases cited, the court upheld the enforceability of the noncompetitive covenant. This substantial precedent evinces the court's unwillingness to search out legal excuses for a willful and deliberate
violation of a reasonable covenant not to compete. We here declare
renewed approval of this precedent. 03

The court then proceeded, after a relatively sketchy analysis of
the covenantor's experience and access to confidential information, to declare that an agreement restricting competition for 3
years within a 200-mile radius of Denver was reasonable, giving
no explicit consideration to the potential hardships that were
thereby imposed on the defendant.
The next, and most recent decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court, Jim Sprague'sAetna TrailerSales, Inc. v. Hruz,"I embodied all that is objectionable in the Colorado common law and
demonstrates why legislative reform seemed necessary. In that
case the trial court had denied both damages and an injunction
to a mobile home company in an action brought pursuant to a
noncompetition covenant against an ex-salesman. The covenantor, Hruz, left his job with Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales
after 4 months and went to work for a rival company. During the
first 2 months on his new job in which he sold a total of 7 or 8
trailers, he dealt with one customer who knew him from his previous position. The court placed some emphasis on the fact that
Hruz was a retired military man who had very little sales experience and no mobile home sales experience prior to working for the
plaintiff. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
which had denied the issuance of an injunction, and remanded
with instructions to enter an injunction in conformity with the
covenant.
While there were factual distinctions between Knoebel and
Jim Sprague's,0 the court failed to note, much less discuss, the
significance of such distinctions. Instead, it rested its decision on
three bases: (1) the territorial and chronological limits of the
Hruz covenant were less than those which had been approved in
other cases; (2) Hruz failed as a matter of law to carry the burden
of proving that the covenant was unreasonable; and (3) Hruz
168 Colo. at 50, 449 P.2d at 814 (citations omitted).
172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970).
1" For example, Siders was an experienced salesman, while Hruz was not. For a
discussion of Knoebel, see text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
1

11
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signed a valid covenant with full knowledge of its significance.
The Jim Sprague's decisions is also puzzling because the lower
court's denial of monetary damages was affirmed, leaving one to
wonder how the likelihood of irreparable harm was established if
no actual damages had resulted from an extended period of
breach.
Since the Jim Sprague's decision, eight other cases have been
decided under Colorado law, none of which have denied injunctive relief on substantive grounds. The courts have continually
emphasized that each case must be determined on its own facts
and circumstances; but even where such facts and circumstances
are relatively similar, the courts have sometimes arrived at different conclusions. For instance, in Wagner v. A & B Personnel
Systems, Ltd., '" the court limited the enforcement of a restrictive
covenant to an area within 50 miles of Denver. In the same year,
another division of the court of appeals"°7 considered a noncompetition covenant which restrained an employee in the same line of
business from competing within a radius of 35 miles of any of the
employer's offices. The court modified the territorial restriction
to enforce the covenant within an area 10 miles from the boundaries of Denver. It is difficult to explain an analysis which permits
a conclusion that a 50-mile radius is reasonable for one employee
and a 10-mile radius is reasonable for another engaged in the
same type work.
In summary it can be said that the express Colorado rule is
in accord with the Restatement of Contracts, although "reasonable" in Colorado often seems to be construed as meaning little
more than "validly entered into." Once this determination is
made, courts seem to consider little else. Only Goldammer and
Knoebel exhibit an attempt to weigh the hardship on the covenantor against the benefit to the covenantee, and many cases
hardly seem to consider whether the covenantee even needs the
protection.
It therefore appears that there are at least two valid grounds
for criticizing the Colorado cases: (1) the decisions have not been
altogether consistent; and (2) there is a tendency to enforce noncompetition agreements without sufficient consideration of the
rights of, and the potential hardship to, the covenantor.
'

473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
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III.

STATUTORY REFORM OF COLORADO COMMON LAW

Against the background of the common law described above,
in 1973 the legislature enacted an amendment to the Colorado
statute which now provides:
(2) Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any
person to receive compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any employer shall be void, but this subsection (2)
shall not apply to:
(a) Any contract for the purchase and sale of a business or
the assets of a business;
(b) Any contract for the protection of trade secrets;
(c) Any contractual provision providing for recovery of the
expense of educating and training an employee who has served
an employer for a period of less than two years;
(d) Executive and management personnel and officers and
employees who constitute professional staff to executive and
08
management personnel.1

The amendment declares a narrowly defined class of covenants
void, leaving all others subject to the existing judicial tests of
reasonableness. 109
Although several other states have passed statutes limiting
noncompetition covenants, section 113 differs substantially in
language and in substance from all of them. Five statesCalifornia, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Michigan
-have adopted statutes declaring every restrictive covenant
void except when given in connection with a sale of business
goodwill or the dissolution of a partnership." 0 Two other states
-Florida and Alabama-have similar laws, but also permit
noncompetition covenants ancillary to employment contracts.",
Louisiana forbids restrictive covenants between employers and
employees except to the extent that restrictions may be justified
COLO. REy. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973) [hereinafter referred to as section 113].
As of this writing, no appellate case has interpreted section 113 and, accordingly,
much of the following discussion of the statute is necessarily speculative.
- CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02 (West 1964) (enacted in 1872; amended in
1945 to include sale of stock by a shareholder; amended in 1963 to delineate further the
nature of sales in which covenants not to compete are permissible, particularly with
respect to the sale of a subsidiary); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.761, .766 (1967)
(enacted in 1905); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 13-807 to 809 (1947) (derived from California
Civil Code and enacted in 1895); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959) (derived from California Civil Code and enacted in 1877); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1966) (enacted
in 1890).
" ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 22-24 (1958) (enacted in 1923 and amended in 1931 to provide
exceptions in favor of purchaser of good will and employer); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12
(1972) (enacted in 1953).
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by training or advertising expenses." 2 The South Dakota statute
has exemptions for sales and partnership dissolution and also
permits employment covenants between practitioners who must
be duly licensed by the state." 3 Wisconsin declares all noncompetition contracts which are ancillary to employment contracts void
except those reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer and further abolishes partial enforcement if the contract
4
contains unreasonable limitations.1
A.

Operative Language

The differences between these statutes and Colorado's may
be better appreciated by a detailed comparison between section
113 and the operative language of the Oklahoma statute, which
is typical of other states:
Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising
a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as
provided by the next two sections, is to that extent void."'

The operative portion of section 113 states:
Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any person
to receive compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor
for any employer shall be void ....
-

There are three significant differences between the Oklahoma
statute and section 113: (1) the Oklahoma statute affects "every
contract by which anyone is restrained" while section 113 voids
"any covenant not to compete which restricts"; (2) the Oklahoma
statute applies to restrictions on "a profession, trade, or business" while section 113 is limited to "performance of skilled or
unskilled labor"; and (3) the Oklahoma statute voids any agreement which would restrain one from "exercising" specified activities while section 113 only protects the right to receive compensation from an employer.
1. Noncompetition Covenant
Is there any difference between a "covenant not to compete"
and a contract by which one is restrained from engaging in certain
I LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964) (enacted in 1934; 1962 amendment added a
training and advertising exception; restraint limited to 2 years and employee's territory
or route).
113 S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to -11 (1969) (enacted in 1877; employee
covenant may not restrain activity for more than 10 years or for more than a 25-mile radius
from employer's principal place of business).
"' WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (1974) (enacted in 1957).
... OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 217 (1966) (footnote omitted).
,I' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973).
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activities? A restraint includes any contractual obligation which
may discourage one from entering into competitive activity. For
example, it may include loss of accrued but unpaid commissions," loss of retirement or profit sharing incentives,"18 and similar penalties which discourage but do not forbid one from entering
into competition." 9 A "covenant not to compete," on the other
hand, might be described as including only an absolute ban on
engaging in competitive activity. The distinction, arguably, is
between a covenant which discourages competition and a covenant which forbids competition.
A "covenant not to compete" does not have any precise legal
definition. The only other state statute which uses language comparable to section 113 is that of Wisconsin which refers to "[a]
covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with
his employer.' ' 20 Courts which have applied this language have
concluded, with relatively little analysis, that a covenant not to
compete is synonymous with a contract which restrains competition.' 2 ' Thus, the Wisconsin courts have held that an agreement
" See, e.g., Buskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 514, 76 Cal. Rptr. 602
(1969), which held that a covenant conditioning an insurance agent's rights to continue
receiving unaccrued commissions on non-interference with his ex-employer was not a
restraint of trade within the meaning of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
"I See, e.g., Couch v. Administrative Comm. of Defco Labs., Inc. Salaried Employees
Profit Sharing Trust, 44 Mich. App. 44, 205 N.W.2d 24 (1972) (forfeiture of profit sharing
benefits not restraint within Michigan statute). But see Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley
Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965); Frame v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971) (forfeiture of rights
under profit sharing plan is a restraint of trade within meaning of CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16600 (West 1964)). See also Comment, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for Violation of
Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 290 (1966); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968).
However, this issue has' been resolved for plans covered by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. Section 203 of the Act requires that benefits be nonforfeitable
and hence not conditioned upon the post-employment activities of the employee. Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 203 (Sept. 2, 1974), to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1053.
"IMackie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 13 Mich. App. 556, 164 N.W.2d 777
(1968) (loss of special benefits upon competition is a restraint within the Michigan statute); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265, 129 N.W.2d 126 (1963)
(requirement to return advances if covenantor subsequently competes is restraint within
Wisconsin statute). Contra, Geiss v. Northern Ins. Agency, 153 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1967)
(payment of renewal commissions conditioned on noncompetition is not restraint within
North Dakota statute).
m WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (1974).
Schroeder v. Gateway Transp. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971) (amendment of noncontributory pension plan, eliminating eligibility of retired employees who
subsequently work for competitors held to be an unreasonable covenant not to compete);
Holsen v. Marshal & Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971) (amendment to
profit sharing and retirement plan, providing that participating employee who intended
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depriving a former employee of pension or other retirement rights
as a result of subsequent competitive activities is void under the
Wisconsin statute.' The Wisconsin view is reasonable because
the policy of the statute to avoid unwarranted interferences with
freedom of employment is enforced by voiding all covenants
which indirectly restrict that freedom even though the covenants
do not amount to complete prevention of competitive activity. It
is likely that a Colorado court would reach a similar decision
under section 113(c), the indirect restraint of the recovery of
implies that other
training expenses. This one indirect restraint
23
indirect restrictions are not permissible.
2. Skilled or Unskilled Labor
The term "skilled or unskilled labor" is not found in any
other statute which affects restrictive covenants. Since "skilled
or unskilled labor" is not defined anywhere in section 113,124 one
must look outside of the statute for a definition. There are vastly
different definitions of the term labor. For example, labor has
been defined as signifying "physical or mental labor under any
circumstances, and in its broadest sense the term is not confined
to physical or manual labor, but includes every possible human
exertion, mental or physical, and even spiritual.' 1 5 On the other
hand, the term "has been defined as purely physical toil."'2 6 It
does not appear useful to discuss the various definitions which
might be used and which are generally derived from fields as
diverse as workmen's compensation, labor relations law, and taxation. 27 What is of significance in defining the scope of section
to engage in competitive activity should receive only 50% of his vested participating
interest in plan, violated statute); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265,
120 N.W.2d 126 (1963) (insurance agent's employment contract requiring agent who competes upon termination of employment to repay all advances by employer on commissions
held invalid under statute).
122 Schroeder v. Gateway Transp. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971); Holsen
v. Marshal & Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
"2 House Hearings, supra note 6, infer that pension plans would not be affected by
section 113.
12 But see CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-16-101(2) (1973), which defines skilled labor
and unskilled labor for purposes of classifying workmen, mechanics and laborers in
connection with certain public contracts.
121 51 C.J.S. Labor at 544 (1967).
132 48 Am. Jun. 2d Labor & Labor Relations § 1 at 49 (1970).
1971) (Immigration & Nationality
12 Buckley v. Gibney, 332 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1970); Addicott v. Upton, 26 Mich. App. 523, 182 N.W.2d 790
(1970) (action against stockholders by former employees to recover unpaid wages under
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2908 (1968); Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550,
258 A.2d 6 (1969) (child labor law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 2-21.1, .17 (1965); People v.
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113 is the intent and purpose of the statute taken as a whole. The
reports of the committee hearings on section 113 indicate that,
although the committee was primarily concerned with skilled
workers such as plumbers and electricians, the words used were
intended to cover a much wider range of activities.' 9 More significantly, in considering the original proposal for section 113 the
committee added subsection (e) exempting "executive and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute
professional staff" from the treatment of the main section.' 9 This
exception would serve no purpose unless executive and management personnel and professional staff would otherwise be included in the coverage of the statute. It therefore appears that a
broad definition of "skilled and unskilled labor" is justified. This
is, however, an area of some question, subject to definitive judicial construction.
3. Compensation . . .Employer
The only contracts which are invalidated by section 113 are
those which would restrain one from "receiving compensation for
performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any employer." The
Oklahoma language, "engaging in a lawful profession, trade or
business," is clearly broader for the statute also protects the right
of the covenantor to enter into a partnership, to become an investor, director or officer, or to participate in any other way, directly
or indirectly, in a competitive business. The Colorado statute
therefore applies to a much narrower set of circumstances.
There are ambiguities and problems even here however. For
example, could an individual subject to an otherwise valid restrictive covenant., set up a family owned corporation, cause the
corporation to employ him and then claim the protection of the
statutory provision voiding any covenant which forbids him from
entering "the performance of skilled or unskilled labor for an
employer"? It is unlikely that a Colorado court would permit the
Aliprantis, 8 App. Div. 2d 276, 187 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1959) (Sunday closing law, N.Y. PENAL
CODE OF 1909 § 2143 [repealed N.Y. PENAL CODE § 500.05 (1967)]); San Marco Constr.
Corp. v. Gilbert, 15 Misc. 2d 208, 178 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1958) (mechanic's lien, N.Y. LIEN
LAW §§ 2, 9(7), (12)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1966); Kline v. Federal Ins. Co., 60 Ohio Op.
2d 445, 152 N.E.2d 911 (C.P. 1958) (contractor's bond statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
153.54 (Page 1969).
I"
See House Hearings, supra note 6. It is important to note, however, that the draft
under discussion at that time contained the additional words "or provision of other services." Therefore, it may be argued that the inclusion of professions such as physicians was
included in "other services" and not "skilled and unskilled labor."
I" See Senate Hearings, supra note 6.
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intent of section 113 to be circumvented so easily. 3 0More difficult
cases may arise, however, where the covenantor puts himself into
the position of being, at least in a technical legal sense, an employee in an effort to take advantage of the statutory protection.
B.

Specific Exceptions

1. Purchase and Sale Exception
Subparagraph (b), the exemption of covenants in connection
with the sale of business goodwill, resembles the exception which
is almost universally included in other restrictive covenant legislation. While the thrust of section 113 is similar to that of most
other statutes, the language and the effect are different. For example, the Oklahoma law provides as follows:
Restraint of trade-Exceptionas to sale of good-will.
One who sells the good-will of a business may agree with the
buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, city or part thereof, so long as the buyer, or any person
deriving title to the good-will from him carries on a like business
therein."'

The exemption in the Colorado statute is broader because it applies to the purchase and sale of a business or business assets
instead of to a sale of goodwill only. Thus, the sale of the physical
assets of a discontinued business not involving goodwill might fall
within the scope of subparagraph (a) of section 113. Similarly,
while the typical statutes apply only to sales, section 113 refers
to purchases and sales, suggesting that the vendee as well as the
3
vendor could be bound by a noncompetition covenant. 1
The primary ambiguity of this exemption is the scope of the
language "purchase and sale." For example, a question arises
whether a noncompetition covenant may be enforced in connection with the dissolution of a partnership, a corporate reorganization which amounts to a transfer of corporate assets, a lease,
" For an example of a Colorado court refusing to allow a covenantor to circumvent
the law see Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929). After signing
a covenant restraining him from engaging in the retail bakery business, Weber organized
a family corporation, capitalized it, entered its employ, solicited business for it, advised
as to its management, held himself out to the public as a party in interest, and participated in its profits. The court found that by so doing, he had completely circumvented
the contract and enjoined him from all of the above activities.
"1 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 218 (1966).
"' It is not clear, however, to what extent the common law would enforce a covenant
against a vendee. Possible situations might include covenants in conjunction with the

purchase of stock by a corporate employee or the purchase of a franchise by a franchisee.
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franchise, license, or similar agreement. Neither the statutory
language nor the existing case law provides much guidance in this
area. It may be argued that the test should be whether the transaction is substantially equivalent to the sale of a business or
business assets. For example, the withdrawal of a partner from a
partnership should be analyzed on the facts of the particular
case. 33 If one partner were to sell substantial assets in conjunction
with a restrictive covenant, the covenant should probably be enforced. On the other hand, if the withdrawing partner were to
have a relatively minor interest in the partnership assets so that
his position was more like that of an employee, his withdrawal
should not be considered substantially equivalent to a sale. 13
Similarly, if a corporate merger or reorganization were considered
an acquisition by one company of the assets of another, the owners of the acquired corporation should be treated like any other
sellers and a covenant pursuant to the merger should be en-

forced. 135
"3 See Brown v. Stough, 292 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1956), in which the court held that the
sale of a withdrawing physician/partner to new partners and repurchase of his interests
by remaining partners were sales within meaning of Oklahoma statute exempting sale of
the goodwill of a business. While it seems clear that a withdrawal of one partner from the
partnership and the consequent sale of his interest is within section 113, the final dissolution of a partnership and distribution of its assets to all of the partners is probably not.
Significantly, most other statutes have separate exemptions for sales and for partnership
dissolutions. If dissolution were considered a sale, the separate dissolution exception
would be unnecessary. But see, Jenson v. Olson, 144 Mont. 224, 395 P.2d 465 (1964).
134Bernstein, Bernstein, Wile & Gordon v. Ross, 22 Mich. App. 117, 177 N.W.2d 193

(1970) (repurchase by accounting partnership of 5 percent interest in partnership held not
sale of good will within Michigan statute as withdrawing partner, having no clients or
separate business of his own, had no goodwill to sell); cf. Buckhout v. Witwer, 157 Mich.
406, 122 N.W. 184 (1909); Key v. Perkins, 173 Okla. 99, 46 P.2d 530 (1935); Public Opinion
Publishing Co. v. Ransom, 34 S.D. 381, 148 N.W. 838 (1914). ContraBessel v. Bethke, 56
N.D. 1, 215 N.W. 868 (1927); Vogue Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 292 Mich. 575,
291 N.W. 12 (1940) (corporation's purchase of 26 shares of its own stock held sale within
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.766 (1967)). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02
(West 1964), which was amended in 1945 to include a stock transfer in its "sale" exemption.
' Farren v. Autoviable Serv. Inc., 508 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1973) held that a covenant
not to compete, executed by an employee of a merged corporation prior to the merger was
pursuant to a "sale." Disregarding definitions of sales from other contexts, the court said:
We do not believe that an actual cash sale of good will was the paramount reason for inclusion of this statute in the law of this State. We believe
that the purpose of this statute is to allow the parties to the transfer of a
going business to mutually agree, as a part of the value of the business
transferred, that the transferee will be protected from his transferor who
might use his previously acquired experience, contacts and expertise to promote his own interests in the same field of business in competition with his
transferee (citation omitted).
In this case there was a corporate merger. The good will of Farren Coin-
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A more difficult problem is posed by the typical franchise
agreement. The sale of a franchise is substantially equivalent to
a sale of business assets; the franchisor sells to the franchisee the
right to use a trade name, goodwill, and the benefits of advertising in a specified area. The franchisee should therefore have
rights similar to a vendee in a classic purchase agreement to
enforce a noncompetition covenant against the franchisor. On the
other hand, the franchisor should have a right similar to that of
an employer to prevent competition to the extent that it is based
on training, trade secrets, or goodwill acquired from the franchisee.' 36 The latter seems to be the approach taken by the court in
Goldammer v. Fay.'37
2. Training and Education Exception
Another exemption in the Colorado statute which has a parallel in another statute is subparagraph (c), excepting "any contractual provision providing for recovery of the expense in educating and training an employee who has served an employer for a
period of less than two years."' 38 This somewhat resembles the
provision of the Louisiana statute which voids restraints on competition except, among other things, "where the employer incurs
an expense in the training of the employee."' 3
There are two distinctions between the Colorado statute and
the Louisiana statute which are of crucial importance. First, the
effect of the Colorado statute is limited to the initial 2-year period
of employment. An employee who terminates his employment
after such 2-year period is unaffected by this provision. Second,
and most important, Colorado apparently does not permit the
general enforcement of post-employment restraints merely because the employer has incurred training expenses, but permits
the use of such restraints only as a sanction to the extent necespany with Farren's consent was included in the corporate entity that merged
with Autoviable, the surviving corporation, and thus transferred to it. We
believe that this is a "sale" of the good will within the meaning of 15
O.S.1971 § 218.
508 P.2d at 648. On the other hand, assignments and leases are probably not sales within
the meaning of section 113(a). See Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423
(1908) (dictum that lease not sale within Oklahoma statute); E.W. Smith Agency v.
Sanger, 350 Mich. 75, 85 N.W.2d 84 (1957) (assignment of right to receive commissions).
3I See Annot. 50 A.L.R.3d 746 (1973) supporting the view that a franchise agreement
is similar to an employment contract. See also Blake at 666.
137 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
131 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (1973).
" LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964).
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sary to compel the employee to repay such expenses. Once the
employee-convenantor reimburses his former employer he is free
of the bonds of the noncompetition covenant.
Louisiana courts have split drastically in their interpretation
of what kind of training is required to bring an employment relationship within the exception to the general avoidance law, and
the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet resolved the differences
among its lower courts. At the present time, the federal courts
and one of the intermediate appellate courts in Louisiana have
interpreted the provision to apply only where the expenses incurred by the employer are of an unusual nature and perhaps only
where the training has the effect of making the employee a specialist in his field. "' The other three Louisiana intermediate appellate courts have held that almost any expenditure will bring
the employee within the statutory exception."'
The Louisiana minority position appears to represent the
better view for almost any employee receives at least some initial
training by his supervisors. Moreover, the structure of section
113, which only permits enforcement of the covenant as a penalty
for failure to reimburse the employer's expenses, suggests that
such expenses must be readily identifiable. Thus, for example, an
employer could recover the cost of sending an employee to a
company-run school, but it is doubtful that the employer could
establish with certainty the amount of training and education
expenses which constitute that part of the employer's general
administrative overhead.
10

Otis Eng'r Corp. v. Guimbellot, 450 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1971) (20 days schooling

costing roughly $2,000 insufficient to justify enforcement of 5-year covenant not to compete within 100-mile radius of place of employment); Theatre Time Clock, Inc. v. Stewart,
276 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. La. 1967) (training expenses of on-the-job training for 2 weeks
insufficient to justify enforcement of 3-year noncompetition clause); Standard Brands,
Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (covenant not enforcible because no
substantial training expenses shown); National Motor Club v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238,
242 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (training expenses, described as "nominal so-called training expenses . . . incurred some 3 or 4 months after initial employment," consisting of
supervision and sales meetings insufficient to justify enforcement of the covenant).
" Covenants not to compete were enforced in National School Studios, Inc. v. Barrios, 236 So. 2d 309 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (training expenses consisted of sending salesmen
to Barrios' office to assist him on three occasions, a week's training in Memphis, and
payment of salary before payment justified by earnings); World Wide Health Studios, Inc.
v. Desmond, 222 So. 2d 517 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (5-year covenant not to compete
in 100-mile radius enforced on basis of intensive 2 weeks of training and several weeks of
being a "manager trainee"); Aetna Fin. Co. v. Adams, 170 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1964) (training consisted of provision of manuals of operation, legal bulletins, and
supervision of activities).
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3. Trade Secrets Exception
Section 113, unlike comparable statutes in other jurisdictions, permits noncompetition covenants for the protection of
trade secrets. "2 A trade secret is commonly defined as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.'1 The
factors relevant in identifying trade secrets include: (1) the degree
of secrecy, (2) the extent to which measures are taken to maintain
secrecy, (3) the amount of effort or costs required to develop the
secrets, and (4) the degree of difficulty required by others to
duplicate the secrets.' Trade secrets were defined by the Colorado Supreme Court in Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp.'
as follows:
Generally it may be said that a trade secret is any plan or
process known only to its owner, and those of his employees to whom
it is necessary to confide it. It is not necessary that the plan or
process be patentable."'

It has long been recognized that traditional common law
remedies do not afford adequate legal protection for proprietary
information because of the problems of identifying trade secrets
and determining when they are being used by the competitor.'47
Therefore, the use of restrictive covenants to protect trade secrets
has been accepted on the theory that if an employee is prohibited
from competing or working for a competitor, he will have no opportunity to use or divulge his former employer's trade secrets. "8
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(b) (1973). See text accompanying notes 10810 supra. But see Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Acct. Servicing House,

Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972) where the court in dictum stated that a noncompetition covenant to protect trade secrets is valid under California statute although the
statute itself does not expressly permit a trade secrets exemption.
"I RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
144 Id.
"4 123 Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951).
" Id. at 605, 233 P.2d at 999. See Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393,
439 P.2d 355 (1968) for an excellent discussion of what is not a trade secret.
"41 See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967); Bender,
Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970); Comment, The
Scott Amendment to the Patent Revision Act: Should Trade Secrets Receive Federal
Protection?, 31 Wis. L. REv. 900 (1971).
"I See Schneider & Halstrom, Trade Secret Protection in Massachusetts, 56 MASS.
L.Q. 239 (1971); Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies
Adequate?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1972). For an evaluation of covenants not to compete
as vehicles for protecting trade secrets see Note, Trade Secret Protectionof Non-Technical
Competitive Information, 54 IowA L. REv. 1164 (1969). State common law, however, is not
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It is possible that, as with training expenses, almost all employees have access to some trade secret information.'4 9 At one

extreme it would be unfair to permit a mere recital of the existence of trade secrets to bring a covenant within the statutory
exemption. On the other hand, it should not be necessary for a
covenantee to prove that a covenantor actually took, or intends
to take, or inevitably will take, trade secrets and use them improperly, for this would force the plaintiff to carry the same difficult
burden of proof that he would have in a suit grounded on a trade
secret theory absent any restrictive covenant.' 5
The better view of subparagraph (b) would therefore seem to
be that one asserting a restrictive covenant must show some logical relationship between the existence of trade secrets in his business and the enforcement of post-employment restraints on the
covenantor. This could be done by establishing (1) that there are
significant trade secrets in his business, (2) that the covenantor
had access to such trade secrets, and (3) that there is some likelihood that such trade secrets will be used by the covenantor if he
goes into competition.
4. Management and Professional Staff Exception
The exemption set forth in subparagraph (d) applies to two
classes of individuals, "executive and management personnel and
officers" and the "professional staff" of management. The term
officers may seem clear, although it could be rather inclusive in
the case, for example, of a large bank with numerous vice presidents. The meaning of management and executive personnel may
also seem relatively precise, but individuals as diverse as the
always adequate to protect trade secrets. See Blake at 657, 670; Note, An Employer's
Competitive Restraints on Former Employees, 17 DnAKE L. REv. 69 (1967).
,' For example, some but not all customer lists are trade secrets. See Suburban Gas
of Grand Junction, Inc. v. Bockelman, 157 Colo. 78, 401 P.2d 268 (1965). However, the
usual definitions of trade secrets are broad enough to create a very substantial class of
employees who might fall within the ambit of subparagraph (e).
"m See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967), citing
Note, Injunctions to Protect Trade Secrets-The Goodrich and DuPont Cases, 51 VA. L.
Rsv. 917 (1965) which says:
An employer seeking injunctive protection for his trade secrets prior to their
disclosure generally makes one or more of the following three allegations: (1)
that the defecting employee actually intends to divulge secrets in his possession; (2) that the defecting employee will inevitably reveal some trade secrets, whether consciously or not, just because of the type of work in which
he will be involved; (3) that there is a substantial probability of disclosure
by the defecting employee in his new employment.
51 VA. L. REv. at 922.
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operating engineer of a large power plant,'5 ' foremen,'52 superintendents,'53 engineers,'54 chemists,' 55 office managers,' 6 paymasters,' 7 and cashiers' 8 have all been considered executive or management personnel in some cases.' 59 "Professional staff" is equally
ambiguous. Does this include, for example, clerks, secretaries,
and stenographers, or is it directed at accountants, engineers, and
the like?'6 0 Even aside from its obvious ambiguities, subparagraph (d) appears to be the most inexplicable provision of section
113. Its purpose is not to protect trade secrets or to recover training expenses for these matters are adequately covered in other
portions of the statute. Subparagraph (d), therefore, must be
intended simply to protect employers from the disruption of operations which occur upon the loss of a key executive or member of
his staff.' " ' It is by no means clear, either as a matter of public
policy or as a matter of fairness to the individuals involved, that
discrimination on this basis is justified. On the other hand, it
might be argued that this exception can be justified on the basis
that such individuals almost always have access to confidential
information and other intangible assets which deserve protection.
However, the reason for this exception, as opposed to the rationalization, seems to be that employers want to retain these key
personnel because of their extreme importance to the company.
If this is the case, then the use of post-employment restraints is
obviously a penalty and not a legitimate effort to prevent unfair
competition.
,5, Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545 (1947).
,52 Smith v. Porter, 143 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1944).
113 Pugh v. Lindsay, 206 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1953).
' '
155

Allen v. Atlantic Co., 145 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1944).
Anderson v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 72 F. Supp. 639 (D. Minn. 1947).
Owin v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 42 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Tex. 1941).

i Cintron Rivera v. Bull Insular Line, 164 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1947).
"'
Kaczanowski v. Home State Bank, 77 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Wis. 1948).
"'
The Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee which drafted section 113 used a chef
as an example of a manager and executive. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6.
"IoIn other contexts professionals have been broadly defined. See, e.g., Rausch v.
Wolf, 72 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ill. 1947) (accountant); People v. Maggi, 378 Ill. 595, 39
N.E.2d 317 (1942) (beautician); State v. Cohn, 184 La. 53, 165 So. 449 (1936) (mechanic);
(Voorhees v. Bates, 308 N.Y. 184, 124 N.E. 273 (1954) (musician).
"I This policy, however, was not articulated in either the House or Senate hearings.
See House & Senate Hearings, supra note 6. One large company had apparently expressed
some concern about the bill, causing the Senate committee to add subparagraphs (d) &
(e). The nature of the policy supporting the concern was never discussed beyond the
inconvenience to employers of the loss of such personnel.
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Summary of Section 113

In summary, section 113 should be judged against the background of what it was intended to accomplish. The legislature was
concerned about a limited group of working people who were
required to execute noncompetition agreements for no valid purpose and were thereby subjected to severe limitations on their
subsequent employment. Section 113 therefore protects only the
right of one who performs skilled or unskilled labor to enter into
other employment, and it contains specific exemptions which
apply to virtually every situation in which a covenantee could
have a legitimate interest in preventing competition. The Colorado legislature has not attempted to alter the overall policy of
Colorado common law; it has simply dredged out a very limited
safe harbor for certain employees.
Section 113 has a number of ambiguities which might have
been avoided by more careful draftsmanship and which will ultimately have to be resolved by judicial construction. Some problems of this sort are no doubt inevitable in any statute and may
well be desirable from the point of view of allowing courts flexibility in applying the statute to changing circumstances. The larger
question is whether this sort of surgical approach to the common
law creates more problems than it solves.

IV.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The problems for the practitioner drafting or litigating a noncompetition agreement under Colorado law 62 include both those
"2 The conflicts of law problems relating to restrictive covenants deserve a separate
article. For present purposes it should be simply noted that the standard contract clause
designating applicable law will probably be ineffective. The general rule expressed by
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAws

§ 187(2)(b) (1971) is:

(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied even if the particular issue is one which the
parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of
the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties.
Noncompetition statutes have been found to reflect a strong public policy, and states will
not enforce covenants void under their laws regardless of the legality of said covenants
under the law of the state designated by the contract. Forney Indus., Inc. v. Andre, 246
F. Supp. 333 (D.N.D. 1965); May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Mich. 1939), alf'd,
117 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 691 (1941); Frame v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971); Auto Club Affili-
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which are inherent in the preexisting case law and those which
arise from the new statute. The following comments are addressed primarily to the lawyer who is drafting a noncompetition
agreement, although they should also be relevant to the lawyer
negotiating for the potential covenantor or for either party in
litigation.
A.

Common Law Problems

Colorado common law favors the covenantee wishing to enforce a noncompetition covenant. However, the broad thrust of
decisions upholding restrictive agreements should not obscure the
fact that Colorado purports to follow a conventional balancing
approach which occasionally has resulted in nonenforcement.
Similarly, the greater weight of Colorado authority follows the
doctrine of partial enforcement, thereby encouraging the draftsman to prepare a covenant as broad as his client wishes. Knoebel
Mercantile Co. v. Siders,6 3 however, suggests the grave possibility that in an appropriate case an excessive restriction may not
be enforced. Moreover, a problem exists in that Colorado law
offers no clear guidelines as to what is a reasonable geographic
area in a particular case. "
A restrictive covenant is not enforced as a penalty or as a
means of forcing a covenantor to continue his employment or
other association with the covenantee. Rather, the purpose is to
protect the covenantee from unfair competition, such as the purchaser who is entitled to legal protection of the goodwill he has
purchased and the employer who needs protection from a disloyal
employee who would otherwise use training and confidential information obtained from the employer to compete with him. In
drafting and enforcing a noncompetition covenant, counsel
should therefore seek to insure that it is limited only to such
reasonable goals.'
ates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Davis v. Ebsco Indus., Inc.,
150 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963). But cf. Grace v. Orkin Exterminating, Inc., 255
S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1953). Of course, nothing is lost by attempting to designate
the applicable law.
,13 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968). See text accompanying notes 72-73, 98-100
supra.
6, See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
'1 Even though a covenant is valid under the applicable statute, it must still meet
common law standards of reasonableness. See Holsen v. Marshall & Isley Bank, 52 Wis.
2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971); Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d
415 (1959). However, section 113 shifts the burden of proof significantly. Under Colorado
common law as in most jurisdictions, the burden of proving that the terms of a covenant

1975

B.

NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS IN COLORADO

Statutory Problems

The lawyer always hopes that a statute will at least eliminate
uncertainty. Section 113 does this to a limited degree by providing that certain covenants are clearly invalid. The extent of this
coverage, however, is uncertain because of statutory ambiguities.
In fact, it is not even clear whether section 113 applies to contracts entered into prior to the effective date of the statute.16 It
is more certain, however, that the attorney can draft a provision
forbidding any covenantor from becoming a shareholder, partner,
owner, investor, trustee, director, receiver, etc., of or in any competitive business without offending section 113.167
Since section 113 permits a full restrictive covenant between
the seller and buyer of a business, one should consider structuring
many other agreements so that the purchase and sale exception
may apply. For example, one could combine a buy-sell agreement
with a partnership agreement and insert a noncompetition covenant in the buy-sell provision so that the covenant is given as
partial consideration for the purchase of a withdrawing partner's
assets.'68 In close corporations key employees often receive stock
or other ownership rights such as stock options, and a noncompeare unreasonable is on the covenantor: Taff v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974); 17A C.J.S., Contracts § 585 (1963). Hence, the covenant is deemed valid and
enforceable until the covenantor proves to the contrary. Section 113, on the other hand,
voids all covenants not to compete unless the covenant is within one of its four exceptions.
Therefore, the covenant is enforceable only if the covenantee meets his burden of proof
that the covenant is within one of the exceptions. See generally, 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence
§ 147 (1967).
I The general rule is that vested rights under existing contracts will not be impaired
by subsequent legislation. 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 171 (1964). No statute avoiding
restrictive covenants has 'ever been applied to covenants executed before the effective date
of the statute; however, it is certainly possible that a legislature acting pursuant to the
state's police power could invalidate an existing contract deemed illegal and against
public policy. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555, 28 N.E.
76 (1891); Heart v. East Tenn. Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 113 S.W. 364 (1908). The
standard safety clause of section 113 supports the view that the statute represents an
exercise of the state's police power. On the other hand, CoLo. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 135-1202 (1963) provides that "a statute is presumed to be prospective in operation".
"I This, of course, is the kind of language which is used in the usual noncompetition
agreement. See, e.g., Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968);
Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Barrows v.
McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913). For standard noncompetition language see 5 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LwaAL FoAms wmTH TAX AALYsis Form 12.01
(1974) at 12-1004: "the Employee will not ...
directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, control, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any matter with the
ownership, management, operations, or control .
"I See note 133 supra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

tition agreement could be required in consideration of the
exercise of such rights.' 5
The greatest uncertainty under section 113 arises in connection with agreements such as franchises, 170 licenses, and leases.
Where feasible, one might structure such transactions in a way
that arguably involves a purchase and sale. In such areas as licenses and franchises, there is also the possibility of using the trade
secret exemption of subparagraph (b), and this, of course, should
be favored since it reflects a valid justification for a noncompetition covenant in these transactions.
There is a vast category of indirect restraints that might be
used in conjunction with an explicit agreement not to compete.
For example, in Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v.
Kappers,'7' a salesman agreed not to solicit clients of his former
employer for the purpose of selling group or franchise policies and
agreed not to attempt to induce the employer's clients to cancel
or fail to renew their existing policies.'7 2 Other indirect efforts to
discourage competition include denial of pension benefits to a
competing covenantor,' withholding of profit sharing distributions,' and denial of unaccrued sales commissions.' A court
- Vogue Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 292 Mich. 575, 291 N.W. 12 (1940).
The sale of stock by a shareholder has been held a "sale" with statutes prohibiting
covenants not to compete except in connection with a sale of goodwill. See Buckhout v.
Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 122 N.W. 184 (1909); Key v. Perkins, 173 Okla. 99, 46 P.2d 530
(1935); Bessel v. Bethke, 56 N.D. 1, 215 N.W. 868 (1927); Public Opinion Publishing Co.
v. Ransom, 34 S.D. 381, 148 N.W.838 (1914). The California courts held to the contrary
in Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling, 124 Cal. 429, 57 P. 468 (1899), necessitating an
amendment to the California statute. See note 110 supra. However, none of these cases
refer to purchase of stock.
"I For a more detailed discussion of policy considerations in franchise agreements,
see text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
" 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
172 ***[Tlhe
Soliciting Agent, hereby expressly covenants and agrees
that after termination of this agreement, for any reason, he shall not for a
period of two years thereafter, do nor shall he aid or abet others to do, any
of the following things: (1) sell, or attempt to sell, any form of accident or
health insurance to or on any of the Company's insureds under group or
franchise policies in the territory covered by this agreement, (2) induce, or
attempt to induce, any of the Company's insureds under group policies or
franchise policyholders to cancel, lapse or fail to renew their policies with the
Company in the territory covered by this agreement***
Id. at 97.
I See, e.g., Schroeder v. Gateway Transport. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860
(1971). But see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 203, Pub. L. No. 93406, § 203 (Sept. 2, 1974), to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1053, which makes covered pension
plans nonforfeitable regardless of subsequent acts of the employee.
14 See notes 118, 121 supra.
"I'See note 117 supra.
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might find some or all of such restraints to be, in effect, a covenant not to compete and hence void. However, some of the sanctions have been approved under other statutes which contain
provisions prohibiting covenants in restraint of trade, and, therefore, might be acceptable under the arguably more narrow language of section 113.
The various covenants of a contract should be in separate
clauses, and the contract should have a severability provision so
that judicial avoidance of one covenant will not necessarily affect
all. Recitals in the contract might state that the covenantor entered into the contract freely, for full consideration, and with full
knowledge of its consequences. '
The remaining question is, of course, to what extent the statute will affect existing common law."' The purpose of section 113
is clearly remedial, and the sponsoring committee expected it to
relieve employees of burdensome and unfair covenants. The Colorado courts, on the other hand, have taken the view that there is
virtually a moral commandment that covenants are to be enforced in accordance with their terms whenever possible. Whether
the courts will apply section 113 broadly to invalidate covenants
the legislature found objectionable or whether section 113 will be
strictly construed to preserve the judicial policy of upholding contracts cannot now be determined. However, the courts might do
"I The Colorado courts have never held that full understanding of the covenant by
the parties is necessary to its enforcement but have occasionally noted that the covenant
in question was knowledgeably signed or that the covenantor was represented by counsel.
See Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970);
Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Gulick v. A.
Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
'" A brief survey of the Colorado cases indicates that at least 10 of the 23 covenants
enforced under common law would probably be enforced under section 113 either because
they involve a sale of a business or a covenantor who was a manager. Sale of business
cases: Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948). Weber v. Nonpareil Baking
Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929); Garf v. Weitzman, 72 Colo. 132, 209 P. 809 (1922);
Barrow v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913); Flower Haven, Inc. v.
Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972). Sale of partnership interest cases: Fuller v.
Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d 18 (1966); Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184
(1951). Employment of manager cases: Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d
228 (1943); Taff v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Gulick v. A. Robert
Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970). The covenants in the other cases
could also be upheld if they were necessary to protect trade secrets, to enforce recovery
for training expenses, or if the statute were construed so as to make the covenantor the
type of key personnel included in subparagraph (d). Unfortunately, these matters cannot
be determined in the absence of judicial interpretation of section 113 and further facts
about the respective cases.
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well to recognize that section 113 represents a legitimate objection to the trend in Colorado common law.
CONCLUSION

The basic problem with Colorado's treatment of restrictive
covenants has not been in the statement of the common law rule
but in the judicial application of that rule. This judicial application has sometimes been inconsistent and has often manifested a
tendency to enforce such covenants too readily.
Although section 113 provides complete protection to a covenantor who is within its coverage, it suffers from ambiguities
which make the extent of that coverage uncertain and from express limitations of scope even if it is broadly construed. These
problems illustrate the difficulties of trying to reform judicial
policy through legislative action, and this is indeed what section
113 attempts. The statutory thrust is to abolish restraints on
future employment which the legislature found to be undesirable.
Yet when the legislature confronted the problem, it determined
that some kinds of restrictions on future employment are legitimate and necessary.
Once it is acknowledged that a distinction between good and
bad restraints had to be made, the legislature was poorly
equipped to cope with the problem. All it could do was state in
statutory terms the criteria which the common law rule should
contain. Thus, the legislation declares restraints on future employment to be void with certain exceptions, and those exceptions
turn out to be strikingly similar to the standards for "reasonableness" which the Colorado courts have already articulated. 7 The
courts are still left to define the terms and their application in
particular cases. If one concludes that the Colorado courts have
demonstrated a tendency to define and apply the rules in a way
which is in effect biased in favor of enforcement, the impact of
section 113 is likely to be modest. Moreover, to the extent that
section 113 provides an impregnable barrier which clearly protects some covenantors, the courts may sometimes be prevented
from granting relief which equity would otherwise require.
The effect of section 113, however limited, should not be
deprecated. There are certainly a significant number of cases in
17SSee text accompanying notes 48-54 supra for a discussion of the particular factors
used by Colorado courts to justify enforcement of noncompetition covenants including:
customer contacts, trade secrets, training, technical or complex business, degree of competition, key employee status, and uniqueness of services rendered.
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which the covenantor will clearly fall within its protection. '" To
this extent section 113 should have a generally wholesome effect.
Its most obvious advantage is that in some cases it will eliminate
any question as to the invalidity of a covenant without the necessity of expensive litigation and thereby do away with the dampening effect that such covenants have on the covenantor's activities.
It is by no means clear that noncompetition covenants are
ever defensible, at least within the context of present and future
employment of the covenantor. Other common law and statutory
remedies, such as those related to trade secret protection, could
provide adequate, although less definite and convenient, protection to the covenantee. However, within the context of the existing Colorado rules, it appears that there is room for significant
improvement in the way in which such rules are applied by the
courts, and perhaps section 113 will provide some impetus for the
courts to reevaluate their attitudes in the restrictive covenant
area.

I"' See note 177 supra for a discussion of the probable effect that section 113 would
have had on cases previously decided under Colorado law.

DEVOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN
COLORADO, REVISITED
By Lucy MARSH YEE*
INTRODUCTION

"Nothing pertaining to the devolution of a possibility of reverter would be gained by a further study of the chain of title [in
School Dist. No. Six v. Russell]"2 according to Professor Thompson G. Marsh. But if an unruly student should persist in studying
that chain, he or she would be astonished. Contrary to prevalent
academic belief,3 it has not yet been decided-by School Dist.
No. Six v. Russell4 or by any other Colorado case-whether a
possibility of reverter may be devised in Colorado. Since other
jurisdictions are divided on this issue,' it is by no means certain
which way the Colorado courts will go. Thus although there are
those who believe that "[t]he law of future interests seems to
have begun in the late thirteenth century, and to have been completed by the late sixteenth century
, , there are still a few
developments to be made in Colorado.
It will therefore be the purpose of this article, first, to demonstrate that it has not yet, in fact, been decided that a possibility
of reverter may be devised in Colorado. Second, the major Colorado decisions on the subject will be studied in an attempt to
indicate just what has presently been determined in Colorado
concerning the possibility of reverter and the closely related, but
significantly different, right of entry for condition broken. Finally, a few illustrations will be offered to indicate some differences in the ways in which possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry for condition broken have been used in Colorado.
* Adjunct Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1963, Smith College;
J.D., 1966, University of Michigan Law School.
This was the title used by Professor Thompson G. Marsh for a discussion of School
Dist. No. 6 v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964), in Marsh, Devolution of a
Possibility of Reverter in Colorado, 41 DENVER L.J. 396 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Marsh].
Marsh at 401.
Id.
156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964).
Holding that a possibility of reverter may be devised are Lacy v. Montgomery, 181
Pa. Super. 640, 124 A.2d 492 (1956) (dictum); Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d
448 (1950). Contra, Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959); Upington v.
Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896).
Comment, Proposed Restrictions on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry,
34 Miss. L.J. 176 (1963).
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School Dist. No. Six v. Russell REVISITED

It has been stated that School Dist. No. Six v. Russell constituted Colorado's first decision that a possibility of reverter may
be devised.7 Russell was an action by the school district to have
title to certain real property quieted in the district. Mary Sander,
one of the defendants named in the quiet title action who appeared and sought to have the title quieted in her, won.'
The original deed to the school district was from Herbert A.
Russell.' The deed contained the provision that "it is understood
and agreed that if the above described land is abandoned by the
said second parties and not used for school purposes then the
above described land reverts to the party of the first part."' 10
Professor Marsh has aptly pointed out that this is a "hybrid.""
He states that if the deed had said,
"unto the said party of the second part its heirs and assigns, so long
as the land is used for school purposes, and no longer, whereupon it
shall revert to the party of the first part and his heirs

. . ."

the

grantor would have had a possibility of reverter.
If the deed had said, "unto the said party of the second part its
heirs and assigns, but if the land is abandoned by the said party and
not used for school purposes then the party of the first part and his
heirs shall have the power to terminate the estate hereby granted,"
the grantee would have had an estate in fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent, and the grantor would have had a power of
termination"2 [here called a right of entry for condition broken].

But since the language of the provision was ambiguous, as so
many such provisions are, the court used the test of purpose' 3 and
determined that the provision in question created a possibility of
reverter. 4 However, by the time the possibility of reverter would
have caused the land to revert to the grantor in this case, the
grantor was dead. Thus the question arose as to who was entitled
to the benefit of the possibility of reverter when the school ceased
to use the land for school purposes.
To answer this question, one must check the chain of title
through which the possibility of reverter must have passed. This
Marsh at 401.
156 Colo. at 84, 396 P.2d at 933.
Id. at 76, 396 P.2d at 929.

Id.
I0
1
12

'3
"

Marsh at 396.
Id.
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.6 (1952).
156 Colo. at 81, 396 P.2d at 932.
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was found by Professor Marsh to have been included in Appendix
B of the Brief of Plaintiff in Error, and reads as follows:
March 11, 1890 Deed, Russell to School District.
Herbert A. Russell dies intestate, with
June 4, 1930
widow, Agnes F. Russell, as sole heir.
May 20, 1950
Agnes F. Russell dies testate, leaving a
brother, David M. Bell, and sister,
Jane B. Darling, with residue to Jane
B. Darling.
May 12, 1955
Jane B. Darling dies testate, leaving
her residuary estate to her heirs, Mort
W. Darling (husband), and children
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner.
Aug. 10, 1955
Mort W. Darling dies testate with residuary estate to his heirs, Dewey L.
Darling, Ray W. Darling, and Satia
May Turner.
June 1960
School discontinued at school site but
possession retained by School District.
May 1, 1962
School District files complaint for
quiet title.
Nov. 5, 1962
Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit
Claim Deed from David M. Bell,
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner to Sander. 5
Based on this chain of title, Professor Marsh has asserted
that "the decision of this case [quieting title in Sander], included, by necessary inference, the first decision that a possibility
of reverter was devisable in Colorado."' 6 But since the Professor
himself has always advocated scepticism, let us closely examine
that idea.
Under the theory that a possibility of reverter is devisable in
Colorado we would find the following chain of title:
March 11, 1890 Deed, Russell to School District, reserving a possibility of reverter in the
grantor.
June 4, 1930
Possibility of reverter passes by intestacy to Agnes F. Russell.
"

Marsh at 399-400.
Id. at 401.
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Jane B. Darling receives the possibility
of reverter by devise (as a tenant in
severalty).
Mort W. Darling, Dewey L. Darling,
Ray W. Darling, and Satia May
Turner receive the possibility of reverter by devise (as tenants in common
or as joint tenants, according to the
terms of the will).
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner receive their
father's share of the possibility of reverter by devise (again as tenants in
common or as joint tenants, according
to the terms of the will).
School discontinued at school site.
Land automatically reverts to the devisees of the possibility of reverter
-here Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling, and Satia May Turner.
School District files complaint for
quiet title.
Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit
Claim Deed from David M. Bell,
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner to Sander.

Therefore if a possibility of reverter is devisable, Sander ends up
with the full title to the land.
But what if the court had held that the possibility of reverter
could not have been transferred by devise, but only by inheritance? Then the chain of title would be as follows:
March 11, 1890 Deed, Russell to School District, reserving a possibility of reverter in the
grantor.
Possibility of reverter passes by intesJune 4, 1930
tacy to Agnes F. Russell.
May 20, 1950
David M. Bell and Jane B. Darling,
evidently the only heirs of Agnes F.
Russell, each take a one-half interest
in the possibility of reverter as tenants
in coparcenary, by inheritance."
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103 (1973).
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May 12, 1955

Aug. 10, 1955

June 1960

May 1, 1962
Nov. 5, 1962

Mort W. Darling, Dewey L. Darling,
Ray W. Darling, and Satia May
Turner, the heirs of Jane B. Darling,
inherit her one-half interest, again taking as tenants in coparcenary. 8 (Mort
has a one-quarter interest as surviving
spouse, and the children divide the
other one-quarter interest, each thus
taking a one-twelfth interest in the
possibility of reverter.9)
Mort W. Darling's one-quarter interest
passes by inheritance to his heirs, the
three children, who take as coparceners-each child thereby acquiring
another one-twelfth interest, giving
each child a total of a one-sixth interest in the possibility of reverter.
School discontinued at school site.
Land automatically reverts, and is
owned by the following persons in the
following shares:
David M . Bell ............ 1/2
Dewey L. Darling ......... 1/6
Ray W. Darling ........... 1/6
Satia May Turner ......... 1/6
School District files complaint for
quiet title.
Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit
Claim Deed from David M. Bell,
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner to Sander.

Sander again ends up with full title to the land! Because Sander
could take full title either under the theory that a possibility of
reverter can be devised, or under the theory that a possibility can
only be inherited, it is not possible to determine that "the decision of this case included, by necessary inference, the first decision that a possibility of reverter was devisable in Colorado."" °
Thus until further elucidation of the law, Colorado attorneys
IsId.
IId.
Marsh at 401.
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must follow the cautious example of the attorney in School Dist.
No. Six v. Russell who insisted upon obtaining a quit claim deed
from David M. Bell, although Bell would have had no interest if
the possibility of reverter had been devisable. For clearer guidelines, one must simply wait for a definitive decision by the Colorado Supreme Court.
But as one waits, it might prove worthwhile to consider the
right of entry for condition broken and the possibility of reverter
more closely, both as to the general similarities and differences
between the two interests, and as to the special qualities which
both may have in Colorado.
II.
A.

THE RIGHT OF ENTRY FOR CONDITION BROKEN AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER

General Similarities

Both the right of entry for condition broken and the possibility of reverter were known to the early common law.2' In fact,
Gray asserted that the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290 had eliminated the ability to create a possibility of reverter, though the
ability to create a right of entry for condition broken was unaffected thereby. 2 Despite Gray, however, both the right of entry
for condition broken and the possibility of reverter are today recognized both in the United States in general and in Colorado in
particular.
At common law neither the right of entry for condition broken nor the possibility of reverter could be devised or alienated,
except in a few very limited situations. 23
In the United States, both interests are considered to be
unaffected by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 2 Whether this is
2 See Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry, 22
B.U.L. REv. 43 (1942); Comment, The Devisibility of Possibilitiesof Reverter and Rights
of Entry for Condition Broken, 7 ARK.L. REV. 390 (1952); 51 HARv. L. REv. 1113 (1938);
27 MICH. L. REV. 346 (1928); 32 MICH. L. REv. 415 (1933).
" J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 30-31 (4th ed. 1942).
u "Neither a possibility of reverter nor a right of entry was assignable at common
law." Roberts, supra note 21, at 44. Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 101, 106 S.E.2d 913,
916 (1958): "[Tlhe possibility of reverter is an interest too nebulous, under the common
law concept, to be devised or conveyed." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 160 (1936): "Except
as stated in sec. 161 the owner of a power of termination [here called a right for entry for
condition broken] in land has no power to transfer his interest, or any part thereof, by a
conveyance inter vivos." See § 161 for three very limited exceptions.
24 Prince v. Charles Ilfeld Co., 72 N.M. 351, 383 P.2d 827 (1963); Commercial Nat'l
Bank v. Martin, 185 Kan. 116, 340 P.2d 899 (1959); E. KING, FUTURE INTERESTS IN
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because each interest is considered vested upon creation,25 or
whether it is simply because American courts have declined to
apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to these interests,"6 is open
to discussion. But the fact remains that in the United States both
interests, being unaffected by the Rule Against Perpetuities, may
last forever.
B.

Major Differences

The first important difference between a right of entry for
condition broken and a possibility of reverter is in the words used
to create the interest. A right of entry27 should be created by such
words as "but if . . . then the grantor shall have the right to
reenter the premises, and this deed shall thereby become null and
void." Failure to include specific words reserving a right of entry
in the grantor may be disastrous."
A possibility of reverter, on the other hand, should be created
by such words as "so long as . . . and no longer, and then to
revert to the grantor." 9 It has been held that the grantor need not
say, specifically, that the land is to revert. The mere use of the
words, "so long as" or "as long as," may be sufficient to create a
COLORADO 24 (1950); Comment, Rights of Entry and Possibilitiesof Reverter- The Perpetual Title Cloud-A Need for Legislative Limitation, 71 DICK. L. REv. 349 (1966).
25King, Future Interests in Colorado, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 227, 248 (1948): "A
possibility of reverter is a vested interest. It is not subject to the rule against perpetuities."
J.GRAY, supra note 22, at § 304:
J
Though rights of entry for condition broken are within both the letter and
the spirit of the Rule against Perpetuities; though there is nothing in the
history of the Rule to exempt them from its operation; though they are held
to be subject to it in England; though the practical inconvenience of excluding them is very great . . .yet in America conditions violating the Rule
against Perpetuities have been repeatedly upheld, and forfeitures for their
breach enforced.
The right of entry for condition broken may also be called a power of termination.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 160 (1936); the estate which is subject to a right of entry for
condition broken may be called a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. L. SIMES,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 14, at 30 (2d ed. 1966).
11 Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 390 Ill. 619, 626, 61 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1945), held
that "equity will not aid a forfeiture where no right of re-entry is provided in the covenant." But see West v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969):
[A]n express reverter clause need not be present, but if a consideration of
all the language of the deed shows an intention to create a condition, then
upon the failure to comply with the condition the grantor in the deed will
have a right of reentry.
Other typical words are "while," "until," "for the purpose of," "to be used for," or
similar expressions of a duration of time. The estate which is subject to a possibility of
reverter may be described as "a fee simple on a special limitation," "a fee simple determinable," or a "base or qualified fee." See City of Klamath Falls v. Bell, 7 Ore. App. 330,
490 P.2d 515 (1971).
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possibility of reverter in the grantor in some jurisdictions, 0 although the result might be opposite in other jurisdictions . 3
The second crucial difference between the right of entry for
condition broken and the possibility of reverter is the method of
enforcement. A holder of a right of entry for condition broken
must assert his right, or the prior estate will simply continue in
the hands of the grantee.32 However, although it is agreed that
assertion of the right is necessary, there is some uncertainty as
to precisely what acts will be sufficient to constitute such an
assertion." The holder of a possibility of reverter, on the other
hand, need do nothing to enforce his possibility of reverter. The
possibility of reverter comes into effect automatically. 3 When the
land subject to a possibility of reverter is no longer used for a
church, for example, the title automatically reverts to the grantor. 3 5 The grantor need not do anything.
The third difference between the two interests is in the
applicability of the statute of limitations. A typical statute of
* "The words, 'as long as' are words of art creating a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter." Lindsay v. Wigal, 145 Ind. App. 338, 339, 250 N.E.2d 755, 756 (1969). No
other words of limitation were there used, and there was no specific mention of reverter.
31 Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 285 A.2d 63 (1971). The clause
read, "It is the understanding of the parties ... that the hereinabove described land is
conveyed solely for the purpose of being used for the . . . erection and maintenance of a
public school or schools ....
" Id. at 450, 285 A.2d at 65. The court held that "[in the
present case there are no words indicating an intent to create a fee simple determinable
or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. There are no words creating either a
right of re-entry or a possibility of a reversion." Id. at 454, 285 A.2d at 67.
32 "[T he power of termination does not take effect in possession on the breach of
the condition, but only when the owner of such power of termination, thereafter, by
appropriate acts, indicates his election to forfeit.
... L. SiMES, supra note 27, at 30. See
Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P.2d 412 (1942); A.
(1959).

GULLIVER, INTRODUCTION TO THE

LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

1 It is not entirely clear just what actions will constitute an "assertion" of the right
of entry for condition broken.
It is generally held today that a physical entry on the land is not required
...
. What the holder of a right of entry must do in lieu of entering is not
too clear under modern law. However, there is substantial support for the
proposition that bringing a suit to recover the land is sufficient.
A. GULLlVER, supra note 32, at 54. See Nogaj v. Nogaj, 352 Mich. 223, 89 N.W.2d 513 (1958)
(holding that bringing a suit for divorce, which was later withdrawn, was sufficient action
to assert a right of entry for condition broken); Mosca Town Co. v. Wellington, 39 Colo.
326, 89 P. 783 (1907) (holding that carrying off personal property from the land was
sufficient to exercise the right).
34 "[The happening of the event named in the special limitation is regarded as
terminating the estate by its own limitation and not by virtue of some extrinsic provision."
L. SIMES, supra note 27, at 28.
"[T]he determinable fee granted will automatically cease, and the property will
revert to the grantor or to his successor in interest." Id. at 28-29.
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limitations for an action to enforce a building restriction on real
property might read as follows:
No action shall be commenced or maintained to enforce the terms
of any building restriction concerning real property or to compel the
removal of any building or improvement on land because of the
violation of any terms of any building restrictions unless said action
is commenced within one year from the date of the violation for
which the action is sought to be brought or maintained3

This sort of statute would bar an action under a right of entry for
condition broken at the expiration of 1 year from the time of the
breach of the specified condition. The statute would have no
effect, however, on the possibility of reverter.37 Since a possibility
of reverter comes into effect automatically, the title to the land
reverts automatically, and no action by the holder of the possibility of reverter is necessary.
Yet the owner of land which was acquired through a possibility of reverter is not entirely safe. A possibility of reverter is not
itself subject to the type of 1-year statute set forth above. But if
after the title has reverted the former owner continues in possession, it may be held that his possession was sufficiently "open,
notorious, and hostile"3 to meet the requirements set forth in a
typical statute for adverse possession,3" or for adverse possession
with payment of taxes. 0 Title acquired through a possibility of
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-119 (1973) (emphasis added). Because of a 1972
change in the statute, it is no longer clear what statute of limitations applies to a right of
entry based on some condition other than a building restriction.
See School Dist. No. 6 v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964).
[fln spite of the School District's contention that the statute was a bar, and
the admitted fact that more than a year had elapsed between the cessation
of the use and the bringing of the action, the court sustained the possibility
of reverter. The necessary inference is that, as such, it was not affected by
the statute. This had never before been decided. It is not here expressed, but
there is no other way to account for the decision.
Marsh at 398.
38 See Van Zandt v. Chan, 7 Ariz. App. 360, 439 P.2d 523 (1968). But see Faus v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 146 Cal. App. 2d 370, 303 P.2d 814 (1956); Prince v. Charles Ilfeld Co.,
72 N.M. 351, 383 P.2d 827 (1963).
E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-101 (1973):
No person shall commence or maintain an action for the recovery of the title
or possession or to enforce or establish any right or interest of or to real
property or make an entry thereon unless commenced within eighteen years
after the right to bring such action or make such entry has first accrued or
within eighteen years after he or those from, by, or under whom he claims
have been seized or possessed of the premises. Eighteen years adverse possession of any land shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership.
E.g., id. § 38-41-108:
Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements, under claim and
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reverter is no more secure from termination by adverse possession
than any other title. But at least either statutory period required
for adverse possession is considerably longer than the 1-year statute applicable to the assertion of a right of entry for condition
broken.
The fourth major difference between the two interests arises
in connection with the question of alienability. In a jurisdiction
where it is held that neither interest may be alienated, the attempted conveyance of the two interests will cause strikingly different results. The attempted conveyance of a possibility of reverter will simply be held to be a nullity." It will not transfer
ownership of the possibility of reverter, nor will it have any effect
on the possibility of reverter itself.42 However, the attempted conveyance of a right of entry for condition broken will have a dramatic effect.
The ...

doctrine, which has gained acceptance in most of the few

American jurisdictions wherein the point has received attention, is
that an attempted alienation of a right of re-entry extinguishes it,
and discharges the premises from the condition, notwithstanding
the alienee receives nothing because of the recognized rule against
alienation.43

Such a difference in the effect of the two interests clearly points
up the importance of distinguishing them. Moreover, a consideration of Colorado case law concerning these interests will show
further significant differences (as well as a few similarities).
C.

Alienability and Devisability in Colorado
The only time a right of entry for condition broken or a possi-

color of title, made in good faith, who for seven successive years continues
in such possession and also during said time pays all taxes legally assessed
on such lands or tenements shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner
of said lands or tenements to the extent and according to the purport of his
paper title. All persons holding under such possession by purchase, devise,
or descent, before said seven years have expired, who continue such possession and continue to pay the taxes as provided in this section, so as to
complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term, provided in this
section, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.
4' See Consolidated School Dist. v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159, 66 N.W.2d 881 (1954).
in those jurisdictions in which a possibility of reverter is
42 [E]ven
considered to be inalienable, it is not, as has sometimes been held in regard
to a right of reentry, destroyed by an attempted alienation of it.
Note, Property-FeeSimple Determinables-DistinguishingCharacteristics,71 W. VA. L.
REV. 367, 374 (1969) (footnotes omitted). "No rule of extinguishment appears ever to have
been applied to an attempted transfer of a grantor's possibility of reverter." Annot., 53
A.L.R.2d 224, 229 (1957).
1 Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 224, 229 (1957).
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bility of reverter is specifically mentioned in the Colorado statutes is in relation to mineral interests." This at least indicates
that the interests are recognized by statute. However, there is no
specific statutory provision regarding the characteristics of these
interests. Devisability and alienability of the interests are of particular concern because of their pragmatic importance, but these
qualities are not statutorily controlled.
With regard to devisability, prior to the new Colorado Probate Code, the applicable statutory provision merely stated that
every person of the age of eighteen years or more, being of sound
mind and memory, may execute a will and may devise and bequeath
real and personal property or any interest therein and by will may
exercise any power of appointment whether such power was created
before or after the effective date of this section.4 5

With the adoption of the new Colorado Probate Code, that provision has been shortened to the simple statement that, "[any
person eighteen years of age or older who is of sound mind may
make a will.""6 Neither under the old law nor under the new
Colorado Probate Code was specific reference made to the right
of entry for condition broken or to the possibility of reverter.
The Colorado statute dealing with alienability inter vivos is
similarly broad:
Any person, association of persons, or body politic or corporate,
which is entitled to hold real estate, or any interest in real estate
whatever, shall be authorized to convey the same to another or a
body corporate or politic by deed.'

Again, there is no specific reference to rights of entry for condition
broken or to possibilities of reverter.
Thus an examination of the case law is necessary. As indicated above, it is not yet known whether a possibility of reverter
may be devised in Colorado. Nor is it clear whether a possibility
of reverter (while it is still a mere possibility) may be alienated,
although it is descendible. s
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
45Id. § 153-5-1 (1963).
4S Id. § 15-11-501 (1973).

§

38-43-101 (1973).

Id. § 38-30-101.
School Dist. No. 6 v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964). Under either of
the theories, devise or inheritance, discussed above, the possibility of reverter must have
descended from Herbert A. Russell to Agnes F. Russell. The court also specifies, for the
first time in Colorado, which heirs take by descent. The court accepts the rule that "the
possibility of reverter is cast by descent upon the person's heirs, at the time of his death."
'7

"
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It is not yet known whether a right of entry for condition
broken may be devised. However, it has been decided that a right
of entry for condition broken may not be alienated in Colorado. 9
Union Colony Co. v. Gallie0 held that the mere attempt to convey
a right of entry for condition broken in Colorado permanently
extinguished the right. In that case, a corporation named Union
Colony had originally deeded a large part of the land now constituting the City of Greeley 5 to various owners, subject to a right
of entry for condition broken in the grantor if liquor should ever
be "manufactured, sold or given away in any place of public
resort as a beverage, on said premises."52 Many years thereafter,
in 1929, the charter of the old corporation expired, and the Colorado Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the right of
entry for condition broken passed under the statute to the trustees of the old corporation.5" But in 1934 the trustees formed a new
corporation, for the express purpose, among other things, of having the new corporation hold and be able to exercise the original
right of entry for condition broken. After the new corporation was
formed, the trustees of the old corporation duly attempted to
convey the right of entry for condition broken to the new corporation. Thereupon Katie Gallie brought an action to quiet title,
claiming that the right of entry for condition broken constituted
a cloud on her title and should be declared to be unenforceable.
The Colorado Supreme Court supported her contention, holding
that, "[alt common law, which was adopted in Colorado . . .
and which, in the absence of a statute otherwise providing, is in
force, the right of re-entry for condition broken. . . could not be
assigned. 5 4 The court went on to say that the trustees, "by such
conveyance . . . have destroyed the power in themselves if it ever
Id. at 82, 396 P.2d at 932. The rule that a possibility of reverter "rains down" on "those
who would qualify as heirs of the person creating the limitation as of the time when the
estate of his grantee is terminated" is rejected. Id.
"1 Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939).
50 Id.

5'Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 2, Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, id., asserts that,
Virtually all present titles to real property within the City of Greeley ...
are deraigned by mesne conveyances from THE UNION COLONY OF COLORADO. . . . Virtually all UNION COLONY OF COLORADO conveyances of real property . . .in . . . Greeley contained a clause identical to
the clause quoted above.
This is not contradicted in any way by the Brief of Defendants in Error.
1 104 Colo. at 48, 88 P.2d at 121.
Id. at 55, 88 P.2d at 124.
Id. at 53, 88 P.2d at 123.

DEVOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER

existed.

'5

Thus clear title was quieted in Gallie, and all the land

in the City of Greeley which had been subject to the particular
liquor clause was freed from that right of entry for condition
broken. 6 It was clearly established that a right of entry for condition broken is not alienable in Colorado, and that an attempted
conveyance destroys the right.
One other significant characteristic of rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter which is not controlled by Colorado statute should be considered-their ability under the common law to
endure forever. This quality of durability has been changed in
some jurisdictions by statute.5" It has been changed in Colorado
by case law.
D. Changed Conditions and Waiver in Colorado
In 1950 Dean Edward C. King published an excellent book
dealing with this subject entitled Future Interests in Colorado.8
But since that time the characteristics of a right of entry for
condition broken, and perhaps a possibility of reverter, have been
significantly changed in Colorado by the case of Cole v. Colorado
Springs Co.5" Under the orthodox rule, both a right of entry for
condition broken and a possibility of reverter are legal interests0
whose validity simply is not affected by changed conditions.' In
contrast, under a simple restrictive covenant in a deed (or the
similar interests known as affirmative or negative easements, or
equitable servitudes), the equitable defense of changed conditions may be applied in certain circumstances. 2 It should be kept
in mind that the basic difference between a covenant and a right
of entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter is that a
covenant is a promise made between the grantor and the grantee,
5 Id. at 55, 88 P.2d at 124.
56

Id.

5 For examples of cases upholding such statutes see Blackert v. Dugosh, 12 Ill. 2d
171, 145 N.E.2d 606 (1957); Town of Brookline v. Carey, 355 Mass. 424, 245 N.E.2d 446
(1969).
5 E. KING, supra note 24.
11 152 Colo. 162, 381 P.2d 13 (1963).
6 "[I]f the land is subject to a legal restraint, i.e., a possibility of reverter or right
of entry, the power to refuse enforcement does not exist and forfeiture must be decreed."
Comment, Legislative Limitation of Reverter and Forfeiture Provisions in Conveyances
and Devises of Land-A Proposed Statute for Kansas, 15 KA. L. REv. 346, 348 (1967).
1I "[A] change of conditions which has eliminated the reason which prompted the
creation of a right of entry or possibility of reverter is supposed to be immaterial." Comment, FutureInterests-Effect of Change of Conditions on Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter Created to Control the Use of Land, 53 MICH. L. Rav. 246 (1954).
62 See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882).
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but the right of entry for condition broken and the possibility of
reverter are property interests retained by the grantor, who has
parted with less than a fee simple absolute. The exact words of
the particular provision are extremely important in determining
whether a covenant, a right of entry for condition broken, or a
possibility of reverter has been established.
If the provision is found to constitute a covenant, against the
sale of liquor for example, and the subject land has subsequently
become the heart of the saloon district, the covenant might well
be unenforceable in equity because of changed conditions.A
Under the orthodox rule the changed conditions would have no
effect whatsoever on the enforceability of a right of entry for
condition broken or a possibility of reverter. 4
But Colorado departed from the orthodox rule in Cole v.
Colorado Springs Co. The final result in that case was that the
Colorado Supreme Court quieted title in the plaintiff, Cole,
thereby holding that the Colorado Springs Company would not
be permitted to enforce a "liquor clause" in its favor which had
been inserted by the company in the deed to Cole's predecessors
in title.65
This particular clause had become rather famous in Colorado,"6 and had been upheld in 1879 by the Supreme Court of the
United States as a condition subsequent, 7 which would thus create a right of entry for condition broken in the Colorado Springs
See Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959).
e' It should be noted, however, that in some jurisdictions forfeiture will be denied if
the court finds that there has been "substantial compliance" with the restrictions contained in a grant creating a right of entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter.
"Conditions of this sort . . . are not favored in the law and are to be construed strictly
against the grantor, . . and hence substantial compliance by the grantee is held to be
sufficient." Lassiter v. Town of Oxford, 243 F.2d 217, 218 (4th Cir. 1956). See also Board
of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1949); J.M. Carey & Bros. v. City of Casper,
66 Wyo. 437, 213 P.2d 263 (1950).
15 The clause provided that
intoxicating liquors shall never be manufactured, sold or otherwise disposed
of as a beverage in any place of public resort, in or upon the premises hereby
granted. . . and it is herein and hereby expressly reserved by the said party
of the first part, that in case any of the above conditions concerning intoxicating liquors are broken. . . then this deed shall become null and void, and
all right, title and interest, of, in, and to the premises hereby conveyed, shall
revert to the said party of the first part . . ..
152 Colo. at 166, 381 P.2d at 15.
11 E. KING, supra note 24, at 29. This restriction, according to King, "came to be
known as 'the Colorado Springs restriction.'"
11 Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55, 58 (1879).
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Company. In Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., however, the court
seemed unable to determine whether the clause created a right
of entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter. In one
paragraph the court spoke of it as a possibility of reverter; 5 in
other paragraphs the court seemed to consider it a right of entry
for condition broken. 9 So it is by no means certain whether the
holding of the case applied to possibilities of reverter, rights of
entry for condition broken, or both.
Similarly, it is not entirely clear on what basis the court
reached its decision. Some of the cases relied upon, including the
Colorado case and three of the five cases from other jurisdictions,
simply do not hold what the Colorado court said that they hold.70
But after all, it is courts and legislatures, not law professors, who
make the law. So whatever the underlying reasoning may or may
not be, the Colorado Supreme Court announced some new law for
Colorado at the conclusion of Cole v. Colorado Springs Co. It
there stated: "[Ilf changed conditions and waiver make the condition unenforceable in the present case, as we conclude they do,
we see no reason why title may not be quieted in this action
"I' Thus Colorado has turned away from the orthodox
rule,
68 "[HIe has only a possibility of reverter." 152 Colo. at 167, 381 P.2d at 16.
" "Like language . . . was . . . held to establish a condition subsequent ....
Id. See also id. at 170, 381 P.2d at 17: "'a reversioner may waive a condition, and . . .
the breach does not of itself determine the grantee's estate without some act on the part
of the person entitled to take advantage of the forfeiture ....
'"
" Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 390 Ill. 619, 61 N.E.2d 552 (1945), specifically
avoids deciding that changed conditions would affect the enforceability of a right of entry
for condition broken. Instead, the court finds that there was no right of entry for condition
broken to begin with. "A breach of a condition subsequent does not revest title in the
original grantor or his heirs . . . and a court of equity will not aid a forfeiture where no
right of re-entry is provided in the covenant. . . . The deeds in question did not contain
a right of re-entry." Id. at 623, 61 N.E.2d at 556 (emphasis added). Lantz v. Pence, 127
Ind. App. 620, 142 N.E.2d 456 (1957), simply made no mention of possibilities of reverter,
rights of entry for condition broken, or of changed conditions. White v. Kentling, 345 Mo.
526, 134 S.W.2d 39 (1939), held that the interest involved was a possibility of reverter
which was still perfectly valid, and the issues discussed did not include changed conditions. Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939), did not hold that
changed conditions had any effect on the right of entry for condition broken. It was the
attempted transfer of the right of entry for condition broken which extinguished it-a
perfectly orthodox rule.
In fact, of the six cases on which Cole purports to rely, only the two California cases,
Townsend v. Allen, 250 P.2d 292 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), and Wedum-Aldahl Co. v.
Miller, 64 P.2d 762 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937), give any support to the position adopted
by the court in Cole. It does appear to be true that in California changed conditions may
defeat a right of entry for condition broken. But that hardly means that "courts have
generally" held that to be the rule.
11 152 Colo. at 173, 381 P.2d at 18-19.
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and held that a right of entry for condition broken, and/or a
possibility of reverter, may become unenforceable because of
changed conditions and/or waiver.
This may allow Cole v. Colorado Springs Co. to be added to
the list of "[riespectable authority [which] can be found for the
most varied and unpredictable positions,"7 or it may be a fortunate judicial method of curtailing the potential power and duration
of rights of entry for condition broken and/or possibilities of reverter. One might wish, however, that the court had been more
clear in its holding and in the basis therefor. In any case, under
the cases as they now stand in Colorado, rights of entry for condition broken and/or possibilities of reverter may become unenforceable because of changed conditions and/or waiver.
E.

Possible Uses of These Interests

The City of Idaho Springs recently benefited substantially
through the use of a possibility of reverter.7 3 It was determined by
the city that it would be of benefit to Idaho Springs to have a
municipal swimming pool. The city was the owner of appropriate
land, but did not have the funds to build and operate a pool. Nor
did the city want to part with the land unless it could be assured
that the land would be developed in accordance with its plans for
74
the municipality. Centennial Properties,Inc. v. City of Littleton
held that a second-class city such as Idaho Springs did not have
the power to lease land owned by the city. Although it could sell
the land, it could not subject it to a lease. Idaho Springs therefore
arranged to convey the property by warranty deed to Overturf,
who agreed to build and maintain a pool. The deed contained a
provision that
the real property described herein, together with the improvements
thereon, shall be used perpetually and solely for the purpose. . . of
the operation of a swimming pool, which said restriction shall run
with the land 2 hereby conveyed and in the event of any breach
72 Comment, Future Interests-Effect of Change of Conditionson Rights of Entry and
Possibilities of Reverter Created to Control the Use of Land, 53 MICH. L. REv. 246, 263
(1954).
11City of Idaho Springs v. Golden Say. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 480 P.2d
847 (1970).
7,154 Colo. 191, 390 P.2d 471 (1964).
71Use of the words "shall run with the land," the phrase usually employed in covenants, would seem to create an unnecessary risk that the provision might be interpreted
as a mere covenant. A clear possibility of reverter could have been set up by conveying
the land to Overturf "so long as it is used as a public pool, and no longer, and then to
revert to the grantor, or its successors in interest."
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thereof, said property shall forthwith revert to the said party of the
first part, its successors and assigns.7"

This was held by the Colorado Court of Appeals, to which the case
was transferred by the Colorado Supreme Court," to set up a
possibility of reverter in the City of Idaho Springs.7" The court
also held that a second-class city does have power to make a
conveyance reserving a possibility of reverter.79 So although a
lease could not be used, a possibility of reverter was available and
effective.
Once Overturf got the land, he conveyed it to Overturf's
Park, Inc., which then executed a deed of trust on the subject
land to the Golden Savings and Loan Association. (Probably the
Golden Savings and Loan Association will not accept that sort of
security again.) When the deed of trust was ultimately foreclosed,
the property was not then being used for a swimming pool. So
after Golden Savings and Loan Association acquired a public
trustee's deed to the land," the City of Idaho Springs brought suit
to quiet title in itself. The courts upheld the possibility of reverter, and Idaho Springs won.'
Another enlightening Colorado case was Mosca Town Co. v.
Wellington.2 In that case a tannery was built on land acquired
by a deed which provided that should the tannery ever cease to
operate, "the deed should thereupon become null and void, and
the title to said premises should thereupon revert to the grantor
... ," The tannery was built, then ceased operations and went
out of business, whereupon both the grantor of the land and a
local lumber dealer claimed "certain lumber, nails, and other
personal property" 4 which had been used to build the tannery.
The court held that the building, "built upon a substantial rock
foundation . . .became a fixture and part of the realty. 8 5 The
case indicates that in Colorado, a fixture which under local law
becomes part of the realty will go back with the land to the
76 City

of Idaho Springs v. Golden Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 120-21, 480

P.2d 847-48 (1970).
7 Id. at 120, 480 P.2d at 847.
7' Id. at 122, 480 P.2d at 848.

Id. at 122, 480 P.2d at 849.
Id. at 121, 480 P.2d at 848.
12

Id. at 124, 480 P.2d at 849.
39 Colo. 326, 89 P. 783 (1907).
Id. at 328, 89 P. at 784.

Id. at 327, 89 P. at 784.
Id. at 328, 89 P. at 784.
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grantor in accordance with the provisions of the deed. This is
particularly significant because the value of such fixtures might
be considerably larger than "certain lumber and nails" and in
some cases might even be greater than the value of the land itself.
Rights of entry for condition broken and possibilities of reverter have also been used on lands containing valuable minerals.
Needless to say, it is important to know the exact legal nature of
the mineral, oil, or gas interests one is attempting to acquire.
Normally, the attempted conveyance of a right of entry for condition broken would extinguish the right. In Colorado, however, the
purchaser of mineral rights has a good deal of statutory protection." Nevertheless,
[dJespite the perhaps hopeful desire of the present-day practitioner
to relegate the law of future interests to the classroom as a subject
of academic interest alone, a knowledge of the general principles in
this field is mandatory for the oil and gas attorney ... until, as is
frequently the case, a dry hole solves the problem once and for all."
CONCLUSION

A right of entry for condition broken is usually created by
such words as "but if," giving the grantor a right to reenter the
premises if the condition is broken. This right of entry for condition broken must be asserted, and is subject to the 1-year statute
of limitations. It is not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities,
nor is it alienable. An attempted alienation of the right of entry
for condition broken will extinguish the right. It may also become
unenforceable because of changed conditions and/or waiver. It is
not known whether it is devisable or not.
A possibility of reverter, on the other hand, is usually created
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-43-101 (1973):
Where lands in this state, or any estate or interest therein, are subject to
contingent future interests, legal or equitable, whether arising by way of
remainder, reversion, possibility of reverter, executory devise, upon the happening of a condition subsequent, or otherwise, created by deed, will, or other
instrument. . . and it is made to appear that it will be advantageous to the
present and ultimate owners of said lands or any estate or interest therein
that such lands, estate or interest be leased for the production of minerals
...upon the filing of a complaint by any person having a vested, contingent, or possible interest in said lands, or any estate or interest therein ...
the district .

.

. court .

.

. shall have the . . . power .

.

. pending the

happening of any contingency and the vesting of such future interest, to
appoint a trustee for such lands, or any estate or interest therein, and to
authorize and direct such trustee to sell, execute, and deliver a valid lease
covering the minerals ....
'7

Mosburg, Oil and Gas, and the Defeasible Fee, 12 OKLA. L. Rv. 233, 263-64 (1959).
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by words indicating the duration of the estate conveyed, by such
words as "so long as." When the terminating event happens, e.g.,
the premises are no longer used for school purposes, the full legal
title to the land reverts automatically to the grantor. Thus although the 1-year statute of limitations is inapplicable to a possibility of reverter, the title gained thereby may be subject to the
provisions of the statutes dealing with adverse possession. The
possibility of reverter is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. It is not yet known whether it may be alienated or devised,
although it has been determined to be descendible. It, too, may
become unenforceable because of changed conditions and/or
waiver.
In many instruments, because of the inaccuracy of the language used, it is difficult to determine which interest has been
created. Probably the most workable test is that suggested by The
American Law of Property, emphasizing the purpose of the restriction.
If the purpose is to compel compliance with a condition by the
penalty of forfeiture, an estate on condition arises [which leaves a
right of entry for condition broken in the grantor], but if the intent
is to give the land for a stated use, the estate to cease when that use
or purpose is ended, no penalty for a breach of condition is involved,
since the purpose is . . . to convey the property for so long as it is
needed . . . and no longer. . ..

which leaves a possibility of reverter in the grantor.
Determining which interest has been created is important
because their legal effects can be strikingly different. The financial value of interests subject to a right of entry for condition
broken or a possibility of reverter may be substantial. 9 The effect
of either provision, suddenly shifting title from one holder to another, is likely to be quite dramatic.
m 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.6, at 97 (1957).

The interests themselves may have value, particularly in condemnation. State v.
Independent School Dist., 266 Minn. 85, 123 N.W.2d 121 (1963). But see State v. Cooper,
24 N.J. 261, 131 A.2d 756 (1957), holding that "if at the time of taking the 'event ripening
the right of reverter is not imminent, the owner of the estate in fee simple defeasible is
entitled to all the compensation.'" Tax questions may be involved. Board of Comm'rs v.
City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 P. 301 (1919); In re Terry's Estate, 218 N.Y.
218, 112 N.E. 931, 157 N.Y.S. 1147 (1916).
"

NOTE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PERFORMER'S
STYLE-A QUEST FOR ASCERTAINMENT, RECOGNITION,
AND PROTECTION*
INTRODUCTION

Because performer's "style" is a term which has heretofore
eluded accurate legal definition, recognition and protection has
not be extended to style as an intangible intellectual property
right. The unauthorized use of a performer's voice, mannerisms,
gestures, and dress is becoming an increasingly common problem
for performers who have developed a "style" immediately identifiable by the public as being associated with the performer. Performers who have sought judicial relief from unauthorized style
imitation have been unsuccessful in demonstrating that style is
readily capable of ascertainment and that concrete limitations do
exist as to what would constitute a protectible style. The judicial
stricture that "imitation alone does not give rise to a cause of
action" has left the performer legally unprotected from unauthorized uses.'
Courts faced with controversies in the field of intellectual
property have responded to new challenges by expanding both
statutory and common law protection for creative work products.
In the resolution of these challenges the interest in freedom in the
expression of ideas was balanced with the interest in securing
"authors" a right to be free from unfair use of their creative
product. A new property right, also worthy of protection, emerges
when the issue of providing legal protection for a performer's style
is considered.
The purpose of this analysis is dual: to distinguish among the
types of style that are sufficiently developed to warrant protection, and then to examine the relevant legal theories under which
such protection should be available. This analysis will attempt to
* This article has been submitted to the annual Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
For cases using this language see Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d
711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362
F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D.
Cal. 1969).
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contribute to an understanding of what "style" is, the difficulties
involved in attempting to bind it definitionally, and the realization that definitional elusiveness is not an insurmountable hindrance to affording legal protection.
I.

PERFORMER'S

STYLE: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE LEGAL
ARENA

The difficulty in capturing a judicially acceptable definition
of style is well illustrated through a brief factual examination of
five major cases in which performers sought protection against
unauthorized imitation. In each instance the style seeking legal
recognition differed. Damages were sought for injury to professional reputation, public deception, and financial deprivation
due to the loss of opportunity for product endorsement. The one
common thread running throughout each case is the admitted,
deliberate appropriation by defendant of a vehicle, termed
"style," through which a character or idea was expressed by the
plaintiff, without disclosing to the public that defendant's "expressor" was not the plaintiff.
A.

Chaplin v. Amador

Charlie Chaplin brought suit seeking injunctive relief from
the unauthorized imitation of his character creation "Charlie
Chaplin," a funny little man who wore "a decrepit derby, illfitting vest, tight-fitting coat, and trousers and shoes much too
large for him, and with this attire, flexible cane usually carried,
swung, and bent as he [performed] . . . . 3 Chaplin developed
the idea of "Charlie Chaplin" and infused life into his creation
through facial expressions, gestures, and dress, which came to be
automatically associated with the character. The defendant, assuming the name "Charlie Aplin," portrayed the character creation of Chaplin through imitation of his gestures, mannerisms,
and dress.
The trial court recognized Chaplin's creation "Charlie Chaplin" as a form of unique character expression when it stated that
the plaintiff is the first person to use the said clothes ... and it is
true that he originated, combined and perfected the manner of acting and mannerisms mentioned herein as used in motion pictures,
and . . . is the first person to originate, use, combine, and perfect
2

93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (1928).

1 Id. at 360, 269 P. at 545.
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. . that certain form of acting, those mannerisms, facial expressions and movements of his body ....
*

The court emphasized the concreteness provided the character
through Chaplin's creative expression, and awarded injunctive
relief on grounds of "passing-off."
And yet it could not have escaped the attention of the court
that Chaplin was the creator of the character, directed the character into production, and, through performing the character,
gave it essence. In other words, "Charlie Chaplin" was the production of Charlie Chaplin. There were no coexisting rights held
by other persons impinging upon the creation. The court did not
have to look to copyright protection possessed by another creator
of the character nor assess the directorial molding of another as
possibly instrumental in the formation of the "style."
B.

Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.5

Bert Lahr had become known for his unique vocal characteristics including his timing, inflection, and manner of comic delivery. Lahr's artistic creation was not associated with any particular character as was Chaplin's; in contrast, Lahr's style of vocal
delivery existed independent of any character creation, and was
a means by which he achieved notoriety and success. Defendant
appropriated Lahr's unique vocal creation for the voice of a duck
in defendant's commercial. The trial court's dismissal of Lahr's
suit was reversed by the appellate court on grounds of defamation, holding "that an entertainer [who] has stooped to perform
below his class may be found to damage his reputation ....
C.

Booth v. Colgate Palmolive Co.7

Shirley Booth, a well-known actress in dramatic and comedy
roles, came to be associated by the public with the cartoon character creation "Hazel" through the portrayal of that character in
the television series of the same name. Miss Booth's voice, one of
her polished dramatic tools, inevitably became associated in the
public mind with that of the character. The creator of the cartoon
character "Hazel," possessing copyright protection for the cartoon creation, licensed defendant's use of the cartoon character
for a laundry detergent commercial.
Id.
300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962), See also Sims v. H.J. Heinz Co. [1959] 1 All. E.R.
547 (C.A.).
300 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted).
362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Although the cartoon-creator of "Hazel" had, for compensation, granted defendant the right to use his copyrighted character, the copyrighted cartoon character did not possess a voice. In
providing "Hazel" a voice in its commercial, defendant utilized
"Hazel's" voice by an imitation of Miss Booth's voice, absent
permission or compensation.' Irrespective of its unauthorized use,
defendant's contention that "imitation of voice without more
does not give rise to a cause of action for unfair competition," 9
was sustained by the court.
Unlike Lahr, Miss Booth had not relied upon a specially
created vocal characterization to bring "Hazel" to life in the medium of television. However, to the public Miss Booth's voice
when coupled with the cartoon character "Hazel" would constitute the "more" necessary to sustain a cause of action.
D.

Davis v. Trans World Airlines'"

Not only individual performers, but vocal groups as well,
have been faced with unauthorized imitation. In Davis the wellknown group "The Fifth Dimension" brought suit for the unauthorized imitation of its unique vocal sound, particularly associated with the song "Up, Up and Away." The defendant appropriated this unique sound in its use of the song in a television
commercial. Once again, the defendant successfully relied upon
the notion that "imitation alone does not give rise to a cause of
action.'""
The case parallels Lahr in that the vocal group had develFor purposes of their motion, defendants concede that "Ruth Holden's
voice as used in the Burst commercials constituted an 'imitation' of the
'normal speaking voice' . .. of Shirley Booth as plaintiff used it and it was
heard in the 'Hazel' situation comedy series."
Id. at 345. It has been argued that there are unique vocal qualities which accompany any
performer's voice which would not be a quality of style which should be protected. "Even
entertainers who make no claim to uniqueness have distinctive vocal characteristics and
may be thought to be recognized." 300 F.2d at 259.
362 F. Supp. at 245.
297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
Id. at 1147. It is interesting to note that in none of these cases did the courts offer
any judicial reasoning for this statement as it applies to "style." Of such judicial stricture
it has observed:
Such language can have its genesis in a first decision, be quoted and followed
by successive decisions, and ultimately become the "law of the land" even
though the original language is devoid of legal support or reasoning.
Duft & Do", Tape Piracy-CompulsoryLicensing Provisionof the CopyrightAct, Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), 52
DENVER

L.J. 313, 321 (1975).
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oped a unique sound, which identified it and distinguished it
from other vocal groups. One could argue also that like Miss
Booth's voice association with the character "Hazel," "The Fifth
Dimension's" sound was associated with its unique expression of
the song. The copyright proprietor of the song granted permission
to defendant for the use of the song, not the right to copy "The
Fifth Dimension's" expression of that song. As the law currently
stands, given license to use the song, a defendant is also free to
appropriate the expression of that song created by another. The
defendant should be required to create his own expression of that
song, or at least be required to compensate the group for the use
of its unique expression.
2
E. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.'
Nancy Sinatra achieved instant public and professional recognition through her version of the song "These Boots Are Made
for Walkin'," distinguished by a special form of dress and delivery
exemplified by high boots and a short skirt, neither in itself nor
in concert unique or unusual. Taking advantage of plaintiff's popularity, defendant coined the phrase "Wide-Boots" for a brand of
tire, was granted the right to use the song by the copyright proprietor, and attempted to secure the services of Miss Sinatra for
endorsement purposes in a proposed television commercial.
When no terms acceptable to the company and Miss Sinatra
could be reached, the company continued with the idea behind
the commercial, deliberately imitating Miss Sinatra's "style" by
flashing brief glimpses of a girl, facially unrecognizable, dressed
in clothing similar to that of Miss Sinatra, using an admitted
imitation of her style of delivery in the song as well.
Miss Sinatra was denied relief, inter alia, because the court
saw an "added clash with the copyright laws [in the] potential
restriction which recognition of performers' 'secondary meanings'
places upon the potential market of the copyright proprietor. '"'
The alleged restriction was that a proposed licensee might become totally discouraged if he had to "pay each artist who has
played or sung the composition and who might therefore claim
unfair competition-performer's protection . . . ."" This author
submits that such reasoning is at best without merit. If a licensee
21

435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).

,1 Id. at 718.
14 Id.
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wishes to secure the rights to use a song or a character in his
commercial, he has every right to do so. He does not have the
right to use the expression of that character which is created by
another. If he in good faith uses the licensed work, he should be
obliged to create his own expression, not simply appropriate that
of another.
The court in Sinatra had before it an admitted voice imitation, coupled with court recognition of concomitant imitation of
dress and mannerisms following unsuccessful efforts to obtain the
services of the performer whose "style" was copied. Was the song
of no commercial value to the defendant without Sinatra or a
copy of her performance? If so, was she not entitled to compensation for the imitation of her style?
II. WHAT Is STYLE, AND WHY SHOULD IT BE PROTECTED?
The cases demonstrate the complexity of protecting style.
One questions the summary denial of protection to performers
whose creative efforts have resulted in a style which is admittedly
imitated for the commercial advantage of a defendant. The reason behind denial is, in large part, an unwillingness of the courts
to enter an area in which the lines have not been drawn regarding
what is and what is not "style." This analysis approaches the
question from another perspective: Did each or any of the plaintiffs possess something recognizably protectible? If so, is this not
"style"?
There are distinctions which go to the very essence of why,
when, and most importantly, how protection should be afforded,
if at all. In Chaplin the performer not only created and originated
the character-idea but created and originated the expression of
the character by the additional creation of an identifiable, concrete style of dress, posture, and mannerisms. The court in
Chaplin found little difficulty in recognizing the right to protection of his character creation under existing legal practice. This
renders the Chaplin fact pattern deceptive in that Chaplin had
created both the character and its expression. Possibly Chaplin
served as the beginning of an almost unattainable standard which
a performer must reach before his efforts are worthy of protection.
Since Chaplin the generalization has arisen, without foundation,
that style as a character expression must be equated with the
15
character itself.
11 One author has observed that "[u]nder pure copyright doctrine ...

a style of

1975

PROTECTION OF PERFORMER'S STYLE

This standard fails in view of those performers who do not
create the characters they portray, but create only a unique expression of that character. A contemporary example would be
Peter Falk's portrayal of "Columbo." Someone other than Falk
created the idea of "Columbo," and there was directorial molding
of the character by others. However, Falk created a unique expression of the character no less stylistically distinctive than that
of Chaplin's. Falk's gestures, mannerisms, postures, and dress are
as uniquely his own interpretation of "Columbo" as Chaplin's of
"Charlie Chaplin," and exist independent of the character alone.
Lahr's unique vocal creation for comic delivery was associated with no particular character other than himself. Yet, his
"style" of vocal delivery was so unique and well defined that it,
too, existed independent of any character. In a similar fashion
"The Fifth Dimension" 's vocal style was also unique. Thus, style
can and does exist independent of a character.
Miss Sinatra may have indeed created a unique style of performing but she failed to convey to the court that she had crafted
either a unique vocal delivery or manner of dress such that a
"style" existed.'6 Possibly there are those performers whose style
is not sufficiently developed to warrant the kind of protection
available to those who have crafted an identifiable, concrete
style. The answer appears to be that there is a difference in degree
which goes to a difference in the kind of protection to be afforded.
delivery is equated to a creative idea, and there can be no cause of action for the copying
of an idea." Lang, Performance and the Right of the Performing Artist, 21 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. 69, 72-73 (1974). This same author discounts copyright protection
for a performer's style based on analogy to artists. He states:
Picasso might then have sole use of "synthetic Cubism"-or must he share
the style with Braque, Max Jacob, Juan Gris and the others who . . . were
responsible for the formation of Cubism?
Id. at 95. The author of the instant article would term "synthetic Cubism" a movement
in art, such as folk music might be termed a "movement" in musical tastes. Within that
movement each artist has his own unique style which distinguishes his expression of
Cubism from that of others. Certainly no one would argue that no artist other than Picasso
could paint in the "synthetic Cubism" movement. Style goes to the individual-i.e., one
of the basic methods of artistic analysis of unsigned paintings is by an examination of the
method of applying pigments, choice of canvas, and stroke techniques. These are but a
few of the considerations given to distinguishing one artist's unique, identifiable style.
IS The court noted:
In this case appellant's complaint is not that her sound is uniquely personal;
it is that the sound in connection with the lyrics and arrangement, which
made her the subject of popular identification, ought to be protected.
435 F.2d at 716 (emphasis added). However, Miss Sinatra did allege a unique style of dress
as well, which the court did not see fit to discuss.
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Only in connection with the character "Hazel" did Miss
Booth's voice assume a recognizable quality entitling her to protection from its imitation. What kind of protection should be
afforded performers who develop their own best personal traits,
which later become either identified with a character creation or
identifiable with the performer independent of a character? A
number of performers' voices are identifiable as such. Imitation
of this voice in a commercial without further identification could
mislead the public into believing that the performer was actually
endorsing the product. Absent identification, this could be the
sponsor's only intent. Such use would constitute "imitation
alone," unless the voice becomes associated with an expression of
a character or idea as in Booth. Here, there exists no infringement
of the performer's artistic talents but strictly an infringement of
the performer's right to select that with which he will be associated in the public mind.
The thread linking these distinctions remains: the
deliberate, unauthorized, and unrevealed copying of the performer or his unique style by a defendant who has everything to
gain and nothing to lose as the law currently stands. If a defendant deliberately appropriates that which is associated with the
professional endeavours of another, be it style or personal traits
identifiable by the public, the appropriation of these efforts
should constitute a cause of action.
III. PROTECTION OF STYLE
The complexities of protecting style should be recognized as
overshadowed by the challenge of resolving why and when this
style should be protected. The remainder of this analysis will be
devoted to a discussion of both statutory and common law protec'1

Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution states that Congress shall have the

power
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...
Thus, if style can be defined as a "writing" within the meaning given to this term,
statutory protection should be available should Congress see fit to include style among
those protectible "writings" in 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
One author has noted that "[the scope of protectible 'writings' as defined by the
Copyright Law, is generally considered to be more narrow than the constitutional term
'writings'...." Oler, Copyrightfor Characters:The Searchfor Statutory and State Law
Protection, 16 IDEA 1, 12 (1974) (emphasis added), citing W. Derenberg, "The Meaning
of 'Writings' in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution," Study No. 3 in COPYRIGHT LAW
REvISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS AND STUDIES, Nos. 1-34 (1961).
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tion which should be afforded to performers by states in the absence of federal protection. First, if style is a "writing" within the
framework of the Constitution, 7 copyright protection should be
available for those performers who have "authored" a "style."
Consideration will also be given to unfair advertising practices,
followed by a discussion of unfair competition, misappropriation,
defamation, and the right of publicity.
A.

Is Style a "Writing"?

The proper subject for copyright protection is not the idea
but rather the expression of that idea.'" Viewing a performer's
style as the expression of an idea, copyright protection is indeed
a possibility for persons possessing a style similar to that exemplified by Chaplin or Lahr. That style can be classified as a "writing" under article I, section 8 of the Constitution is evident from
the historical basis of the copyright clause. 9 In keeping with the
early views expressed, there has been a gradual and liberal expansion of what constitutes "writings." ' " Case law has so broadly
construed "writings" as to include lamp base statuettes as "works
81 "It is a fundamental precept of copyright that only the expression of ideas, and not
the ideas themselves are copyrightable." 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.1, at
39 (1974). Professor Nimmer further notes that "[there have been no cases squarely
ruling on the question of whether common law copyright may be claimed in a non-tangible
oral or visual expression." Id. at 40 (emphasis added). However, in Estate of Hemingway
v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 777
(1968), the court did recognize the possibility, when it stated: "The principle that it is
not the tangible embodiment of the author's work but the creation of the work itself which
is protected finds recognition in a number of ways in copyright law." If style is indeed a
"non-tangible oral or visual expression" why is not common law copyright available? Must
a performer be denied the right to protection merely because his "expression" is concrete
but "intangible"? See notes 29-32 infra and accompanying text.
11During the Continental Congress the need was early recognized for protection of
literary property in order to advance the arts by securing to authors the exclusive rights
to their writings. See Selvin, Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as
Infringement, 6 BuLL. CR. Soc'y 53, 57 (1958). An excellent article discussing writings
under the Constitution interpreted the historical intent and subsequent judicial interpretation of the scope of this clause. See Note, Copyright-Study of the Term "Writings" in
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1263 (1956). In reflecting upon
a discussion in THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison), the authors conclude:
The statement places no limitation, either direct or implied, upon the scope
of the clause but rather intimates that the types of objects protected will
expand when the common law sees fit to expand them.
Id. at 1267.
2
Note, supra note 19, at 1311. See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Statutory protection is now afforded to works of art and sound
recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1970) (works of art) and § 5(n) (Supp. II, 1972) (sound
recordings), which are obviously not "writings" within the literal meaning of this term.
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of art."' 1 One leading authority has concluded that the constitutional provision intends
to protect all intellectual property capable of extensive reproduction, and that whenever new methods of reproduction made possible
the "pirating" of unprotected works resulting from intellectual
ef22
fort, the clause could be expanded to include these objects.

The manner in which a performer's style qualifies for copyright
protection by meeting the more liberal interpretation of "writings" is analyzed below.
1. Expression of a Character
Fictional characters standing alone are not subject to copyright protection.2 3 However, they are so entitled once incorporated
into a book or play because it is "in their relationships and integration with the sequence of incidents, scenes, locale, motivation
and dramatic expression through which the story, novel or play
is evolved, 2' 4 that the characters move from the realm of ideas to
the expressions of those ideas. Examined more closely, the words
"dramatic expression" are of significance. Unless formally part of
a literary writing, a character to be portrayed by a performer
would not be eligible for protection; only through dramatic expression of the character does protection become possible. In
order to invoke relationships, motivations, and scenes, the performer dramatizes through voice, mannerisms, and dress, transforming the character-idea into a unique character-expression.
The performer thereby creates a style which expresses the charac21 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). In construing the meaning of artistic works,
hence writings, courts have gone so far as making textile fabric designs eligible for copyright protection "where ... the designs reflect creative originality and a substantial
degree of skill, labor and independent judgment." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co.,
173 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Even reproductions of paintings are independently
copyrightable. Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
"Writings" has been broadened to include items which are not literal writings, as these
cases indicate.
2 Note, supra note 19, at 1269.
21 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). But see Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), where Judge Hand recognized that characters, if
sufficiently developed to constitute a "distinctive word portrait," they should be protectible "quite independently of the 'plot' proper .... " For a more recent discussion of
copyright protection for characters see Note, Charactersand the Copyright Clause-Is a

Charactera Writing?, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 222 (1974).
24 WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS, § 231b, at 1003 (1953) (emphasis added).
See also Kellman, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters,25 BROOKLYN L. REV. 3,

8 (1958). It is an "idea" which may be copied, not the "expression" of that idea, which
distinction gives rise to the excellent discussion by Mr. Kellman.
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ter in such defined terms that it exists independent of that character. Since this metastasis is made possible by the performer's
style, the style should then become eligible for protection under
copyright laws. Just as an author creates the book or play as his
expression of an idea, so a performer may create a unique style
as his expression.
The protection afforded cartoon characters exemplifies how
character-expression has been assessed for copyright purposes in
another medium. Cartoons have traditionally been the subject of
individual copyright for each strip, no protection being afforded
the characters alone. 2 As one court has noted: "[Elvery such
cartoon embodies a conception of humor or surprise or incredibility . . . [w]hat the owner of the copyright is entitled to is the
protection of that embodiment of his concept. '2 In granting relief
for infringement upon the "Superman" character, the court explained in its modifying opinion that the character was eligible
for protection because the pictorial representations and verbal
descriptions of "Superman" embodied an arrangement of incidents and literary expressions as opposed to a mere delineation
of the character alone.Y The court reiterated that a monopoly for
a mere character was not allowed, but at the same time ordered
the defendant to cease imitating the costume and appearance of
"Superman. ''28
Having originated the character-idea "Charlie Chaplin,"
Chaplin fashioned mannerisms, dress, and gestures by which the
I Note, Unfair Competition-TheProtectionAfforded Literary and Cartoon Characters Through Trademark, Unfair Competition and Copyright, 68 H~Av. L. REv. 349, 358
(1954).
This was explained by the court in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). Here,
the court denied that the character "Sam Spade" was protectible apart from the comic
strip as a whole; one commentator stated that cartoon characters are protectible within
the comic strip because what is appropriated is the "expression and development." Kellman, supra note 24, at 10. It may thus be appropriate to say that a performer's style is
the method of expression and development of a character. Although it is unfortunate that
a character is not in itself protectible, this does not prohibit protection of style if style is
defined in terms of expression.
" Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), modified, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
'7 111 F.2d at 433-34.
23 Id. See also Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), wherein
the court found infringement upon the characters of "Mutt and Jeff" because the speech
and dress of the characters were substantially copied by defendants, and the representation was intended to and did in fact affect adversely the value of the copyright, even
though the characters were set in a different plot.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

idea was transformed into an identifiable character. Although
"Charlie Chaplin" was not protected under copyright, the court
recognized Chaplin's ownership of the character vis-a-vis imitation which might result in public deception. The court did not
consider the originator-performer combination as determinative,
and the decision appears to have been founded essentially on the
performing style by which embodiment of the idea took place.
Thus, it can be argued that Chaplin, through dramatic expression, transformed a character-idea into a character-expression,
rendering the expression of the character-style-copyrightable.
For Mr. Lahr, "The Fifth Dimension," and Mr. Falk, all of whom
have created a unique style, such expression exists independently
of any "character" creation and is no less definable and concrete
than Mr. Chaplin's. Since style can and does exist independent
of any character, those who have created their own gestures, mannerisms, timing, and type of vocal delivery have developed a
unique artistic expression.
2. Meeting Statutory Standards of "Concreteness"
Before copyright protection may be secured an author clearly
must put his ideas into some concrete form, as it is an appropriation of that form which is prohibited.29 However, there exists a
misconception regarding requirements of tangibility and concreteness. The general conclusion is that the Constitution requires tangibility of form.30 "Tangible" is defined as "capable of
being touched; . . . readily apprehensible by the mind; real;
....

",31

In contrast, "concrete" is "characterized by immediate

experience of realities whether physical things, sensations, or
emotions: belonging to or standing for actual things or events: not
abstract or ideal. ' 3 Although there exists no immediate tangibility in a performer's style, an idea, such as style, which is capable
of perception is concrete. For purposes of federal copyright protection, style must be reduced to tangible form. Tangibility requirements can be met by registering tapes of voice or video tapes
of the gestures, mannerisms, and style of dress involved in the
expression of the character portrayed. Upon alleged infringement,
these registered tangibles would provide an objective standard by
,9 Note, supra note 25, at 356.
10 Dunlap, Expansion of the Copyright Law into the Area of Conversations,20 BULL.
CR. Soc'Y 285, 296 (1973). See also 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 302 (1970).
' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (third definition listed) (P.
Gove ed. 1961).
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which the alleged infringement of voice, dress, and mannerisms
could be judged.
3. Infringement Upon Style
If Congress should include style as a "writing" within the
federal copyright statutes, when infringement upon a performer's
style were alleged the question as to what constitutes infringement would arise. Infringement of writings is defined as "[a]
copy, more or less servile, of a copyrighted work." 33
In other areas of artistic property, the courts have established various standards for judging infringement. When assessing whether an object had been the subject of copyright infringement, the court in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp.34 stated the test to be whether "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
' 35
overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.
The test for evaluating the possible existence of substantial similarity between a copyrighted property and an alleged copy was
more liberally stated in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. 3 as
"whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
'37
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.
Style, as the culmination of creative effort by a performer
such as Lahr, for example, could be judged by the same criteria:
(1) if the average person listening to an unidentified voice imitation would normally assume the voice to have originated from its
performer-creator, or (2) if an ordinary individual could visually
recognize dress and mannerisms associated with a particular performer's style as a copy of the original, an appropriation of that
performer's style would be found. In the area of cartoon characters, items such as dolls 3 and toy horses 39 have been held to
infringe upon the copyright of their respective cartoon characters.
These items, as an imitation of the original creation, are not in
substance different from an unauthorized imitation of a style
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 920 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). In order for the copy to constitute
infringement "[T]here must be appropriation of substantial portions of the copyright
matter . . . ." Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, 127 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
Id. at 489.
360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966).
'7 Id. at 1022.
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935).
" King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
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created by a performer. An imitation of a performer's style is as
perceptible to the average person as is an imitation of a cartoon
character. Because there has been little difficulty in establishing
tests for judging the existence of infringement in other artistic
areas, style should be no exception if viewed in its most elementary form-the work product of creative effort.
4. Does a Defense Imply a Cause of Action?
The defense of fair use is allowed in actions for alleged copyright infringement. Fair use is the privilege accorded others to use
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the
copyright proprietor's consent. 0 In the field of performer's style,
mimicry has long been recognized as a separate and distinct talent of its own under the guise of a different variety of the historical art of singing." Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon4" was a cornerstone
" WARNER, supra note 24, § 157, at 612. Fair use as well as its relationship to copyright

infringement has been the subject of numerous discussions. See Cohen, Fair Use in the
Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. Symu. 43 (1955); Netterville, Copyright and
Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225
(1962); Selvin, supra note 19; Wyckoff, Defenses Peculiar to Actions Based on Infringement of Musical Copyrights, 5 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SymP. 256 (1954).
" See, e.g., Murray v. Rose, 30 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Savage v. Hoffman, 159
F. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1908). Parody, the partner of mimicry, is a humorous or satirical imita-

tion of a serious piece of literature or writing.

THE RANDOM HOUSE DCTIONARY OF THE
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1050 (first definition listed) (unabr. ed. 1966). Parody has also been

traditionally recognized as a defense to alleged infringement. See Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); cf. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
The case of Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub
noma.Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam),
had a somewhat sobering effect upon parody as fair use of copyrighted works. Jack
Benny's television parody of the play and motion picture Gas Light failed to obtain
privilege as fair use because of substantial copying. The court felt that there was no
authority that would support the idea "that wholesale copying and publication of copyrighted material can ever be fair use." 239 F.2d at 536, quoting Neon v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937). Despite this, fair use as a defense to copyright
infringement does exist in the form of parody and mimicry.
42 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903). The court held that the copyright proprietor of the song
"Sammy" had no cause of action against the owners of a musical comedy in which Fay
Templeton imitated the original style of delivery of the song created by Lotta Faust. The
court recognized that
where . . .it is clearly established that the imitation is in good faith...
the performance is [not] forbidden . . . .Fay Templeton . . .merely imitates the singer; and the interest in her own performance is due, not to the
song, but to the degree of excellence of the imitation. This is a distinct and
different variety of the histrionic art from the singing of songs . ...
Id. at 978-79 (emphasis added).
The problem encountered is where to draw the line between permissible fair use and
infringement. One commentator has noted that, as in most of the law, drawing the line
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case dealing with the imitation of another's performance. One
analysis of the court's decision allowing fair use as a defense has
noted:
[Wihere the imitation is of another's unique performance, actions,
gestures, tones, etc., and where the imitator's own excellence of
talent contributes materially to the acceptability of the imitation

and where the imitation is done in good faith, the imitation is not
an example of literary larceny.' 3

Such analysis admits to, yet ignores, a critical issue: the legal
system recognizes the existence of style-in its words "actions,
gestures, tones"-for which no legal protection is available.
Nonetheless, protection in the form of a defense is afforded the
imitator in an action for infringement because of the presence of
his own excellence of talent, that is, style. How can the imitator's
own style make him incapable of legally infringing upon the style
of another, if the other's style is not entitled to legal protection?
The recognition of a defense based upon the copier's own style
logically extends to legal recognition of a cause of action for infringement of the style of the performer copied.
5. A Call for Congressional Action
Style, as either a single perfected characteristic or as the
combination of voice, gestures, and mannerisms of a performer,
can be classified as a writing under the Constitution and copyright protection would be constitutionally available if Congress
should so enact. It would appear that Congress should continue
the expansion of the term "writings" by providing protection for
style through amendment to the present federal copyright laws.
Congress might provide that the determination of the style of a
particular performer be made by setting requirements for registering style by means of the filing of tapes and pictorial descriptions of the performer's creative work product. In a given case
infringement upon style would be determined by the same tests
used in establishing infringement in other copyrighted areas. The
defense of fair use would, of course, be applicable.
Protection for the expression of characters, both self-created
and otherwise, is needed in order to secure to such performers the
between fair use and infingement is one of degree. Selvin, supra note 19, at 63. As Judge
Hand stated, the question is "whether the part so taken is 'substantial,' and therefore not
a 'fair use' of the copyrighted work." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
,3 Netterville, supra note 40, at 249 (emphasis added).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

right to be free from unauthorized use, especially where commercial exploitation and public deception result. Copyright offers the
possibility of affording protection to those who create the expression of a character, such as Chaplin; and those who create a
unique expression per se, such as Lahr.
Since Congress in the past has not seen fit to provide copyright protection to a performer's style, other alternatives must be
examined. These alternatives do exist via state statutory and
common law theories in light of the Supreme Court decision in
44 The following discussion will focus on
Goldstein v. California.
the legal justification for protection under these legal theories.
B.

Lanham Act § 43(a): False Advertising45

The distinct possibility exists that a performer's style might
one day be protected from unauthorized commercial exploitation
through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Professor McCarthy
has noted that "§ 43(a) is designed to protect the right of the
consumer to be told the truth."" Of the cases discussed in this
article17 only Miss Booth alleged a cause of action under section
43(a).1 s It is indeed unfortunate that the court passed over this
44 412

U.S. 546 (1973).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). This section provides:
Any person who shall. . . use in connection with any goods or services. ..
a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . .
shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is
situated or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged
by the use of any such false description or representation.
112 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 27:3, at 247 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as MCCARTHY]. Professor McCarthy further comments upon the usefulness of section 43(a):
[W]hatever the explanation for the slow start of § 43(a), the volume of §
43(a) litigation greatly increased in the decade 1960-1970.
Admittedly, § 43(a) is not intended to bring all types of unfair competition in interstate commerce within federal jurisdiction. But § 43(a) furnishes
a valuable tool for honest commercial concerns, if not consumers, to blow the
whistle on the false advertising tactics of sellers.
Id. § 27:9, at 259 (citations omitted). For an excellent critical analysis of section 43(a) see
Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come
a Long Way, Baby-Too Far Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973).
11See note 2-14 supra and accompanying text.
48 Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The
court held:
It is evident . . .that . . .this alleged cause of action is also insufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to relief. There is no indication that plaintiff used her
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cause of action so hastily, as the applications of section 43(a) are
not yet realized. The Second Circuit apparently has rejected the
application of the Act unless the parties are in direct competition,
despite the distinct wording of the Act to the contrary. 9 This was
one of several reasons given for the denial of Miss Booth's allegation under section 43(a), yet the same court found no such problem in a later case, at least for purposes of issuing a preliminary
injunction.?0
However, Miss Booth did fail to show that her voice in any
way functioned as a trademark, which failure would, in and of
itself, negate a cause of action in her situation. At this point a
question is raised concerning those whose style of performing, be
it of a particular character (Chaplin or Falk) or merely a uniquely
personal style irrespective of any character (Lahr), serves to identify their performance and distinguish it from that of any other
performer. Could this style ever serve as a trademark protectible
from unauthorized deceptive imitation in commercial advertising, where that style is used by an advertiser to lead the public
into believing that the performer is endorsing the product?
Arguably, Mr. Chaplin and Mr. Lahr would have been able
to recover under section 43(a). Each had a style which served to
distinguish his performance from those of all others. In keeping
with the purpose of protecting the consumer from false designation of product origin, a manufacturer who deceives the public
into thinking that a certain performer endorses the product, or
another performer who appropriates that style such as in the
Chaplin case, should be held liable under section 43(a). A singer
who has created an identifiable style that has been the key to his
voice in connection with any "goods or services," nor that her voice alone can
serve as a trademark or trade name, nor that plaintiff and defendants were
in competition, nor even that the defendants used any description or made
any representation to identify her, apart from the use of the Hazel cartoon
character ....
Id. (citations omitted).
,' "It is submitted that such a restrictive reading of § 43(a) is both bad policy and
improper judicial interpretation of clear statutory language." 2 McCARTHY § 27:5, at 249.
10 See Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.) (preliminary
injunction granted), 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), wherein the question of direct
competition never arose, at least for purposes of issuing a preliminary injunction under
section 43(a). Here defendant, a toy manufacturer, was restrained from representing its
dolls as being created and approved by the plaintiff, the author and creator of Dr. Suess
characters. An author of cartoons and books is certainly not in direct competition with a
toy manufacturer.
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success should also be protected here. In this author's mind, there
is little difference between a "mark" which distinguishes one person's manufactured or printed product or services from another's
and a performer's style which distinguishes one performer's performance from another's. In many situations, the use of such a
"mark" upon a product is accompanied by an implication of
quality or endorsement. The stamp of a particular performer
upon a product certainly carries with it an implication of the
latter. The possibilities of protection of style from commercial
exploitation under this section are as yet unexplored and one may
only speculate at this time that its applications will be expanded.
State Statutory and Common-Law Protection of Style

C.

The frustrations which have been encountered in obtaining
protection for any uncopyrightable creative works were compounded by the decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.51
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc."2 In these decisions
the Supreme Court held that states may not apply state unfair
competition laws in order to protect those works not subject to
protection under federal patent or copyright law. 53 As a result, at
least two cases involving style turned upon these rulings and
54
denied protection.
One wonders whether the founding fathers who said in the Constitution that Congress had the power to secure to "Authors" the exclusive right to their "writings" would have thought that this meant
that the states were thereby prevented from protecting against ap, 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere
8, of the Constitution and in
with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl.
the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.
Id. at 237. There has been much discussion of the states' rights to afford protection in light
of these decisions. See Gamboni, Unfair Competition ProtectionAfter Sears and Compco,
15 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1 (1967); Comment, CopyrightPre-emption and Character
Values: The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1018
(1968); Note, Unfair Competition ProtectionAfter Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV.
101 (1965); Note, Unfair Competition After Sears and Compco, 22 VAND. L. REv. 129
(1968).
11See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1967), wherein the misappropriation doctrine was deemed to have been overruled by Sears-Compcoon the rationale
that where a "writing" is within the scope of the copyright clause of the Constitution and
"Congress has not protected it, whether deliberately or by unexplained omission, it can
be freely copied."
12

13
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propriation of distinctive performer characterizations merely because Congress had failed to legislate in this particular matter. Such
a denial of state power throws entertainers to the dubious remedy
of lobbying in Congress for special interest protective legislation. It
is difficult to believe that the Constitution and Sears-Compco policy
should be so bent out of shape as to deprive entertainers from making use of common law principles which protect the public from
confusion and commercial interests from outright poaching.5

Then came the Supreme Court decision in Goldstein v.
5 which opened the door for state statutory and
California"
common law protection, particularly protection of style.57 Professor McCarthy has noted that "the failure of Congress to grant
federal copyright protection to distinctive literary and entertainer
characterizations does not deprive the states of the power to protect such creations under state unfair competition law."5 " Additionally, Mercury Record Productions,Inc. v. Economic Consult5 has interpreted the decision as extending the right not
ants, Inc."
only to state statutory protection but also to common law protec1 MCCARTHY, § 10:21, at 308.
11Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a California penal statute prohibiting the piracy of sound recordings. In so doing the court recognized that article I, section 8 of the Constitution does not
expressly or by inference vest power to grant copyright protection exclusively in the federal
government and that 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 do not preempt state control over all works to which
the term "writings" might apply.
See Comment, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preemption,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1974); Note, Goldstein v. California:A Validity of State Copyright
Under the Copyright and Supremacy Clauses, HASTINGs L.J. 1196 (1974); Note,
Copyrights: States Allowed to Protect Works Not Copyrightable Under FederalLaw, 58
MINN. L. REv. 316 (1973); Comment, Copyright-New Light on Sears and Compco-State
Copyright Laws Are Not Totally Preempted by the Copyright Act, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
843 (1974); Comment, Goldstein v. California-The Constitutionality of a State
Copyright, 1973 UTAH L. Rv. 851; Note, Goldstein v. California and the Protection of
15

Sound Recordings: Arming the States for Battle with the Pirates,31 WASH. & LEE L. REv.

604 (1974).
11Kaul, And Now, State Protection of Intellectual Property?, 60 A.B.A.J. 198, 202
(1974).
Not only does Goldstein offer the opportunity to states for "tailor-made"
legislation dependent upon individual needs, it also gives the unique opportunity to test the feasibility of copyright protection in new areas on a localized basis without resort to federal copyright protection until such time as
interpretative case law emerges. In particular, New York and California, as
centers of the entertainment industry are presented with a challenge to respond to the needs of those "authors" of "style" which heretofore have gone
unheard.
1 McCARTHY, § 10:20, at 13 (Supp. 1973).
64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974), appeal docketed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 1974) (No. 74-674), wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the right of a
state to assert the common law misappropriation doctrine against tape pirates.
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tion as well..6 ' The continued development and expansion of common law principles should now freely emerge, unhampered by the
remnants of Sears-Compco, allowing protection for performers'
style.
1. Unfair Competition: Appropriation of Style
In the past, protection of a performer's style has been sought
primarily under the theory of unfair competition."' Unfair compeWe conclude . . . that Goldstein permits state protection by common
law as well as by statute . . . . The Goldstein court pointed out that such a
conflict does not arise in the case of recordings of musical performances,
because in this category of "Writing," Congress has not drawn a balance.
No federal scheme has been devised that is applicable to the subject matter
of this action . . . . Under Goldstein, a state is free to apply its own law.
Id. at 177, 218 N.W.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (lst
Cir. 1962); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Other
grounds were indiscriminately alleged in combination, including defamation; the result
is an area of law in which no clear-cut answers are available. For example, one commentator has noted that "[tihe overlapping of principles between copyright and unfair competition has caused a great deal of confusion in arriving at solutions to problems involving
copyright and unfair competition questions." Leach & Feldman, The Relationship Between Copyright and Unfair Competition Principles, 10 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 266
(1959).
The matter is further complicated when the defense of fair use is applied with equal
force to unfair competition problems as well as copyright problems.
[T]he jurisprudence indicates that the concept of fair use is the same in
copyright law and unfair competition; and, consequently, unfair use under
unfair competition principles cannot be a fair use for purposes of copyright
law, and there will be copyright infringement.
Id. at 279. See also Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950) (dictum);
West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1909), modified, 176 F.
833 (2d Cir. 1910). The result of this overlap is the problem of seeking protection for style
under two merging theories of recovery, with a defense which applies to both theories.
The introduction of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act in 1964 has resulted
in codification of many of the unfair competition principles in several states. Thus far,
the uniform legislation has received only limited acceptance; those states which have
enacted the act have established the prime vehicle for protection of performers and the
public from unauthorized appropriation of style and/or personal characteristics. The relevant portion of the statute is delineated in section 2:
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of
his business, vocation, or occupation he:
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services;
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstandingas to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship approval,
characteristics,ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do
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tition is of special significance in prohibiting the exploitation of
style through unauthorized imitation in commercial advertising.
An examination of unfair competition as it relates to literary
property will provide an opportunity to better understand the
applicability of unfair competition principles to cases involving
appropriation of style.
In an action for unfair competition "a person who establishes
a trade name or symbol as the means by which the public identifies his goods may obtain damages and an injunction against
another who sells his products under that symbol or name.""2 One
author has suggested that unfair competition cases generally fall
into three overlapping categories." First is the commonly termed
"palming-off"' or "passing-off," which consists of making false
representations to the public with the intent to deceive, thereby
not have or that a person has a sponsorship,approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have ....
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.
(b) In order to prevail in an action under this Act, a complainant need not
prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or misunderstanding
13132 (1964), revised at 306-15 (1966) (emphasis added). As of 1973, the following states have
enacted the act, retaining section 2 in substantially the same form: (Colorado) COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105 (1973); (Delaware) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2532(a) (Rev. 1974);
(Georgia) GA. CODE ANN. § 106-702(a)(1) to (12) (1968); (Hawaii) HAwIi REv. STAT.
§ 481A-3 (Supp. 1974); (Idaho) IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (Supp. 1974); (Illinois) ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 1211/2 § 312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); (Kansas) KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626(b)
(Supp. 1974); (Maine) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1212 (Supp. 1974-75); (Nebraska)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-202 (1971 reissue); (New Mexico) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-2(C)
(Supp. 1973); (Ohio) OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (Page 1973); (Oklahoma) OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 78 § 53 (Supp. 1974-75). As recent authorities have noted:
Several state legislatures passed this Uniform Act. But differences concerning recovery of costs and counsel fees caused a revision of the proposal in
1966. As a consequence of Sears and Compco decisions. . . the first impetus
toward passage of the Uniform Act was slowed down by the understandable
desire on the part of the state legislatures to await the effect of these decisions upon this entire area of the law. ...
Eventually, about one quarter of the States enacted one or the other of
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. A number of other states
passed acts of their own drafting. As a consequence, what prevails now are
not fifty different statutory schemes, but about five or six of them.
1 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAw OF ADVERTISING, § 13.03[3][a] (1973) (footnotes
omitted).
'2 Note, supra note 25, at 349. For excellent discussions on background in unfair
competition, see Callmann, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 GEO. L.J. 585 (1940); Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1940).
11P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES, 10708 (1973).
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
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inducing it to believe that the goods or services of another are
those of the plaintiff. 4 Professor Prosser states the test in such
cases to be "whether the resemblance is so great as to deceive the
ordinary consumer acting with the caution usually exercised in
such transactions, so that he may mistake one for the other. 6' 5 A
less stringent standard is now applied in palming-off situations:
the plaintiff need not show an actual intent to deceive but only
that the false representation is likely to deceive.66
The second is secondary meaning, found when an article is
used in such a way and to such an extent that the public comes
to identify the goods or services as those of the plaintiff, making
them distinguishable from all others. 7 The third, usually called
trademark, exists when the plaintiff's symbol or device is distinctive and functions exclusively to identify the plaintiff. 8 It is often
conclusively presumed that its unauthorized use by another will
be attended by consumer deception. 9
Before examining case law involving performer's style and
unfair competition, an important distinction must be drawn between imitation and the elements of fraud and deception. In a
case of mere imitation of style, the public would normally be
aware that a performance was a duplication of an original. In such
case, the privilege of fair use would allow this imitation as mimicry or parody. 0 The applicability of unfair competition to imitation of style arises when the elements of fraud and deception
become apparent. Here the public is either intentionally deceived
or a likelihood of public deception is present." In other words, the
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToiRs § 130, at 957 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
Id. at 957-58.
OS Id. at 958. "In an action for unfair competition plaintiff has the burden to prove
by whatever means he can that defendant's conduct has or is likely to cause confusion
... " Pennsylvania Dutch Co. v. Pennsylvania Amish Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 41, 45 (C.P.
Cumberland County 1974). Herein the court concluded that there are three ways in which
a plaintiff may discharge this burden: 1) by showing actual confusion; 2) by relying on
experts to testify as to the effect that the conduct and business practices of the parties
are likely to have on the average consumer; or 3) by relying on the fact finding ability of
the court to determine that the average purchaser will be deceived as to the source of the
defendant's goods. Id. (citations omitted).
67 PROSSER at 959.
p. GOLDSTEIN , supra note 63, at 108.
6'Id. at 107-08.
T'See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
7'See, e.g., Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1926).
But see Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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style of a particular performer is passed-off as that of another, or
the imitation is presented in such a way that the public is led to
believe that it is the original artist performing. Traditionally, the
presence of deception has been the key to a finding of unfair
competition.
In Chaplin the court found secondary meaning in Chaplin's
character-creation "Charlie Chaplin. '"72 The public was deliberately led to believe that the imitator was the real Charlie Chaplin,
which belief constituted the requisite fraud and deception upon
the public to sustain an allegation of "passing-off" thereby justifying the court's grant of injunctive relief from copying. The test
for whether the identity of the character was revealed is by judging the probable reaction in the public's mind.73 As it would apply
to style, this test serves as an objective standard: if the ordinary
viewer would mistake the style or voice for that of its true creator,
then passing-off is present.
A query at this point is whether the tort of passing-off can
be extended to voice imitation alone. The leading cases dealing
with voice imitation indicate that this is possible. In Lahr the
First Circuit, in reversing the trial court's dismissal, stated that
imitation of the voice could constitute unfair competition by
passing-off.74 In a similar English case, the court did not pass on
the question therein, but did recognize "a grave defect in the law
if it were possible for a party, for the purpose of commercial gain,
to make use of the voice of another without his consent."7 5 As one
commentator has so accurately observed: "A voice which
identifies a famous man as clearly as does his name or likeness
7

93 Cal. App. at 361, 269 P. at 546.

7 Gardella v. Log Cabin Prod. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 897 (2d Cir. 1937). Here the plaintiff
sought and the trial court granted, relief for unauthorized imitation of the character "Aunt
Jemima." The Second Circuit reversed on grounds that the plaintiff could not recover
under the Right of Privacy Statute, NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTs LAw §§ 50, 51 (1903), but
that unfair competition could be established only in accordance with the court's directives. See also Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942). Here the defendant
appeared in circuses around the country as the "Lone Ranger." The court directed the
lower court to enjoin further performances by the defendant because the performances
involved fraudulent appropriation of the plaintiff's character and goodwill established
through the original "Lone Ranger" radio program.
7, 300 F.2d at 259.
7' Sims v. H.J. Heinz Co. [1959] 1 All. E.R. 547, 551 (C.A.). See Mathieson,
"PassingOff" of Actor's Voice-Appropriationof Another's PersonalityWithout His Consent-An Equitable Right of Privacy?, 39 CAN. B. REv. 409 (1961). The author therein
reviews the Sims case and concludes that protection should be granted equitably through
injunction.
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would seem to present simply another manifestation of personality that ought to be likewise protected against commercial use."7
If a character's voice is created by a performer and becomes so
identifiable with the performer that the public associates it only
with the performer, any imitation which deceives the public into
believing that it is the performer's voice would constitute fraud
and deception upon the public. A performer's work product, such
as Lahr's style of vocal delivery, is as much an expression of
creative ability as any book, and as salable as any manufactured
goods and services.
Although in Booth the New York court denied relief under
unfair competition, the rationale of the case seems irreconcilable
with the general principles of unfair competition. The court ignored two underlying principles of unfair competition: likelihood
of consumer deception, and secondary meaning. The imitation of
Miss Booth's speaking voice, arguably not a creative work product, acquired secondary meaning when heard in conjunction with
the cartoon character "Hazel." The ordinary viewer of the commercial, with knowledge both of entertainer endorsements and
the fact that "Hazel's" voice was Booth's would presume Miss
Booth was, in fact, endorsing the product and receiving compensation therefrom." Thus, the combination of voice and character
increased the likelihood of consumer deception.
A certain judicial obstructionism has been encountered when
bringing actions under unfair competition for imitation of performers' styles. An example is to be found in the Sinatracourt's
rejection of the unfair competition claim because
[t]here is no competition between Nancy Sinatra and Goodyear
Tire Company. Appellant is not in the tire business and Goodyear
is not selling phonograph records. There is no passing-off by the
defendant of the plaintiff's products as its own either by simulation
of name, slogan, device or other unfair trade practice. 8

The Lahr court quite properly saw through this bit of legal obfuscation:
7' Netterville, supra note 40, at 253.
7 The court stated: "Neither she nor the plaintiff were named or identified during
the commercials." 362 F. Supp. at 345 (emphasis added). The court also stated that

Goldstein reaffirmed the notion of Sears-Compco that preserves the right to copy or
imitate an idea. Id. at 346. This may well be, but voice as it relates to style is not an idea,
but rather the expression of an idea.
71435 F.2d at 714.

PROTECTION OF PERFORMER'S STYLE
[P]laintiff here is not complaining of imitation in the sense of simply copying his material or his ideas, but of causing a mistake in
identity. Such passing off is the basic offense. True, it was not
defendant's product that was offered in competition, but that of
the anonymous imposter whom defendant, for its benefit, subsidized. This is a distinction without a difference."'

2. Misappropriation
"The misappropriation doctrine is a common law, judgemade offshoot of the general law of unfair competition . . .
usually invoked by a plaintiff who has what he considers a valuable commercial 'thing' which he sees another has appropriated
... ,,sIn those jurisdictions recognizing its existence" the misappropriation doctrine circumvents the need for proof of fraud
upon the public. Relief is granted in cases where no fraud and
deception exits, but only a misappropriation for the commercial
advantage of one person of a benefit or of a property right of
another." Hence a performer's style should now be protectible in
those states accepting the misappropriation doctrine, dispensing
with the need for an allegation of palming-off or that the parties
3
are competitors.1
300 F.2d at 259 (emphasis added).
1 McCATHY, § 10:23, at 318. Professor McCarthy provides a valuable and intriguing discussion of this doctrine, its origin, the dispute surrounding its acceptance, and
possible applications. See also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dept. 1951) (per curiam); Pittsburg Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting
Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Ahrens, The MisappropriationDoctrineAfter SearsCompco, 2 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 292 (1968); Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriationin
Unfair Competition, 11 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1958); Note, Goldstein v. California: A New
11
'0

Look for the MisappropriationDoctrine, 8 U. SAN FAN. L. Rav. 199 (1973).
11 (Alaska) Veatch v. Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904 (D. Alaska 1953); (California) Capitol

Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969); (Delaware) Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956); (Illinois) Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970);
(Massachusetts) Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934),
modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936); (New York) Mutual
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941); (Pennsylvania) Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937); (Wisconsin)
Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N.W.2d
705 (1974).
82 p.GOLDSTEIN, supra note 63, at 92. One author has stated that a plaintiff seeking
protection under this doctrine must prove three elements:
(1) that time, effort and money has gone into the creation of the thing
misappropriated so that there is some "property right" in the thing taken;
(2) that there is appropriation by the defendant at little or no cost; and
(3) unless an injunction is granted there will be a diversion of the plaintiff's
profits to the defendant.
Ahrens, supra note 80, at 295.
13 P. GOtSTEIN, supra note 63, at 92.
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The foundations of the doctrine are credited to the Supreme
Court's holding in InternationalNews Service v. Associated
Press. 4 The widespread acceptance of the doctrine was hindered
by the holdings in Sears and Compco,5 but Goldstein appears to
have removed any constitutional barriers previously blocking recognition of the misappropriation doctrine.8" Recently, the doctrine has been extended to protection from tape piracy of sound
recordings.8 7 The fact that style is an intangible property right
makes it no less a protectible property right as a product of a
performer's creative efforts. As the court noted in Mercury:
The essence of the cause of action in misappropriation is the defendant's use of the plaintiff's product, into which the plaintiff has put
time, skill, and money; and the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
product or a copy of it in competition with the plaintiff. . . . The
wrong is not in the copying, but in the appropriation, of the plaintiff's time, effort and money.8

As the doctrine relates to style, no difficulties are encountered in
applying it to either a situation such as Chaplin, where the performer created the character as well as the expression of that
character, nor a situation such as Lahr, where the performer has
developed a distinctive vocal quality. In these situations style is
as much a product as is a record. In contrast, misappropriation
might be an inappropriate form of relief in a Booth-type fact
pattern, where the imitation is not of a voice creation but merely
the performer's own voice.
3. Defamation: A Rear-Guard Action
Closely related to the principles of unfair competition is defamation. In fact, most cases alleging unfair competition have also
brought parallel actions for defamation. 9 The overlap between
unfair competition and defamation was noted by the court in
Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co."° The court held that if the
- 248 U.S. 215 (1918) wherein the plaintiff who gathered news for the purpose of
lucrative publication was held to have a "quasi-property" right in the product of his
efforts. The court afforded equitable relief against the appropriation of those efforts by
the defendant which constituted unfair competition. Id. at 236.
" See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.

Note, supra note 80, at 212.
See Mercury Record Prod., Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wisc. 2d 163,
218 N.W.2d 705 (1974).
7

88 Id. at 175, 218 N.W.2d at 710.
gg See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Gardella v. Log Cabin
Prod. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
0 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
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imitation was of an inferior kind, an action for defamation might
arise." The court further recognized that the common element
existing between passing-off and defamation is confusion and
deception of the public." Thus, if a performer's style has been the
subject of an inferior imitation likely to cause damage to the
performer's reputation, the performer could successfully maintain an action in defamation.
There is, however, an essential weakness to a defamation
allegation based on inferior imitation. When rejecting this aspect
of Lahr's defamation claim, the court noted:
Even entertainers who make no claim to uniqueness have distinctive
vocal characteristics and may be thought to be recognized. If every
time one can allege, "Your [anonymous] commercial sounded like
me, but not so good," and contend the public believed, in spite of
the variance, that it was he, and at the same time believed, because
of the variance, that his abilities had declined, the consequences
would be too great to contemplate.3

Nevertheless, the court did argue that an action for inferior imitation would exist if there were some element in addition to the
imitation per se which acted to identify plaintiff with the imitation.
On the other hand, the Lahr court held that plaintiff's professional reputation might be damaged through unauthorized
imitation in a commercial on the defamatory ground of having
"stooped to perform below his class." 4 But even this form of
defamation was rejected by the Booth court, which argued:
A star performer's endorsement of a commercial product is a common occurrence and does not indicate either a diminution of profes"

The gravamen of the second phase of the cause of action . . . is that the

professional reputation of the appellee has been defamed. Eva Taylor's...
performance is alleged to have been of inferior quality thus causing deception
of the public and inducing the belief that appellee's abilities had deteriorated. If we assume these claims to be true, a cause of action for unfair
competition is stated which in turn consists of the tort of defamation.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 896.
300 F.2d at 259.
" The court stated:
92
"

A charge that an entertainer has stooped to perform below his class may be
found to damage his reputation. Plaintiffs allegations in this respect are not
insufficient. ...
[ult has never been held in defamation that a plaintiff must be identified
by name.
Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added).
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sional reputation nor a loss of professional talent, though plaintiff
herself might prefer to avoid such engagements."

In a sense, defamation requires a tortuous reasoning process,
which might successfully destroy any cause of action for the unauthorized use. For example, the allegation of inferior quality
might weaken plaintiff's case such that the court will be unwilling
to find sufficient similarity to constitute passing-off or public
deception. If the imitation is so inferior, how could the public be
deceived? Although not impossible, it is improbable. Similarly
the theory of "stooping to perform below one's class" conflicts in
principle with the misappropriation doctrine, which presumes
that the performer's commercial base has been damaged by the
unauthorized use. Thus, a defamation action for imitation of a
performer's style should be used with circumspection, and pleading in the alternative should be utilized.
4. Right of Publicity
A performer's style has potential protection under the newly
emerged doctrine termed the right of publicity. The right of publicity has grown out of the interest and concern with the right to
privacy, which protects an individual's interest in being free from
unauthorized exploitation of his name or likeness." This protection begins with the tort of appropriation which was first recognized in New York in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co. 7 When the court denied the existence of appropriation,
the New York legislature in reaction passed a statute making it
a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name, portrait, or
picture of any person for "advertising purposes" or for the purpose of trade without written consent."
From the doctine of appropriation has arisen the right of
publicity. Mention of publicity as a protectible right was noted
by Warren and Brandeis:"
g5 362 F. Supp. at 349.

" The right of privacy was early recognized by Warren and Brandeis in their article
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). See also Green, The Right of Privacy,
27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REv. 637 (1973). See notes 104-07 infra and accompanying

text.
,7171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Contra, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
,8N.Y. CIV. IGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948) (originally enacted in 1903). See
also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.2 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 to -9
(1953).
" Warren & Brandeis, supra note 96.
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The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated to others.

.

.

. [E]ven if he has cho-

sen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the
limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of
this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression
adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in
painting, by sculpture, or in music ....
'0

The right of publicity has been called the antithesis of the
right of privacy. 0° The right of privacy protects one from injury
to self-esteem.0 M One commentator has noted that in such cases
some sort of compensable injury occurs to the sensibilities as a
matter of law.' 3 The right of publicity protects not injury to selfesteem, but rather recognizes the possibility of economic injury
to one's personality.'0 4 The case of Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co. ,05
illustrates that a celebrity has an economic interest in his personality. Here the court said there was no invasion of privacy, but
there was an invasion of the antithesis, the right of publicity.'00
Id. at 198-99 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County 1957).
,o See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1972); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Kunz v. Allen,
102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
'1 Treece, supra note 96, at 641. Professor Treece in a discussion of Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952), reaches this conclusion after in essence
recognizing that the compensable injury must be based upon the offensiveness to one's
sense of justice as opposed to concrete facts. Id.
I", See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E.
55 (1938). For an excellent discussion of one author's view of the justification for protection
of public figures from unauthorized product endorsement see Treece, supra note 96, at
645-47. Professor Treece predicates his argument, with good cause, upon the effects of such
conduct upon the public.
114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. Phila. County 1957).
oS Id. The court recognized that the right of publicity is, in effect, another form of
unfair competition.
On the other hand, where plaintiff is a person who may be termed a
"public figure", such as an actor or an athlete, the gist of this complaint is
00

entirely different. He does not complain that, by reason of the publication
of his picture in connection with the advertisement of a product, his name
and face have become a matter of public comment, but rather that the
commercial value which has attached to his name because of the fact that
he is a public figure has been exploited without his having shared in the
profits therefrom. ...
It is, therefore, our conclusion that the true theory upon which plaintiff
seeks to ground defendant's liability to him is the very antithesis of the right
of privacy. Plaintiff does not complain that his name should have been
withheld from public scrutiny: on the contrary, he asserts that his name has
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When an advertiser appropriates that personality without his
consent, he injures that economic interest. 0°
The right to privacy protects name and likeness as part of
personality. The right of publicity, if it is to protect a celebrity
from economic loss to his personality, cannot be so limited.' 8
Personality is defined as "the complex of characteristics that distinguishes a particular individual or individualizes or characterizes him in his relationships with others . . . the total of distinctive traits and characteristics . . . ."09
Those performers who create the expression of a character,
great commercial value in connection with the game of golf, and that defendant's use of his name has resulted in damage to him. We therefore hold that
plaintiff's right of privacy has not been violated.
Therefore, in the instant case, if plaintiff is to recover damages from
defendant on the theory of unfair competition he must demonstrate: (1) That
he has an enforceable property right in the commercial value of his name and
photograph in connection with the game of golf; (2) that he did not authorized defendant to make any commercial use of his name and photograph,
and, (3) that the publication, sale and advertisement by defendant of the
book "Golf With the Masters" constituted unfair competition as to the plaintiff.
Id. at 314.
107Treece, supra note 96, at 643. An interesting aspect of this, as well as any of the
tort theories discussed herein, would be the possibility of waiving one's cause of action in
tort and suing in assumpsit on a quasi-contractual theory. The authorities would indicate
that this possibility exists but that courts have been reluctant to allow this. Professor
Corbin defines quasi-contract as
a legal obligation, not based upon agreement, enforced either specifically or
by compelling the obligor to restore the value of that by which he was unjustly enriched.
Corbin, Quasi-ContractualObligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533, 550 (1912) (emphasis omitted).
Professor Gordon provides an excellent discussion as to why courts have denied quasicontract as an alternative in right of privacy situations. He does note, however:
Since the basis of recovery in quasi-contract is the defendant's enrichment,
it is clear that only those tortious acts which produce enrichment can provide
the grounds for an action in assumpsit ...
There is no reason why a tortious invasion of privacy may not produce
enrichment for the wrongdoer. Thus, in cases where it does one might reasonably expect that quasi-contractual relief will be granted.
Gordon, Recoveries for Violation of the Right of Privacy in Quasi-Contractand the Federal
Income Tax: An Illustration of Law's Response to Changes in Attitudes About the
Personality, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 368, 370-71 (1964), 7 PEAL 357, 360-61 & n. 17 (1967).
0I The recent commentators would indicate that privacy itself should be more liberally defined. See, e.g., Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RurrGERs L. REv. 275 (1974).
This author defines privacy as "control over when and by whom the various parts of us
can be sensed by others." Id. at 281.
" WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1687 (fifth definition listed) (P.
Gove ed. 1961).
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or a unique style of their own, have created a reflection of personality and a form of expressing that personality. Performers such
as Miss Booth whose own voice or personal traits are appropriated
should be even better protected under this doctrine. Within the
framework of the definition of personality, the use of one's own
voice in performing comprises an aspect of personality. As Warren and Brandeis noted, the existence of the right to limit publicity is not affected by the "method of expression." Hence, style
and personal traits used in performing should be given protection
under the right of publicity when an advertiser appropriates that
aspect of personality, and deceives the public into believing that
the celebrity has endorsed his product.
The celebrity who depends upon an aspect of his personality
as his source of income and notoriety has a vested economic interest in that personality as a means of livelihood. The practice of
celebrity endorsement of a product has become a common one
and is a lucrative source of income for the performer. If a performer's style or voice is appropriated without permission or compensation, future attempts to secure an engagement for product
endorsement might be thwarted, since the primary value of celebrity endorsement to the sponsor is the fact that the public is given
a feeling of the product's approval by the performer who is associated only with the sponsor's product.
An additional consideration apart from the financial deprivation resulting from unauthorized use is the inability of the
performer to control whether or not he wants to be associated with
product endorsement in any form. In other words, he is unable
to "fix the limits of publicity" given his style. This was exemplified in Booth wherein Miss Booth's voice would not in and of itself
invoke "Hazel," yet the imitation of Miss Booth's voice coupled
with the cartoon character "Hazel" would invoke Miss Booth as
the endorser. Miss Booth alone should have the right to determine if and when her voice, in fact or by imitation, is to be used
in conjunction with the portrayal of the cartoon character.
CONCLUSION

A performer's style may be the expression of a character or
may exist independent of any character expression. A performer
begins an unconscious search for style through trial and error,
rejecting those techniques which do not meet his attempts at
expression. Two things tend to gradually narrow or define the
limits of his expression: 1) what a performer wants to do, and 2)
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what he is capable of doing best. Inherent in the first is the
attempt to meet his own needs of fulfillment. The latter is often
determined by audience reaction, i.e., how the performer best
conveys meaning to his audience. By trying certain acting techniques, for example, a performer may find that some are not the
way in which he best expresses himself or that he does not enjoy
that means of expression. At the same time, he may also develop
the ability to express to his audience different ideas in different
ways by use of a unique combination of technique in a given
situation.
Thus, these two factors work together to help the performer
realize his limitations, both in capabilities and desires. The word
"limitations" is used only in the positive sense of helping narrow
the scope of those physical manifestations which are to be solidified into an identifiable style, uniquely personal to that performer. At some point, the performer becomes conscious of the
process and is capable of directing and governing the elements
which will become his "style." The culmination of this process
may take years for some, a relatively short time for others, or may
never occur at all. Those performers who successfully create a
unique style have used those techniques in a given situation and
have continued their expansion and development to meet their
needs for creative expression. This style manifests itself in timing, voice, gestures, mannerisms, and dress. What has evolved is
personal to the individual. In other words, he has ascertained his
limitations and turned to the perfection of the realm within those
limitations. This is a creation of that individual's mind and is his
representation of the ideas he chooses to express.
"Style" heretofore has been afforded virtually no protection
from unauthorized appropriation. As noted above, those performers who have created a unique identifiable style may be one of two
types. First, those who create the character and the expression of
that character, such as Chaplin, are probably the most unusual.
From this uniqueness, however, arises the misconception that
style must be equated with an idea. But there are the performers
such as Falk who create only the expression of the character, and
the performers who create a unique style which exists independently of any character portrayed, such as Bert Lahr and "The
Fifth Dimension." One point emerges from a comparison of these,
i.e., style can and does exist independent of any character-idea.
"Style" consists of a unique combination of posture, dress,
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mannerisms, gestures, and/or vocal delivery, that individual
combination being sufficiently developed to distinguish that performer from all others. As such, style must be recognized as and
afforded its place among those protectible, intangible intellectual
property rights. Style is capable of being delineated a "writing"
within the constitutional framework and is therefore eligible for
copyright protection.
The traditionally liberal defense of fair use would still protect
those imitators who act in good faith. The irony of this defense is
that for many years, it has protected the imitator because of his
own unique "style," yet no protection has been available for the
style of the performer imitated. Statutory requirements of tangibility can be met by the filing of pictorial narratives and videotapes as well as tapes of unique vocal style. However, because the
statutory "writings" have been more strictly interpreted than
constitutionally protectible "writings," Congress will remain reluctant to grant such protection for style. As a result, style must
be protected by state and common law theories.
The imitation of style, when done in good faith, is not only
permissible but desirable. It is when this style is appropriated for
commercial exploitation, either by another performer or an advertiser, that the wrong occurs. The latter is of special importance
because of two resulting consequences. The public is deceived
into believing that a performer has endorsed a product and has
received compensation therefor. But, the performer has not received compensation and in fact is deprived of something greater.
He is denied the right to choose when, how, and under what
circumstances his creative expression, style, is used. His opportunities for future product endorsement are narrowed, and the
advertiser is allowed to profit with no need to reveal the source
of the imitation. As the law currently stands, such an advertiser
would be foolish to offer a performer a chance for product endorsement and to compensate him therefor when he is free to copy
that style and pass it off to the public as originating from the
original creator with little or no fear of judicial sanction. The
problem exists, and will remain as long as courts and legislatures
fail to take cognizance and afford protection.
Those performers who have not created an identifiable style
and/or have merely developed their own personal traits which
have become readily identifiable by the public have not produced
a unique expression worthy of copyright protection. However,
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they too deserve protection from commercial exploitation in product advertising under the right of publicity, defamation, and unfair competition. For those performers, as well as those who have
created a style, secondary meaning may attach under given circumstances such that the voice or style becomes an identifying
"mark" and possibly protectible under Lanham Act section 43(a)
which is designed to protect the public from such false advertising
practices.
The challenge is presented-the answers will emerge only if
that challenge is met. Since Congress has failed to act, states are
now free to do so and should provide protection for those who
have become the "authors" of "style" in order that they may be
free from unfair use and "outright poaching" of their creative
efforts.
Cheryl L. Hodgson

COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-REs JUDICAA-Application of Res
Judicata to Agencies with Parallel Jurisdiction
Umberfield v. School District 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974)
INTRODUCTION

Although the application of res judicata to administrative
agency determinations was once questioned,' it is now accepted
that under appropriate circumstances the doctrine may be used
in administrative law. It is, however, well settled that the doctrine may not be indiscriminately applied to administrative determinations.' Before concluding that an agency decision is res
judicata, courts must consider not only the traditional criteria
applied to judicial decisions, i.e., identity of claims, parties, and
causes of action, 3 but also the theory, purpose, and intent of the
doctrine in light of the specific factual situation before the court.,
The Colorado Supreme Court in Umberfield v. School District 115
applied the doctrine of res judicata to the decision of a teacher
tenure panel, despite previous statements that "where public interest may be adversely affected" prior administrative determinations should not be binding.' The Colorado Civil Rights Commission's (CCRC) jurisdiction over an alleged discriminatory dismissal of a tenured teacher was effectively denied by this decision.
The question of res judicata as it applies to two administrative agencies having parallel jurisdiction has arisen infrequently
in case law. Accordingly, there are no well-established guidelines
to follow in determining the appropriateness of the doctrine's
application. Thus the rationale (or lack thereof) of Umberfield is
potentially applicable in other situations where administrative
agencies have overlapping jurisdiction. Reliance on the court's
reasoning may result in further unwarranted, and perhaps even
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 18.03 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS].
2Id.

E.g., Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1965).
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906); Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d
244, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See generally note 14 infra and accompanying text.
522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974).
B & M Serv., Inc. v. PUC, 163 Colo. 228, 232, 429 P.2d 293, 295 (1967) (PUC decision
was not binding and could be changed).
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unintended, judicial limitation of agency jurisdiction. This comment will examine the theory and rationale behind the application of res judicata to administrative agency decisions. An analytical framework will be proposed which courts may use as a guide
in applying res judicata to decisions made by agencies with potentially overlapping jurisdiction.
I.

A.

RES JUDICATA AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

The Doctrine of Res Judicata

Courts unhesitatingly apply res judicata to final judicial decisions. As generally defined, res judicata means claim preclusion-it prevents relitigation of all issues raised in the original
suit between two parties, or their privies, as well as all issues that
might properly have been raised.
Before the doctrine can be applied, three basic elements
must be present: identity of the claims upon which the two proceedings are based; identity of the parties or their privies; and a
final determination of the issues.' Inherent in these elements are
two other elements: that the matter deemed to have been conclusively determined is within the jurisdiction of the body; and that
the body making the determination is independent and uninterested. If any of these five elements are lacking, the original decision should not be held determinative of the later cause of action.9
B. Res Judicata and Administrative Agencies
1. Theory Behind Its Application
Although the trend is toward recognition of the doctrine in
administrative law, 0 many courts" and most authorities" have
I Umberfield

v. School Dist. 11, 522 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo. 1974). See generally
Introductory Note §§ 41-72 (1942); Vestal, Extent of Claim
Preclusion, 54 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1968).
1 E.g., City & County of Denver v. Colorado Seminary, 96 Colo. 109, 41 P.2d 1109
(1934).
1 E.g., United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 504-05 (1953) (where
subsequent action is based on a different claim the original proceeding operates as a bar
only for those issues actually heard and determined); Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v.
Burnet, 287 U.S. 308, 312 (1932) (res judicata requires identity of the parties); Gensinger
v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1953) (jurisdiction lacking in the original Tax
Court proceeding); Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128, 132 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 753 (1945) (an order which was not final, issued by an agency which
lacked jurisdiction, could not preclude redetermination of the issues).
IC United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966); Fairmont
Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838
(1955) (res judicata applies to agencies when exercising "judicial functions"); French v.
Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953); DAvis § 18.01. CompareMcMahan v. Yeilding,
270 Ala. 504, 120 So. 2d 429 (1960) (ministerial actions are not res judicata).
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS,
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stressed the need for careful consideration of the unique processes
of administrative law 3 in applying the doctrine. It has been established that res judicata will be considered a bar to collateral
attack of an agency decision only when the agency has been acting in its quasi-judicial capacity." When the determination is
based on unchanged law and facts the doctrine has been most
strictly applied.' 5 The rationale behind limiting the application
of res judicata in this manner is that the doctrine is used in
administrative law for the same reasons that it is applied to judicial determinations:" finality and judicial economy.
Case law 7 suggests that when the issue of res judicata arises
in respect to an administrative determination
" United States v. Stone Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927) (nature of Court of Customs precludes its finding from being res judicata); Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281
(1906) (initial hearing on alien exclusion too hasty to bar a future hearing on the same
question); United States v. Smith, 482 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (res judicata must
be flexibly applied to administrative decisions); Gordon County Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
446 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NLRB finding that employee was not dismissed for racial
reasons did not bar a Title VII action since the NLRB examiner was primarily concerned
with union activities); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.
1971) (a Labor Relations Board decision on the issue of racial discrimination did not
preclude a subsequent consideration of this issue by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission); Grose v. Cohen, 406 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1969) (when facts in administrative
determinations so require, the doctrine of res judicata should not be strictly applied); Lane
v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1950) (determination by the National
Railroad Adjustment Board concerning an employment relationship was not binding on
Railroad Retirement Board since two different statutes were involved); Sekov Corp. v.
United States, 139 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1943) (prior FTC determination did not bar a district
court redetermination of same issue).
2

E.g., 2 F.

COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

503 (1965) [hereinafter cited as

COOPER]; DAVIS § 18.04.
'1

Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942 Wis. L.

REV. 1.
" United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Associated
Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973); Tipler
v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Jet Air Freight v. Jet Air
Freight Delivery, Inc., 264 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy,
366 Mich. 351, 194 N.W.2d 704 (1972); Standard Auto Parts Co. v. Michigan Employment
Security Comm'n, 3 Mich. App. 81, 143 N.W.2d 135 (1966); Morin v. S.H. Valliere Co.,
113 N.H. 436, 309 A.2d 153 (1973); Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 855, 325
N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See DAVIS §§ 18.02-.03. Res judicata does not apply to
decisions made when an administrative agency is acting in its rulemaking capacity.
" Stucky v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904, 911 (9th Cir. 1973); Painters Dist. Council 58
v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969) (all facts pertinent to second
action had been fully heard and decided in the initial proceeding); DAvis § 18.03, at 559.
11Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1955); Old Dutch
Milk Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F. Supp. 971, 974
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); DAVIS § 18.03.
11Cases cited note 11 supra.
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the decision [whether to apply the doctrine] depends upon a weighing of competing interests in light of all the factors involved in the
particular case."0

Administrative agencies are given the authority to investigate,
adjudicate, and legislate in specified areas based on the premise
that they will develop expertise in their fields. The decisionmakers are generally selected for their knowledge within the areas of
agency jurisdiction. Their expertise justifies the deference given
to administrative agencies by courts, particularly when the
agency has been created to protect an individual's rights and to
enforce public policy."9
2. Three Contexts in Which Res Judicata May Apply
The question of whether to apply res judicata to an agency
decision arises in three basic contexts: what weight a court should
give to an agency decision in a subsequent proceeding; what effect
the original decision has if the same parties seek a rehearing
before the same agency; and what effect a prior administrative
decision has when a collateral attack is made to another agency
based upon the same factual circumstances.
The first of these situations arises when the consequences of
an agency decision are bypassed by a collateral attack on the
issue in court. 20 Must the agency's decision be accorded the conclusive effect of a similar decision by a court of law? Courts have
answered this question affirmatively or negatively depending
upon the facts before them. 2 ' When there has been reliance upon
" COOPER at

508.

" See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I.

duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS
2401 (purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII).
I This situation frequently arises in EEOC Title VII cases. As a result of a recent
Supreme Court decision, a finding by the EEOC that a complainant has been dismissed
for cause does not preclude a collateral attack in court. The district court is not bound by
the factual findings or conclusions reached by the EEOC. In fact, the petitioner is entitled
to a trial de novo at the district court level on the issue of the alleged Title VII violation.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
" United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (holding that prior
agency determination was final and binding on court based on the facts of the case);
Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
838 (1955) (applying res judicata to a prior Tax Court determination of liability); Old
Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F. Supp. 971
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (denying application of res judicata to administrative determination
when it appeared that there were significant facts that remained to be determined); Jet
Air Freight v. Jet Air Freight Delivery, Inc., 264 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972) (court
applied res judicata to a prior agency determination); EPPS Air Serv., Inc. v. Lampkin,
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the initial decision, or when the decision has provided the basis
for a third party's change in position, the courts appear more
ready to find the agency decision conclusive. However, when it is
22
apparent that all the facts were not considered by the agency,
or when the agency has exceeded it statutory authority,2 3 res judicata will generally not be applied. Rather than allowing a collateral attack, however, courts usually hold that the proper recourse
2
is an appeal of the agency decision. 1
Different factors must be considered when, as in the second
situation, what is sought is a rehearing before the same agency,
rather than a collateral attack in court. Rehearings by an agency
may be mandated by its organic statute or by the inherent nature
of the agency itself.25 The situation arises most often, however,
when there has been a change in facts or law, or when new facts
have been discovered.2 1 When facts change there is no real question of res judicata, since the previous decision was based on
premises which are no longer valid. Similarly, when a statute
provides for redetermination of issues previously decided, there
is recognition by the legislature that the subject matter of the
agency's jurisdiction may require periodic reconsideration. Problems of conclusiveness of a prior decision do arise, however, when
the petitioner requests a rehearing based on some inadequacy in
the initial proceeding.2 If an agency's refusal to grant a rehearing
229 Ga. 792, 194 S.E.2d 437 (1972) (court did not accord prior agency decision finality
based on different issues raised in the two proceedings); Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer, Inc., 67
Misc. 2d 855, 325 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
E.g., Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F.
Supp. 971 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
13 E.g., Flavell v. Department of Welfare, 144 Colo. 203, 355 P.2d 941 (1960).
21 E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Lightsey, 185 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1950).
An example of this is the ability of the FCC to review radio and television licenses
periodically. Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (the court refused
to prevent agency rehearing on whether to approve a license previously granted).
21 Jason v. Summerfield, 214 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954)
(change in law); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 795 (1944) (previous agency inaction does not operate as a bar to a new action on
new facts even though the same parties were involved); B & M Serv., Inc. v. PUC, 163
Colo. 193, 429 P.2d 293 (1967) (previous grant of license not a bar to refusal to grant license
on the same factual situation presented in the first application); Metropolitan Dade
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970) (court held
prior zoning determination res judicata in regard to subsequent attempt at rezoning hearing, barring substantial change in circumstances); Canada v. Peake, Inc., 184 Neb. 52,
165 N.W.2d 587 (1969) (order of railway commission was not res judicata as to subsequent
application of same nature since issues presented for new application were not raised at
the previous determination).
2
E.g., Southland Indus., Inc. v. FCC, 99 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (there should
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is appealed, courts analyze the initial hearing in the same way
that a trial court decision is reviewed by an appellate court: the
court examines the significance of the alleged inadequacy and the
effect it may have had on the original decision. Unless the agency
decision has denied fundamental fairness, courts will generally
defer to an agency's grant or denial of a rehearing." The specific
standards of review provided for most agency decisions2 9 and the
expertise of administrative agencies justifies this deference by the
courts.
Cases presenting the question of res judicata have arisen with
some regularity in the two contexts described above. The applicability of the doctrine to one of two agency determinations when
both agencies have heard and decided the issue based upon their
own statutorily-defined objectives has arisen infrequently. 0 It
was in this context, however, that the court in Umberfield considered and applied res judicata to the teacher tenure panel decision.
Where two agencies have had parallel jurisdiction, the potential conflict in decisionmaking ability has frequently been resolved by statutory interpretation,' informal agreements between the agencies themselves,3 2 or the court's reliance on procedural or factual variations between the proceedings.3 3 If these
solutions prove unworkable, the court should carefully examine
all pertinent issues in order to reach the desired result and avoid
be a right to rehearing to enable the commission to correct errors or hear newly discovered
evidence).
"
E.g., United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535 (1946); ICC
v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 73 (1945).
2 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-106(7) (1973).
'o The situations in which this issue may arise are limited. For example, areas of
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction include CCRC and EEOC, Social Security and
state welfare agencies, ICC and a state public service commission which also grants
licenses; concurrent jurisdiction between two federal agencies may arise between the
NLRB and EEOC, FTC and FDA, Railroad Retirement Board and National Railroad
Adjustment Board; concurrent jurisdiction between two state agencies exists between
state unemployment commission and CCRC, and now, the teacher tenure panel and the
CCRC.
1, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428
F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Lane v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1950).
32 For example, such agreements exist between the FTC and the FDA. See generally
Groner & Sternstein, Res Judicata in FederalAdministrative Law, 39 IOWA L. REv. 300
(1954); Kleinfeld & Goding, Res Judicata and Two CoordinateFederalAgencies, 95 U.
PENN. L. REV. 388 (1947).
33 E.g., State Licensing Bd. for Healing Arts v. Alabama Bd. of Podiatry, 287 Ala.
132, 249 So. 2d 611 (1971) (record insufficient to determine if the issue between the two
boards was really identical).
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unwarranted intrusions upon agency jurisdiction. Since the court
found no informal agreements or significant procedural variations
in Umberfield, the failure to analyze fully the application of res
judicata to the facts in the case was particularly critical.
A.

II. Umberfield v. School District 11
Case Facts and History

Umberfield, a tenured teacher in School District 11, joined
the World Wide Church of God in 1969. He requested leaves of
absence in October 1969 and in April 1970 to observe religious
holy days. Although the school board denied permission, Umberfield was absent on the holy days.34 In April 1970 he was charged
with breach of contract and neglect of his teaching duties and the
school board initiated dismissal proceedings. 35 The teacher tenure
panel (the panel) recommended dismissal and the school board
acted thereon. In August 1970 Umberfield filed a complaint with
the CCRC, alleging that his dismissal was based on his religious
practices and thus violated the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act
of 1957 (Antidiscrimination Act).36
11The record before the CCRC stated that Umberfield had offered to procure and pay
for a substitute teacher or to teach summer school without compensation, and that he did
provide detailed lesson plans to be used in his absence. Transcript of the Hearing before
the Comm'n at 15 (Sept. 24, 1971).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(1)-(4) (1973) describes the procedure to be
followed: The board accepts the recommendation of any member that a teacher be dismissed. The teacher is notified and may request that a panel to review the recommendation be convened. The panel is composed of three lay individuals who are not affiliated
with the school district. The board selects one member, the teacher selects a second
member, and a third is chosen by the two who have already been selected.
Id. § 24-34-306(2). The question of religious discrimination was never considered
on its merits by any court of review. However, the CCRC did find as a result of its
investigation and hearing that Umberfield's dismissal violated the Antidiscrimination
Act, which forbids an employer to discharge any person who is otherwise qualified because
of his creed. The commission found that the school district interfered with the free exercise
of Umberfield's religion by forcing him to choose between continued employment and
observance of the tenets of his faith. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). Furthermore, the CCRC found that such an infringement can only be justified by
a compelling state interest or business reason. Applying the standards used by the courts
in interpreting rights arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e [hereinafter cited as Title VII], and by the CCRC in rights arising under COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973), an attempt at reasonable accomodation must
be made by the employer if it can be made without undue hardship. Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1973); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d
216 (10th Cir. 1972) (where job criteria are justified by "business necessity" they are
permissible); Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973); cf.
Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1973).
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The CCRC found that the dismissal was in violation of the
Antidiscrimination Act. 7 The school district appealed the
CCRC's decision, alleging that the CCRC lacked jurisdiction over
Umberfield's complaint because of the panel's previous adjudication of the matter. The district court upheld the school district's
contention. On appeal the court of appeals reversed the district
court's finding that the CCRC lacked jurisdiction, but affirmed
the decision on the basis that the CCRC's findings were not supported by the evidence. 8 The Supreme Court of Colorado granted
certiorari "[p]rimarily to review the correctness of the Court of
13 9
Appeals ruling that the doctrine of res judicatadid not apply.
B.

The Court's Rationale

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the CCRC lacked
jurisdiction because the teacher tenure panel findings were res
judicata. They reasoned that since the court's broad scope of
review of a tenure panel decision 0 extended to all matters, the
'7

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).

38 "The findings of fact by the commission are conclusive upon the district court if

supported by substantial evidence." Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo.
App. 10, 17, 488 P.2d 83, 85 (1971). E.g., Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Refrigerated
Foods, Inc., 515 P.2d 1137 (Colo. 1973); Texas Southerland Corp. v. Hogue, 30 Colo.App.
560, 497 P.2d 1275 (1972) (the requirement may be met by indirect evidence). Substantial
evidence requires affirmance of an agency determination of fact unless the weight of the
record as a whole "clearly precludes" the agency's decision. Inherent in the concept of
substantial evidence is a requirement for quantity as well as quality. The quality aspect
is satisfied when there is a residuum of legally admissible evidence sufficient to support
the agency's findings. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Colo. 591, 597, 328 P.2d 384,
387 (1958); Williams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 Colo. 458, 464, 319 P.2d 1078, 1081
(1957). See also COOPER at 727.
3,522 P.2d at 732.
Id. at 733. A panel hearing is subject to review as statutorily provided.
If [the district court] finds that the agency action is arbitrary or capricious,
a denial of statutory right, contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege
or immunity. . . then the court shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency
action . . . .In all cases under review, the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and shall apply such interpretations to the facts duly found or established.
Id. § 24-4-106(7). The statutory standard which the court applies is "clearly erroneous
on the whole record, unsupported by substantialevidence when the record is considered
as a whole .... " Id. (emphasis added). As defined by the court in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), "clearly erroneous" is a finding that
leaves the reviewing court "with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." "Policy, authority and history all thus show that the 'clearly erroneous' rule
gives the reviewing court broader powers than the 'substantial evidence' formula." Stem,
Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58
HARV. L. REV. 70, 88-89 (1944). See also COOPER at 726. Note that the 1969 amendment to
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panel itself had authority to consider violations of statutory or
constitutional rights. 4 Although the grounds for dismissal which
are specified in the Teacher Employment, Dismissal, and Tenure
Act of 1967 (Teacher Tenure Act)4" make no mention of statutory
or constitutional rights, the court argued that the scope of review
defined the panel's jurisdiction. It was the court's contention that
Umberfield actually presented his complaint of discrimination to
the panel when he alleged a violation of his constitutional rights,
and that the panel rejected it." (The court stated that he could
have, but did not, allege violation of the Antidiscrimination Act).
The court reasoned that if it failed to accord finality to the panel's
decision and allowed the CCRC to hear the question of a discriminatory practice, the court might be "compelled to affirm opposite
results of the two administrative bodies." 44
To support its contention that res judicata may be applied
to an administrative determination, the court cited United States
v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.45 Although the Supreme
Court in that case made the general statement that res judicata
may apply to administrative agencies when they have resolved
"disputed issues of fact properly before [them] which the parties
have had an adequate opportunity to litigate . . .," the facts in
the case were much stronger. The parties had contractually
agreed that the determinations were to be final.47 By simplistically adopting the Supreme Court's general statement, the Colorado court failed to consider whether the requisite elements for a
finding of res judicata were present in Umberfield.
Of the five elements necessary for a proper application of res
judicata, only two, the identity of the parties before both the
panel and the CCRC, and the finality of the panel's decision, were
clear. The identity of claims, the jurisdiction of the panel to dethe Colorado Administrative Procedure Act provides for both standards of review. The
court has not, as yet, interpreted these two standards together.
41 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973) provides that a tenured teacher may be
dismissed for "physical or mental disability, incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality,
conviction of a felony, insubordination, or other good and just cause ....
42 Id.
41At the CCRC hearing Umberfield stipulated that he had alleged at the panel
hearing that the school board's action was in "[v]iolation of the rights guaranteed all
citizens, including the teacher, under the Constitution of the United States and the State
of Colorado.
... 522 P.2d at 734.
44Id.
" 522 P.2d at 732, citing 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
48 384 U.S. at 422.
' Id. at 419.
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termine a violation of the Antidiscrimination Act or of the Constitution, and the determination by an independent board were only
questionably present.
To support a finding of res judicata, the same claim must
provide the basis for both actions.48
In deciding whether the substances of two actions are for res
judicata purposes the same, various tests have been advanced: Is the
same right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different judgment obtained in the second action impair rights under the first
judgment? Would the same evidence sustain both judgments?"

Since these guidelines are directed at judicial rather than administrative determinations, they should be liberally interpreted and
applied2 ° In Umberfield two distinct rights arising under two
different statutes provided the bases for the claims. A finding of
discrimination, or lack thereof, by the CCRC would not impair
Umberfield's rights before the panel. However, due to the mandate against discrimination, if there were a finding that Umberfield's rights under the Antidiscrimination Act had been violated,
this might impair the school board's ability to effectuate a dismissal.
Likewise, although the evidence necessary to both actions
arose out of the same transaction, arguably different evidence is
relevant to meet the statutory criteria of the Teacher Tenure Act 1
and the Antidiscrimination Act.5" Thus the requirement that both
causes of action arose from the same claim should not have been
so quickly dismissed by the court. Even if the court had found
that the complaint before the CCRC and the action by the panel
were based on the same claim, the question of jurisdiction was not
effectively resolved by the court. As a defense for his absences
from school Umberfield may have presented the infringement of
his free exercise of religion. This did not, however, give the panel
direct jurisdiction to make a final determination of the constitutional violation,' 3 much less a violation of another state statute.
" See, e.g., United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953).
Acree v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 390 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
852 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-67 (1942).
"

"
12

3

See generally DAvis § 18.03.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116

(1973).

See note 116 infra for the text of the Act.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942):
Where a court has incidentally determined a matter which it would have
had no jurisdiction to determine in an action brought directly to determine
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Direct jurisdiction to make final determinations of legal and factual issues may not be conferred by incorporating by reference a
general procedural statute.
Not only did the panel lack direct jurisdiction, but the final
decision to dismiss Umberfield was not made by an uninterested
body, as the doctrine of res judicata requires. The school board
makes the final decision to terminate a tenured teacher's employment. 54 Thus the court found that a decision by an interested
party was res judicata, thereby preventing a determination of a
statutory violation by an independent, statutorily-created
agency.
In the CCRC the legislature has created an agency with expertise in discriminatory employment practices. However, the
court's rationale effectively weakened the CCRC by limiting its
ability to hold a hearing on the alleged discriminatory dismissal.
If, as the court suggested, the scope of review 55 expands the jurisdiction of the agency, all agencies would have authority to decide
violations of any constitutional or statutory rights.5" Consequently, there would be no need for the CCRC. Inasmuch as the
legislature did create an agency with specific jurisdiction over
discriminatory employment practices, it is reasonable that the
CCRC, and not other agencies, should be allowed to make final
determinations of discrimination.
The court in Umberfield ignored not only the expertise of the
CCRC and the legislative intent expressed in its creation, but also
the absence of several elements required for the application of res
judicata. Even if the court had determined that all necessary
elements were present for finding the panel decision res judicata,
it, the judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action brought to determine the matter directly.
Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals in School District v. Howell, 517 P.2d 422 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1973), held that the CCRC could not determine violations of constitutional
rights. The scope of the CCRC's jurisdiction was specifically limited to determining violations of its own organic statute. If the court's logic in Umberfield were extended, then
Umberfield would overrule Howell. Since the CCRC is also subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act's standards of review, it too would have jurisdiction to make determinations of constitutional violations.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(10) (1973).
5 Id. § 24-4-106(7). The Administrative Procedure Act defines the scope of review for
all administrative agency decisions except those exempted by provisions of individual
statutes. Id. § 24-4-107.
" The Administrative Procedure Act is purely a procedural statute and was not
intended to be a source of agency jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of an agency is determined
solely by the organic statute of that agency.
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there are other factors which must be considered before the doctrine can be applied to an administrative decision.

III.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING THE
APPLICABILITY OF RES JUDICATA

Under the case law dealing with the application of res judicata to administrative agencies57 it is clear that this doctrine is
not a simplistic concept, but one in which issues other than the
basic definitional elements must be considered. It is a complex
doctrine when applied to administrative determinations, and
must be applied differently in different contexts. Although courts
have generally dealt with one, or at most two, of these issues in
any case, each issue is important and should be considered by the
court in all instances.
A.

An Overview of the Proposed Analysis

A functional breakdown of the case law suggests that there
are four basic issues which a court must analyze (in addition to
the five elements discussed earlier) 8 when considering the application of res judicata to administrative agency decisions: (1) election of remedies; (2) primary jurisdiction; (3) exhaustion of remedies; (4) public policy considerations.59 Although these issues
have usually arisen in contexts where a rehearing before the same
agency is sought or a collateral attack of an agency decision is
made in court, they are equally relevant to the situation in which
two administrative agencies have parallel jurisdiction, as in
Umberfield. Because any of these issues can constitute sufficient
grounds for refusal to apply res judicata to an administrative
decision, it is not usually necessary for a court to consider all of
them. But if one or more considerations appears to support application of the doctrine, the court should carefully examine each of
the remaining issues. For example, even if there has been an
election of remedies, there may be important public policy considerations or questions of primary jurisdiction which may preclude use of the doctrine.
The relative weight of each of the four issues will vary with
the facts of the particular case. When an agency decision is collat7 See text accompanying notes 10-19 supra.
See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
' No one case was found which discussed all these issues. See the detailed discussion
accompanying notes 60-118 infra, for cases dealing with each issue.
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erally attacked in court, for example, the questions of election
and exhaustion of remedies are probably the most important and
should be considered first. However, when two agencies have parallel jurisdiction, as in Umberfield, and a party attempts to establish that only one of those agencies may hear and decide an
issue, the questions of election of remedies, primary jurisdiction,
and, sometimes, public policy should be given the greatest
weight.
In Umberfield the Colorado Supreme Court completely
failed to recognize the complex nature of the doctrine. They took
a simplistic definition 0 and applied it uncritically to the tenure
panel decision. Had the court considered all the relevant factors,
the inappropriateness of applying res judicata to the facts of this
case would have been apparent.
B.

Elements of the Analytical Framework

1. Election of Remedies
When a court is faced with a situation where a party has two
or more potential avenues of relief available, the issue of election
of remedies must be explored."' In Umberfield there was no real
election made since the panel hearing preceded Umberfield's dismissal and the dismissal itself provided the basis for his complaint to the CCRC. The issue, however, was still pertinent, since
'the court proceeded as if Umberfield's pursuit of his right to a
hearing before the panel resulted in a choice of forums. The court
held that he was estopped from seeking alternative relief when
the panel action resulted in his dismissal by the board."
In Colorado, courts have traditionally been reluctant to impose an election of remedies on a party unless directly inconsistent positions must be taken to avail oneself of both remedies., 3
The principal limitation on the pursuit of concurrent remedies is
that a party is entitled to only one satisfaction. 4 In conjunction
s0522 P.2d at 732.
, Election of remedies is often used by courts to include election of forums. Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Thus, although there was no possibility of
duplicate relief being awarded, nor any real election of remedies made in Umberfield, the
term as used throughout this section incorporates election of forums.
11 522 P.2d at 734.
Louis Cook Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Frank Briscoe Co., 445 F.2d 1177, 1179
(10th Cir. 1971); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 82, 388 P.2d 399, 401 (1964);
Holscher v. Ferry, 131 Colo. 190, 193, 280 P.2d 655, 657 (1955); Thornburg v. Homestead
Minerals Corp., 513 P.2d 219, 220 (Colo. App. 1973).
" Marean v. Stanley, 5 Colo. App. 335, 338, 58 P. 395, 396 (1894).
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with the contract claims actually made before the tenure panel
in Umberfield, it would not have been inconsistent to allege a
violation of the Antidiscrimination Act. 5 Nor was there any possibility of duplicate relief being sought, since Umberfield did not
file a complaint with the CCRC until after the panel had met, the
school board had acted, and he had been dismissed.
In Umberfield the court was faced with a situation that is
directly analogous to cases that have arisen alleging violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)66 and labor agreements or
the National Labor Relations Act. 7 Labor arbitration agreements
and the National Labor Relations Act provide for arbitration of
labor disputes by a board of arbitrators chosen specifically to deal
with the complaint. If the complainant also alleges that a discriminatory employment practice has occurred, there is an additional remedy provided by Title VII.
Title VII 8 is the federal counterpart to the Antidiscrimination Act."8 They are both designed to
eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The title authorizes the establishment of a
Federal Equal Opportunity Commission and delegates to it the primary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful employment practices ....
70

Thus, cbmparison of Umberfield with cases arising where resort
to arbitration has preceded or accompanied a Title VII action is
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). Although most of the cases arising under Title VII deal
with racial discrimination, the language of its provisions also forbids discrimination on
the basis of religion. The wording of the Antidiscrimination Act and Title VII in these
sections is nearly identical, so the comparison of these cases with Umberfield is appropriate. However, the procedure embodied in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-305 to -308
(1973) and that in Title VII differ in how allegations of discrimination are dealt with.
Under the Colorado Act, the CCRC conducts an investigation and hearing and
reaches a final determination of the substance of the allegation. Its findings are reviewable
by a district court. However, according to the provisions of Title VII, the EEOC conducts
an investigation and determines the validity of the complaint. It then attempts by informal means to resolve the problem. If this attempt is unsuccessful, it notifies the complainant of its findings and authorizes him to seek judicial relief. Under the 1972 amendment
the EEOC itself may pursue a judicial hearing on the question. Therefore, under Title VII,
the court makes the final determination, enforceable by law, as to the existence of any
discrimination, whereas in Colorado the CCRC is empowered, based upon its own decision, to grant appropriate relief.
1129 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
"

O

1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2401; see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301
to -308 (1973).
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appropriate, since both Title VII and the Antidiscrimination Act

address similar problems.
The Teacher Tenure Act provides for the convening of a tenure panel at the teacher's request to conduct a hearing concerning
any proposed dismissal of a tenured teacher. Its composition and
functions are defined by statute.71 The panel evaluates, in light
of the Teacher Tenure Act 72 and the teacher's contract, the validity of the complaint on which the recommendation for dismissal
is based. The statute defines the grounds for dismissal and provides the framework in which the panel operates. Similarly, the
role of the arbitrator or an arbitration board
is to carry out the aims of the agreement that [it] has been commissioned to interpret and apply, and [its] role defines the scope of
[itsl authority."

The rights arising under both Title VII and the Antidiscrimination Act, however, are distinct and separate from the rights
guaranteed by an employment contract or the Teacher Tenure
Act. The courts have stressed the distinction between the rights
arising under a labor arbitration agreement and those arising
under Title VII, refusing to apply an election of remedies to Title
VII cases. 4 This same distinction between the rights arising
under the Teacher Tenure Act and those protected by the Antidiscrimination Act was ignored by the Colorado court in
Um berfield.
In a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Alexander v.
7" it was held that the doctrine of election of
Gardner-Denver,
remedies is inapplicable when there are statutory rights distinctly
separate from the employee's contract rights. Prior to GardnerDenver, courts had limited an arbitrator's authority to determining the existence of any contract violations; he had no authority
to make a conclusive determination of any other statutory rights
that may have been violated." Courts reasoned that the fundamental nature of the rights protected by Title VII 7 militates
"
72

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(5)-(9) (1973).
Id. §§ 22-63-101 to -118.

11 Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 1970).

1, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
75 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
71 Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings
v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
71 See generally 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2401.
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against use of any body, other than the one specially created, to
make a final finding of discriminatory employment practices.7 8
The Teacher Tenure Act was designed to prevent arbitrary dismissals of tenured teachers,79 and similarly most labor agreements are designed to protect both the employer's and employee's
rights and interests in the employment relationship, and to prevent unjustified, capricious actions on the part of either party.
The Supreme Court found that the fact that a violation of one's
civil rights and contract rights arose from the same incident did
not erase the distinction between those two rights. In allowing
Alexander to pursue both remedies, the Court found the relationship between the forums to be complementary rather than inconsistent. 0 Since the rights protected by the Antidiscrimination
2
Act l are identical with those the court found in Gardner-Denver
to be distinct and separate from the rights guaranteed in the
arbitration agreement, the analogy seems compelling.
In failing to follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Colorado court constructively imposed an election of remedies on
Umberfield by precluding his complaint to the CCRC. By so
doing, it failed to give any weight either to its traditional
reluctance to impose such a harsh doctrine or to the importance
of safeguarding those rights protected by the Antidiscrimination

Act.83
2. Primary Jurisdiction
In failing to allow the CCRC to investigate claims directly
within its competence, the Colorado court ignored a fundamental
tenet of administrative law, primary jurisdiction. The court
argued that if it recognized the CCRC's jurisdiction over the dismissal, affirmation of two conflicting agency decisions might be
required. They justified their holding that the tenure panel decision was res judicata on the issue of religious discrimination on
the basis of this potential conflict. 4
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that when
there is concurrent jurisdiction between an administrative agency
7, Cases cited note 76 supra.

§§ 22-63-111 to -116 (1973).
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
s' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

.2

'3

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-301 to -308 (1973).
522 P.2d at 734.
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and a court, the court should defer factual determinations to the
agency. This deference is based on the supposed expertise of the
agency and the need for uniform interpretation of statutory provisions that can only be afforded when one body hears all cases that
arise thereunder.15 It has been suggested that this concept could
be applied in modified form to two administrative agencies with
concurrent jurisdiction."
Under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," even if the issues raised in the first proceeding were arguably within the jurisdiction of that agency but another agency had been created with
specific jurisdiction over those issues, it would be the second
agency whose jurisdiction would be recognized. If this concept
had been accepted by the court there would have been no potential conflict. Because the two agencies involved in Umberfield
have distinct functions and because only the CCRC has explicit
jurisdiction and expertise in discriminatory employment practices, it, and not the tenure panel, should be authorized to make
a final determination of any discriminatory acts.
3. Exhaustion of Remedies
The question of exhaustion of remedies, like those of jurisdiction and scope of authority discussed below, involves statutory
construction and consideration of legislative intent. The issue
which a court must decide is whether all remedies that are provided in the statute have been, or must be, exhausted 8 before an
appeal can be taken or a collateral attack made. The rationale
behind the application of exhaustion of remedies to an administrative decision is threefold:
11G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379 (Alas. 1974).
See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
86 Editorial Note, Res Judicataand Administrative Jurisdiction-A Proposalfor Resolving Conflicts Between Agencies with OverlappingJurisdiction,35 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1056, 1063 (1967). The note suggests that an interlocutory appeal provision be incorporated into the APA providing for a determination of proper jurisdiction. A court would
determine, based on the issue in controversy, which agency would have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the controversy. This decision would then be subject to judicial review under
APA provisions.
87 Denver-Laramie-Walden Truck Line, Inc. v. Denver-Ft. Collins Freight Serv., Inc.,
156 Colo. 366, 370, 399 P.2d 242, 243 (1965) (failure to follow statutory provisions requiring
appeal to agency barred pursuit of judicial relief); Hannum v. Hillyard, 131 Colo. 37, 41,
278 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1955) (failure to take advantage of appeal provided for in statute
prevented court action); Florida Welding & Erection Serv., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins.
Co., 285 So. 2d 386, 389-90 (Fla. 1973) (where statutory provisions provide for appeal of
agency decisions to the agency making the original determination, these must be followed).
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(1) judicial review may be facilitated by allowing the appropriate
agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, (2) judicial time may be conserved because the agency might grant the
relief sought, and (3) administrative autonomy requires that an
agency be given opportunity to correct its own errors.M

Exhaustion of remedies is used by the courts in two contexts.
Courts may require that all administrative remedies within an
agency be exhausted prior to granting an appeal of the agency
decision.89 Similarly when an administrative determination is attacked in a different forum, courts may refuse to recognize the
validity of the challenge if the initial decision was not judicially
appealed. 0 However, courts have held that when fundamental
rights protected by a statute are involved, failure to appeal an
agency decision will not always bar a collateral attack.'
Umberfield failed to take advantage of the appeal provision
in the Teacher Tenure Act." The court, by implication, based its
determination that the panel decision was res judicata on this
0 United States ex rel. Marroro v. Warden, 483 F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 653 (1974), citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 19495 (1969).
11 E.g., James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that under
New York law, state administrative remedies must always be exhausted before appeals
may be taken to federal court, but not always before appeals to state court); Jackson v.
Colorado, 294 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (D. Colo. 1968) (where there was a requirement that
all administrative remedies be exhausted prior to asking for an injunction, there was no
final record or clear knowledge that the petitioners fell within the agency requirements
without exhausting the agency remedies); Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Authority, 176
Colo. 281, 301, 490 P.2d 299, 301 (1971) (prior to judicial appeal all administrative remedies must be exhausted (dictum)); Denver-Laramie-Walden Truck Lines, Inc. v. DenverFt. Collins Freight Serv., Inc., 156 Colo. 366, 370, 399 P.2d 242, 243 (1965); Hannum v.
Hillyard, 131 Colo. 37, 41, 278 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1955).
10 Egner v. Texas City Indep. School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931, 934 (S.D. Tex. 1972)
(where available state judicial and administrative remedies exist, a collateral attack in
federal court may not be made).
" See Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 628 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1973) (court stated that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not a
prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 section 1983,
particularly since the teacher was dismissed for exercising first amendment rights); James
v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1972) (administrative remedies, but not
appeals to the state court, must be exhausted prior to collateral attack on dismissal);
Wishart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530, 533 (D. Mass. 1973) (teacher's failure to seek
judicial review of an administrative decision upholding his dismissal did not bar section
1983 action). Similarly many courts have held that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies may not be required when violation of fundamental rights protected by section
1983 is an issue. E.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Webb v. Lake
Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 806 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
92 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(11) (1973).
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failure to appeal. 3 Thus they relied on the premise that all judicial appeals must be exhausted before the validitiy of a collateral
attack may be recognized. The logic supporting this application
of exhaustion of remedies is, however, less compelling when the
question presented, as in Umberfield, is whether failure to exhaust remedies arising under one statute precludes the assertion
of a separate, independent right arising under another statute.
Exhaustion of remedies arising under one issue will not necessarily have any effect on the others. In light of the legislative intent
expressed in the creation of the CCRC, there are overriding principles which suggest that failure to exhaust remedies in the present case should not operate as a bar to the CCRC's jurisdiction. 4
Moreover, the lack of factual determinations by the panel on the
issue of religious discrimination, and the total inadequacy of the
record, provided no real basis to support an appeal of the decision.9 5 Furthermore, if the agency decision had been appealed, the
court might have referred the issue of a discriminatory employment practice to the CCRC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Indeed, such a course might have resulted in a situation
identical to the one which the court faced when it granted certiorari: a tenure panel finding justifying the dismissal on the basis
of a requirement in the Teacher Tenure Act" and a CCRC decision finding that the dismissal violated the Antidiscrimination
Act.97
4. Public Policy Considerations
Before a court applies res judicata to an administrative decision, it should examine the language and legislative history of the
statute creating the agency to determine the legislative intent. In
Umberfield the court did examine the statutes which created the
522 P.2d at 734.
,4 Cases cited note 91 supra.
, In Umberfield, the petitioner's brief noted that no record of the panel hearing had
been presented to either the CCRC or to the federal district court when the school district
appealed the CCRC's decision. A court, when asked to review an agency decision that is
insufficiently supported by the record, has two possible courses of action: it can either
make an independent determination of the facts, or it can remand the case to the agency
for a redetermination and compilation of a complete record on which its decision has been
based. The latter course of action is the one recognized by Colorado and many other states.
Neverdahl v. Linder, 141 Colo. 186, 347 P.2d 512 (1959). Accord, e.g., Rock Island Metal
Foundry, Inc. v. City of Rock Island, 414 Ill. 436, 111 N.E.2d 499 (1953); Moore's Case,
330 Mass. 1, 110 N.E.2d 764 (1953); Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Borough of Paramas, 34
N.J. 406, 169 A.2d 814 (1961); Hooper v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 132, 241 A.2d 809 (1968).
, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973).
'7 Id. § 24-34-307(12).
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CCRC and the tenure panel,9" but without the aid of any articulated constructional guides.
a. Canons of Construction
The basic canons of construction are often used as an aid in
interpreting language used by the legislature so that effect may
be given to the expressed and implied intent of that body. In
Umberfield the court strictly construed the Antidiscrimination
Act99 and liberally interpreted those sections of the Teacher Tenure Act which deal with a teacher tenure panel.100This anomalous
procedure resulted in a judicial expansion of the panel's jurisdiction beyond both the express and implied intent of the legislature, and a contraction of the CCRC's jurisdiction, which frustrated and prevented action by the CCRC.
Administrative agencies are "creatures of statute" and have
only that authority explicitly or implicitly conferred upon them
by the legislature in their organic statutes. 1 1 While the jurisdiction of the agencies has been subject to judicial clarification in
several areas where questions have arisen, the directives in the
statutes, as construed in light of the legislative intent, should
provide the controlling interpretation. Colorado courts have repeatedly asserted that they
should confine themselves to the construction of a statute as it is
written and not attempt to supply omissions or otherwise amend or
change the law under the guise of construction.
The fundamental rule of construction is that the court shall
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, as expressed in the statute.12

The problem in Umberfield, however, is that two statutes must
be interpreted in such a way that effect is given to the legislative
intent of each of them.
11520 P.2d at 733, citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-3,-5 (Supp. 1969); COLO.
§ 123-18-17 (Supp. 1967). These sections are currently codified as COLO.
§§ 24-34-303, -305 (1973); id. § 22-63-117.

REV. STAT. ANN.
REV. STAT. ANN.
gg
"o

Id. §§ 24-34-301 to -308.
Id. § 22-63-117.
Courtney v. Island Creek Coal Co., 474 F.2d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 1973); Civil Serv.

Comm'n v. Pitlock, 44 Mich. App. 410, 205 N.W.2d 293 (1973); City of Pittsburgh v. Milk
Mktg. Bd., 7 Pa. Comwlth. 180, 299 A.2d 197 (1973); Mountaineer Disposal Serv., Inc. v.
Dyer, 197 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1973).
10 83

Christner v. Poudre Valley Cooperative Ass'n., 235 F.2d 946, 950 (10th Cir.

1956) (footnotes omitted); United States v. Colorado & N.W.R.R., 157 F. 321, 323 (8th
Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 544 (1908); Johnston v. Ctiy Council, 117 Colo. 223, 228,
493 P.2d 651, 654 (1972); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 142 Colo. 28, 349 P.2d
995 (1960).
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b.

Legislative Intent
1. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission
A careful examination of the functions and authority of the
CCRC reveals the broad legislative intent behind the creation of
that agency.103 The Colorado legislature created a statewide
agency with expertise in the field of discrimination. This expertise of the CCRC is derived from the lay and professional commissioners who compose the commission. During their 4-year term,
they acquire knowledge and skill in the area of discriminatory
employment practices.
Due to its experience and the limited area of its jurisdiction,
the CCRC has developed uniform standards to test an employer's
compliance with the law prohibiting discrimination in employment. These standards are one of the tools used by the CCRC to
reach its decisions. The court's decision in Umberfield now raises
the question of the feasibility of maintaining a uniform statutory
application of the Antidiscrimination Act if any agency could
make a final determination, subject only to judicial review, that
the provisions of that statute have or have not been violated. ,04 If
this view prevails, the benefit of having a specialized commission
whose function it is to interpret and apply the statute would be
lost. Although most of the questions presented to courts have
arisen in connection with limitations of the CCRC's jurisdiction,
these limitations have effectively abrogated much of the legislative intent evident in the Commission's creation.105 The observation was made in 1969 that
[u]nder the statutes only the Civil Rights Commission can make
the determination of whether an unlawful act of discrimination has
occurred and the findings of the commission are binding on the court
so long as they are supported by adequate evidence.'0
,03
See generally text accompanying note 70 supra.
1* See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
05 State v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 521 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1974) (the court held

that the CCRC lacked jurisdiction over a civil service employee); Colorado Antidiscrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 149 Colo. 259, 368 P.2d 970 (1962), rev'd, 372
U.S. 714 (1963) (the Colorado Supreme Court held that the CCRC could not regulate
hiring practices of an interstate air carrier because this was a matter reserved to the
federal government); Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo. App. 10, 488 P.2d
83 (1971) (CCRC has jurisdiction over constructive discharge); State v. Adolph Coors
Corp., 29 Colo. App. 240, 486 P.2d 43 (1971) (the court found a commissioner's complaint
insufficient to justify issuance of a subpoena).
101Penwell, Civil Rights in Colorado, 46 DENVER L.J. 181, 207 (1969).
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The continued validity of this observation in light of recent decisions is questionable.
2. The Teacher Tenure Panel
While the panel was created to review recommendations of
dismissal and to comply with the principles of a right to a hearing
prior to dismissal, 07 it functions only as a fact-finding body and
may not dismiss the teacher itself. Dismissal is a function of the
8
board of education.1
The panel is an ad hoc body whose members are chosen each
time a dismissal action is pending before a board of education.
Due to the selection process, °9 it is unlikely that any two panels
would be composed of the same members. The panel serves a
function analogous to that of an arbitration board whose powers
and duties are prescribed by the employment contract, or in the
case of the panel, the statute which it is interpreting."0 This
role of interpreting and applying the statute to the facts should
define the scope of the board's authority. It has been held in other
states that similarly constituted boards, with functions analogous
to the Colorado panel, are limited by the specific grants of power
which they have been given."'
The Colorado statute lists the specific grounds which justify
dismissal of a tenured teacher." 2 Instead of confining the panel's
scope of inquiry to the statutory standards, the court in
Umberfield has increased the jurisdiction of the lay panel, including within its purview questions of fundamental statutory and
constitutional rights."' The mere availability of judicial review
which can include consideration of any statutory or constitutional
rights"' does not create jurisdiction in the original agency to consider and determine such questions.
"I Case law holds that prior to dismissal a tenured teacher is entitled to notice and a
hearing of the charges. See School Dist. No. 13 v. Mort, 115 Colo. 571, 176 P.2d 984 (1947);
School Dist. No. 1 v. Parker, 82 Colo. 385, 260 P. 521 (1927); School Dist. No. 25 v.
Youberg, 77 Colo. 202, 235 P. 351 (1925); School Dist. No. 2 v. Shuck, 49 Colo. 526, 113
P. 311 (1911). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117 (1973).
108 School Dist. No. 50 v. Witthaus, 30 Colo. App. 41, 490 P.2d 315 (1971).
109COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117(5) (1973).
10 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d
303, 312 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969).
" See Shiffer v. Board of Educ., 45 Mich. App. 190, 206 N.W.2d 250 (1973); Alberts
v. Garofalo, 393 Pa. 212, 142 A.2d 280 (1958).
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-116 (1973).
" 522 P.2d at 733.
.. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-105(7) (1973) (for text of statute, see note 40 supra).
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Given the purpose of the hearing before the panel and the
fact that Umberfield's dismissal occurred subsequent to it, the
allegation of religious discrimination was not strongly asserted
before the panel."' The dismissal, which the panel found to be
justifiable under the Teacher Tenure Act,"' was a prerequisite to
a finding by the CCRC that a discriminatory employment practice in violation of the Antidiscrimination Act" 7 had occurred.
Until the dismissal, Umberfield's complaint of discrimination
had not ripened.
In Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours, Inc.,' a case involving
discrimination which was prohibited by both the National Labor
Relations Act and Title VII, a claim was filed with both the
EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board. Even then it was
held that the NLRB hearing did not adequately consider the
factors necessary for a Title VII violation."' The court said that
[a]lthough these two acts [Title VII and the Labor Relations Act]
are not totally dissimilar, their differences significantly overshadow
their similarities. Absent a special consideration, a determination
arising solely under one statute should not automatically be binding
when a similar question arises under another statute. This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of
different statutes ordinarily vary.'"

Drawing the obvious analogy between Tipler and Umberfield, it
is clear that the determination under the Teacher Tenure Act in
Umberfield should not preclude a determination by the CCRC.
The panel, unlike the CCRC, has no expertise in the area of
discriminatory employment practices and should therefore not be
accorded the role of making a final determination of any violation
2
of the Antidiscrimination Act which may have occurred. '
The Supreme Court has stated that the rights guaranteed by
Title VII, which are identical to those protected by Colorado's
statute, represent a strong statement of congressional intent that
"

See note 43 supra.

.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-117 (1973).

"7 "It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice: (a) For an employer

Id.
creed.
to . . . discharge . . . any person otherwise qualified because of ...
§ 24-34-306.
433 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
"' Id. at 129.
jm Id. at 128. See also Lane v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1950);
DAVIS § 18.04, at 577. (Professor Davis states that one determination is not necessarily
binding when the same question arises under two statutes).
"I See 522 P.2d at 735 (Pringle, J., dissenting).
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"each employee [shall] be free from discriminatory practices."',
The Court has stressed that Congress felt that those rights are so
important that they not only provided the remedies available
under Title VII proceedings, but also provided that these remedies "supplement, rather than supplant" existing remedies which
also forbid discriminatory practices. 2 '
CONCLUSION

Although the application of res judicata is appropriate in
many administrative law contexts, courts should apply it only
after a deliberate determination of its usefulness. It is not an
inflexible doctrine; courts should consider not only the essential
elements of same party, same claim, and final determination, but
also the theory, purpose, and intent behind the doctrine's use.
Once it has been determined that the factual situation before the
court meets the fundamental criteria for the application of res
judicata, the utility of applying the doctrine should be tested
against the elements of the analytical framework proposed in this
comment. All four issues should be analyzed in light of the facts
of the particular case, with any one of them potentially precluding a finding of res judicata.
In Umberfield the Colorado Supreme Court applied res judicata in reaction to the potential problem of having to conform two
conflicting agency decisions. Failure to approach this issue of first
impression without careful analysis seriously limited the CCRC's
jurisdiction. It resulted in a denial of the CCRC's right to exercise
its expertise whenever the complainant had recourse to a prior
agency determination on any issue arising from the same set of
facts. In order to provide the CCRC with the authority and jurisdiction which it needs to effectively achieve its purpose, a reconsideration of the question presented in Umberfield is imperative.
Sandy Gail Nyholm
122Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
123Id. at 48-49.

COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESSPrejudgment Seizure of Property
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974)
INTRODUCTION

Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo,
and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company under an installment sales contract which, by state law,' provided Grant
with a vendor's lien to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase
price. Because of a delinquency in payments by Mitchell and
based on its lien, Grant filed suit to recover the unpaid purchase
price. In addition to the suit, Grant applied to the court under
the Louisiana sequestration statute2 for a writ authorizing the
He who has sold to another any movable property, which is not paid
for, has a preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of
the purchaser, whether the sale was made on a credit or without, if the
property still remains in the possession of the purchaser.
So that although the vendor may have taken a note, bond or other
acknowledgement from the buyer, he still enjoys the privilege.
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952).
By operation of the law of Louisiana, title may pass to the purchaser, but the vendor
retains preference on the purchase price over other creditors. Wallace Lincoln-Mercury
Co. v. Gentry, 469 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1972). The vendor's privilege is referred to as a
"statutory lien" on the property. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, aff'd per curiam, 402
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
The important sections of the Louisiana statute are:
A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the nature
of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for
the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the
petition verified by, or by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel
or agent.
The applicant shall furnish security as required by law for the payment
of the damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained wrongfully.
LA. CODE CIv. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a
writ of attachment or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds
upon which the writ was issued. If the writ of attachment or of sequestration
is dissolved, the action shall then proceed as if no writ had been issued.
The court may allow damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of
attachment or of sequestration on a motion to dissolve, or on a reconventional demand. Attorney's fees for the services rendered in connection with
the dissolution of the writ may be included as an element of damages
whether the writ is dissolved on motion or after trial on the merits.
Id. art. 3506.
A defendant may obtain the release of the property seized under a writ
of attachment or of sequestration by furnishing security for the satisfaction
of any judgment which may be rendered against him.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

seizure of the household goods pending the litigation. In support
of its application for the writ, Grant's credit manager swore in an
affidavit that the seller had reason to believe that the buyer
would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchandise described in the foregoing petition during the pendency of
these proceedings, and that a writ of sequestration is necessary
in the premises." 3 Based on this ex parte application by the creditor, and without notice to the buyer or hearing before seizure of
the property, the judge authorized issuance of a writ of sequestration. A surety bond was filed by the creditor, and Mitchell's goods
were seized.
Mitchell challenged the seizure by motion, arguing that his
rights to due process under the fourteenth amendment had been
violated by a seizure of his property without prior notice or a
hearing. Mitchell's motion to dissolve the writ was denied by the
state court, and this action was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.4
Only 2 years prior to Mitchell, in Fuentes v. Shevin,5 the
Supreme Court found the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes' unconstitutional as a denial of due process because the statId. art. 3507.
The security for the release of property seized under a writ of attachment
or of sequestration shall exceed by one-fourth the value of the property as
determined by the court, or shall exceed by one-fourth the amount of the
claim, whichever is the lesser.
Id. art. 3508.
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a
mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under
a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal,
dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the
property from the parish, during the pendency of the action.
Id. art. 3571.
An applicant for a writ of sequestration shall furnish security for an
amount determined by the court to be sufficient to protect the defendant
against any damage resulting from a wrongful issuance, unless security is
dispensed with by law.
Id. art. 3574.
If the defendant does not effect the release of property seized under a
writ of sequestration, as permitted by Article 3507, within ten days of the
seizure, the plaintiff may effect the release thereof by furnishing the security
required by Article 3508.
Id. art. 3576.
1 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 602 (1974).
4 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
1 Sequestration, replevin, and attachment are prejudgment remedies. A writ of sequestration issued by the court allows property which is in the possession of the defendant

1975

PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE OF PROPERTY

utes allowed prejudgment seizure of property without prior notice
or a hearing.
This comment examines case law interpretations of Fuentes
to show that courts acknowledged that the case required notice
and a hearing prior to seizure. Analysis of the Mitchell opinion
reveals that exceptions to the due process requirement of notice
and a hearing were used to support the Mitchell holding; that a
new right, that of the interest of the creditor under the fourteenth
amendment, was created; and that the statutes at issue in
Mitchell and Fuentes are so procedurally similar as to be indistinguishable. Thus, it appears that the Court in Mitchell overruled
the due process requirements of Fuentes. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss what statutory procedures will be upheld under
Mitchell.

I.
A.

Fuentes v. Shevin:

ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS

The Fuentes Line of Cases

Until 1969 courts upheld the constitutionality of prejudgment provisional remedies which provided for the seizure of property without prior notice and a hearing.7 In 1969, however, in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp." the Supreme Court reversed
the trend. The Court held that a prejudgment garnishment procedure by which an employee's wages could be withheld before trial
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as
a taking or property without prior notice or a hearing.' After
Sniadach the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly 0 that the
due process clause required prior notice and a hearing before the
state could terminate welfare payments. Next, in Bell v. Burson,I I
to be taken by the sheriff and held by the court pending outcome of the suit. Replevin is
an action to recover possession of goods unlawfully taken and entails a redelivery to the
owner. Attachment involves taking defendant's property into legal custody as security for
a judgment against the defendant. Attachment, unlike replevin, involves no claim of
ownership on the property seized. Louisiana statutes provide only for the prejudgment
remedies of attachment and sequestration. However, in Louisiana, sequestration involves
a claim of ownership or possession of the property seized and is very similar to replevin
statutes of other states.
' Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); Robinson v. Loyola
Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1970); Shell Oil Co. v. Milne, 127 Vt. 249, 246 A.2d
837 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965, 396 U.S. 916 (1969); McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me.
110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Id. at 342.
I0 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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the Court held that the due process clause required a hearing
before the state could deprive an uninsured motorist of his
driver's license. A significant trend appeared to be developing,
and the courts began to proscribe the more severe creditors' remedies. 2
Then, in 1972 the Supreme Court in Fuentes found the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes unconstitutional as a denial of due process because the statutes allowed prejudgment
seizure of property without prior notice or a hearing. Because lack
of a hearing and prior notice could cause unfair, arbitrary, or
mistaken deprivation of the use or possession of property," this
procedural deficiency was a violation of the fourteenth amendment. The statutes in Fuentes, like the statute in Mitchell, required a hearing before final deprivation of property 4 and the
posting of a bond by the creditor before the writ was issued." Yet,
while these provisions were adjudged insufficient to adequately
protect the debtor under the fourteenth amendment in Fuentes,
they were upheld in Mitchell. Moreover, in Fuentes, retention of
the title by the vendor" or probable success at trial did not affect
the basic right to a prior hearing before seizure of the property
from the debtor.
Fuentes recognized "extraordinary situation" exceptions
where certain governmental or public interests outweigh the requirement of prior notice and a hearing before prejudgment deprivation of property. 8 For example, in order to collect revenue,
the state has been permitted to seize its citizen's property without
prior notice or a hearing. 9 Additionally, in order to protect the
public health, 0 to meet the needs of a national war effort, 2' to
2 See Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn.
205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970). But see Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100
(D. Conn. 1971); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
" 407 U.S. at 81-82.
1, Id. at 82-83.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 86.
17 Id.
11407 U.S. at 90-92. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908); Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1954).
" Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1954).
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
"

6
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protect the public from bank failure,2" and to secure jurisdiction
in court, 3 the state is allowed a post-seizure adjudication. The
Court in Fuentes, however, held that because the replevin statutes at issue served only private interests, not a compelling governmental or public interest which would allow post-seizure adjudication,"' a hearing was required prior to seizure.
As a result of Fuentes, courts struck down prejudgment provisional remedies which did not provide for prior notice and a
hearing before deprivation of property. 5 Further, of the 34 states
that had statutes similar to the replevin statutes held unconstitutional in Fuentes, 15 have repealed or amended their statutes
since the case was decided. Moreover, courts interpreted the due
process requirements of Fuentes very broadly, and applied them
27
to situations unrelated to a creditor-debtor relationship.
21 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414

(1944).
2 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S.
29 (1928).
3 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339
(5th Cir. 1973); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973); United States
Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972); Standard Oil Co. v. Superior Ct.,
44 Del. 538, 62 A.2d 454, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 930 (1949).
21 407 U.S. at 92.
1 Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1973) (garnishment); Turner
v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972) (replevin); Hammond v. Powell, 462
F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972) (claim and delivery); Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973) (attachment); In re
Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (attachment);
Yates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (detinue); Gunter v.
Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (attachment); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973) (attachment and garnishment);
Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973) (attachment); Trapper
Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1973) (attachment);
Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (replevin); McClellan v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1013 (D.R.I. 1972) (attachment); Schneider v.
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972) (attachment); Miloszewski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 346 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (search and seizure of personal property);
Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972) (replevin).
"SThe states which repealed or amended their statutes are: Colo., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill.,
Iowa, Kan., Mich., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.D., Okla., S.D., Tenn., and Wyo.
7 For cases which require broad due process procedures in employee discharge proceedings, see McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973); Silar v. Smith, 361 F. Supp.
1187 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973); Pennsylvania ex rel.
Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Kennedy
v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
For cases which require broad due process procedures in search and seizure proceedings, see Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494
(D.N.J. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1974); Fell v. Armour, 355 F.
Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
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Cases Interpreting Fuentes

The reasoning of Fuentes was subsequently applied to determine the constitutionality of attachment statutes."8 It is indicative of the broad interpretation given to Fuentes that attachment
statutes which did not deprive owners of actualpossession of their
property 29 were found unconstitutional.3 0 For example, in Gunter
v. Merchants Warren National Bank 3l a statute allowing attachment of real estate was found unconstitutional. The court in
Gunter held that while a real estate attachment does not disturb
possession, it creates a lien on the property and deprives the
owner of his ability to convey a clear title-a significant property
interest. Thus, according to interpretations of Fuentes,32 property
which cannot be deprived without notice and a hearing includes
33
both possessory and non-possessory interests.
Fuentes was also applied to determine the constitutionality
of materialmen's and mechanics' liens.3 4 In Mason v. Garris31 a
Georgia statute was challenged which allowed a mechanic, who
had worked on a vehicle and had not been paid, to foreclose by
levy and sale of the vehicle without notice or a hearing. The
statute was held unconstitutional, and the rights of one with a
security interest similar to the one held by Grant in Mitchell were
" Unlike sequestration and replevin statutes which provide for seizure of property by
one with an interest in the property, attachment statutes allow seizure of property in
which the creditor has no prior interest.
" Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725
(W.D. Wash. 1973); Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973); Gunter
v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973); Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972).
3 In addition to attachment and replevin, other summary creditors' remedies were
struck down, including, for instance, landlord lien statutes which allow the landlord in
the event of a rent default to seize the property of the tenant without prior notice or
hearing. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Macqueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va.
1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972).
31 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973).
' Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973); Trapper Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1973); McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1013
(D.R.I. 1972); Miloszewski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 346 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
See cases cited note 29 supra.
Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973); Mason v.
Garis, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp.
902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
3 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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discussed in light of Fuentes: "It is the vehicle owner-not the
mechanic-who, under the current statutes, is deprived of the use
of his vehicle without the protections of procedural due process.
The mechanic's interest is only a security interest. ' 3 In cases
dealing with creditors' rights, "deprivation" has always referred
to the use and possession by the debtor, never to the security
interest of the creditor, and post-Fuentes cases consistently so
hold. 7 The cases that upheld lien statutes after Fuentes did not
involve the execution of the lien. In these cases the courts reasoned that no dispossession of property had occurred 8 or that the
deprivation was de minimus.3 9 However, even these cases recognized that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, prior
notice and hearing were required before any significant deprivation of property.
Thus, case law interpretation has held Fuentes to require
some form of notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation of the
use or possession of property, with the exception of an extraordinary governmental or public interest. Clearly, the holding in
Mitchell that Fuentes required a hearing only before final deprivation of property4 is inconsistent with case law analysis of
Fuentes.
II. THE EFFECT OF Mitchell
Rationale of the Majority Opinion

A.

As support for its argument that post-seizure adjudication
satisfies the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court cites cases widely recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of prior notice and hearing.4 Further, the Court in
Mitchell creates a right of the creditor heretofore unrecognized
under the fourteenth amendment which is "measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase price."4 Finally, the Court distin'

Id. at 424.

2 See cases cited note 25 supra.
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hansons, Inc., Civil No. 72-417PHXWEC (D. Ariz. Sept.
12, 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
" Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973).
, 416 U.S. at 611.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per
curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611
(1905); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
,1 416 U.S. at 604. See text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
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guishes the statutes at issue in Mitchell and Fuentes on a procedural basis. However, the replevin statutes in Fuentes and the
sequestration statute in Mitchell are so similar as to be indistinguishable. Therefore, the Court in Mitchell has, in essence, overruled Fuentes and has effected a change in present day requirements of prejudgment due process.
1. Exceptions to the Requirement of Notice and Hearing
Used as Support for the Mitchell Holding
The Court in Mitchell states that Sniadach and Fuentes
stand for the proposition that "a hearing must be had before one
is finally deprived of his property and [they] do not deal at all
with the need for a pretermination hearing where a full and immediate post-termination hearing is provided. ,4 3 To substantiate
this position, the Mitchell opinion cites three cases: Phillips v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue," Scottish Union & National
InsuranceCo. v. Bowland,15 and Springer v. United States." Each
case involves the enforcement of a tax lien by summary proceedings with subsequent opportunity for the determination of legal
rights. As noted above,47 the collection by the government of its
revenue has consistently been recognized as an exceptional situation of compelling state interest allowing post-seizure
adjudication." Fuentes" and cases subsequent 0 have also recognized this exception.
The majority in Mitchell relies most heavily on Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.5" to substantiate its argument that
case law merely requires "a full and immediate post-termination
hearing. ' 2 Ewing involved a prehearing seizure of articles in
order to protect the public from misbranded goods. Again the
Court cites an acknowledged exception-protection of public
health 3-to support its proposition that only post-seizure adjudi416 U.S. at 611.
1,283 U.S. 589 (1931).
45 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
44 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
11 See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
" Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1954).
4' 407 U.S. at 92 n.24.
Commonwealth Dev. Ass'n v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 792, 795 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Catoor v. Blair, 358 F. Supp. 815, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp..735,
737 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
' 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
52 416 U.S. at 611.
5 See cases cited note 20 supra.
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cation is required. Situations of compelling public interest were
noted as exceptions in Fuentes4 and cannot be analogized to a
creditor-debtor situation as done by the Court in Mitchell.
Finally, the Supreme Court notes its unanimous approval in
Coffin Brothers v. Bennett,55 Ownbey v. Morgan," and McInnes
v. McKay 57 of prejudgment attachment liens effected without
notice or hearing. Coffin challenged a Georgia statute which gave
the state power to issue an attachment which acted as a lien on
the property of shareholders of a defunct bank. Protecting the
public from the consequences of bank failure is a public interest
exception recognized as allowing seizure without notice or a hearing5" and is not analogous to a creditor-debtor situation.
Ownbey upheld a foreign attachment law which provided a
basis for jurisdiction in a state court. By obtaining quasi in rem
jurisdiction a creditor may subject the tangible property of the
debtor to the payment of a debt even though he is unable to
secure in personam jurisdiction over the debtor. Historically, attachments to secure jurisdiction in a state court have been upheld" and are a recognized public interest exception not requiring
prior notice and a hearing. The reliance on this exception provides no support for the Court's holding since the trial court had
personal jurisdiction over Mitchell.
In McKay the Maine Supreme Court upheld a prejudgment
attachment of the debtor's real estate and stock without prior
notice or a hearing. However, the statute in McKay differed from
the statute in Mitchell because it did not provide for prejudgment
seizure nor did it prevent the debtor from disposing of the property prior to judgment. 0 The statute in McKay merely permitted
a lien to be placed upon the property, allowing the creditor to
seize and levy upon the property only in the event he was successful in a later suit against the property owner.' The court upheld
the statute on the basis that the procedure did not constitute a
deprivation of property, stating, "[deprivation] takes place
when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the power to
407 U.S. at 90-92.
s 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
',127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699, aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
See cases cited note 22 supra.
, See cases cited note 23 supra.
:0 127 Me. at 114, 141 A. at 702.
*1Id.
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dispose of it at will is affected.""2 The court upheld the statute
in McKay because there was no deprivation of property and did
not address the question of notice and hearing. Thus, the McKay
holding is not applicable to Mitchell where there was actual dispossession of property.
2. Balancing the Interests of Buyer and Seller
In Mitchell and Fuentes the debtors were deprived of identical property, household goods. In Fuentes the debtor's interest
protected by the fourteenth amendment was characterized as the
use and possession of this property. However, in Mitchell the
debtor's interest was characterized as "no greater than the surplus remaining, if any, after foreclosure and sale of the prop3
erty."
The interests of the vendor-seller in the property of the vendees in Mitchell and Fuentes were also similar. In Mitchell the
vendor retained a lien on the goods;" in Fuentes the vendor retained the title to the merchandise. Under the fourteenth amendment protected property includes vested rights,65 and a lien once
acquired has been held to be a vested property right." Additionally, the possession of title has been held to allow recovery of a
property interest in an action of replevin. 7 Yet, the substantive
property right protected by the fourteenth amendment is the
right to retain the lien or title until the debt is paid. 8 There is
no case law holding, as the Court in Mitchell does, that the
creditor-vendor has a right in the property other than his title or
lien. However, the Court in Mitchell characterizes the interest of
02 Id.
at 116, 141 A. at 702. The concept of "deprivation" under the fourteenth amendment is the same in McKay and Fuentes. 407 U.S. at 86.
6 416 U.S. at 604.

" In Louisiana a conditional sales contract vests absolute title in the buyer, and a
vendor's lien is automatically created which secures the vendor for the unpaid puchase
price of the property so long as the property remains in the possession of the vendee.
Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
65 Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933); Grunbaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384
Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
" Bass v. Stodd, 357 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964); White v. White, 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1961).
11 Brennan v. W.A. Wills, Ltd., 263 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1959); Harlan & Hollingsworth
Corp. v. McBride, 69 A.2d 9 (Del. 1949); Long v. Burnside, 295 111.App. 82, 14 N.E.2d
660 (1938); Berry v. Adams, 71 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); Hays v. Bashor, 108
Wash. 491, 185 P. 814 (1919).
" See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); SecurityFirst Nat'l Bank v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 85 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 613 (1937); White v. White, 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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the creditor as "measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase
price.""5 This heretofore unrecognized property interest is elevated to a protected right under the fourteenth amendment by
the Mitchell Court. The Fuentes line of cases 0 recognized only
the debtor's interest in the use and possession of his property as
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Clearly, the concept of
property interests protected by the fourteenth amendment according to Fuentes has been expanded by Mitchell.
3. The Majority's Argument that Fuentes is Procedurally
Distinguished
The Court in Mitchell emphasizes the differences between
the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes which were struck
down in Fuentes and the Louisiana sequestration statute. Although the names differ, the Louisiana sequestration and the
Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes permit the same
thing: prehearing seizure initiated by one who claims ownership
or right to possession. 1
The Supreme Court in Mitchell emphasizes that the writ in
Fuentes was issued on the mere "bare assertion of the party seeking the writ that he is entitled to one,"'72 whereas, the Louisiana
statute requires "specific facts" showing the debt, lien, and delinquency.73 In reality, there is no true distinction between the statutes. As noted by the Mitchell dissent,7 4 even though the Louisiana writ requires more information than that required by Pennsylvania and Florida, the application for the writ is still an ex
parte pro forma allegation on the part of the creditor acting in his
own interest. This is the same procedure that was struck down
in Fuentes, and therefore, the cases are indistinguishable on this
basis.
The Court in Mitchell75 emphasized that the bond requirements in the Louisiana statute are protective of the interests of
416 U.S. at 604.
7 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315
F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones Press, Inc.
v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
11 LA. CODE Ctv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961); PA. R. Civ. P. 1073 (1967); Act of
March 11, 1845, ch. 78, § 1, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
72 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74 (1972).
"

LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).

7, 416 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 608.
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the debtor, but, in fact, a comparison of the statutes shows that
the bond requirements of the statutes struck down in Fuentes
were more protective of the debtor because they required a larger
bond from the creditor."6 The statutes at issue in Mitchell and
Fuentes also have provisions for counterbond, allowing the debtor
to effect the return of his property." Likewise, in this instance,
the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes required a larger counterbond from the debtor than the Louisiana statute, thus more adequately protecting the creditor's interest. Therefore, the statutes
struck down in Fuentes provided greater protection for both the
creditor through the bond and the debtor through the counterbond than the statute upheld in Mitchell. Yet, the Court holds
that the bond requirement is adequate protection for the debtor,
thus overruling Fuentes which holds a bond no substitute for
prior hearing."
The Court in Mitchell approves of the fact that the writ of
sequestration is issued by a judge, not a court clerk as in
Fuentes." In essence, the procedure is indistinguishable because,
as noted by the Mitchell dissent, all either a judge or clerk does
based on this procedure is pass upon the "formal sufficiency" of
the pleadings. 0
Finally, the Court in Mitchell distinguishes Fuentes on the
basis that the Louisiana statute provides for an immediate hearing, which was not required by the statutes in Fuentes.' First, the
hearing under the Louisiana statute is not automatic but may be
had only upon motion of the debtor. 2 Secondly, the Louisiana
statute does not set any time limits within which the debtor's
motion must be heard.83 Under Fuentes, any deprivation of property would require a prior hearing. Matters such as bond, 4 length
11Both statutes required a bond of at least double the value of the property. PA. R.
Civ. P. 1073 (1967); Act of March 11, 1845, ch. 78, § 7, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
7' LA. CODE CIV. PRo. ANN. art. 3508 (West 1961); PA. R. Crv. P. 1076 (1967); Act of
March 11, 1845, ch. 78 § 13, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
78 407 U.S. at 83.
" Outside the Orleans Parish a clerk issues the writ. However, the validity of issuance
in these areas is not at issue. 416 U.S. at 606-07.
s 416 U.S. at 629.
The Pennsylvania statute contained no time requirement for a hearing. However,
under the Florida statute the plaintiff was required to prosecute his action "without
delay." Act of March 11, 1845, ch. 78 § 7, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
82 LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
83

Id.

s, 407 U.S. at 83.
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and severity of deprivation,8 5 the necessity of the goods, 8 and
probable success at trial8 7 were specifically held not to affect the
right to a prior hearing. Clearly, then, the requirement of a prior
hearing has been overruled.
As a result of the Mitchell opinion, the due process requirements of Fuentes have been overruled and a new balancing of the
rights of the creditor and the debtor has been introduced. The
immediate question raised by Mitchell is what kind of prejudgment provisional remedies will withstand a due process challenge.
HI.

Mitchell
Prejudgment seizures of property will predictably be upheld
under Mitchell if the statute requires: (1) an affidavit or verified
petition showing the debt, the security interest, and delinquency;88 (2) that the affidavit or verified petition be examined
by a court official, not a clerk, who will then authorize issuance
of the writ;89 (3) notice at the time of seizure;9 0 (4) a bond on the
part of the creditor in an amount that may be determined by the
court;9 (5) a counterbond payable within 10 days by the debtor
wishing to effect the return of his property exceeding by onefourth the value of the property or claim;"2 (6) a hearing which
STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACH TO

Id. at 86.
Id. at 89.
" Id. at 87.
"
In order to protect the debtor, the Court in Mitchell will not allow issuance of any
writ on demand, as allowed by the statutes in Fuentes. There must be a showing of
"specific facts" on the part of the creditor going beyond conclusory allegations.
11The Court in Mitchell emphasized that the writ is not to be issued perfunctorily.
The Louisiana statute requires that before a writ is issued, cause must be shown to a judge,
not a clerk. Because of the problem of overcrowded dockets, a referee or hearing officer,
rather than a judge, would probably be permitted under Mitchell to pass on the adequacy
of the petition as long as there was sufficient scrutiny of the pleadings and as long as the
writ was not merely issued on request.
"
Notice is received by the debtor at the time of seizure, and the debtor, according
to Mitchell, is protected by the right to an immediate hearing.
" The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes which were found unconstitutional in
Fuentes required a bond in an amount at least double the value of the property. However,
the Louisiana statute only requires "security as required by law," and in fact, Grant was
required to furnish a bond in the amount of $1,125, just less than twice the amount of the
alleged unpaid purchase price.
1 The statutes declared unconstitutional in Fuentes gave the debtor 3 days within
which to effect the return of his property by paying a bond in an amount double the value
of the property. The statute upheld in Mitchell provided that the debtor's bond shall
exceed by one-fourth the value of the property or the claim, whichever is the lesser. Under
Mitchell the debtor is allowed 10 days to file a counterbond before the creditor may effect
the release of the property.
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may be had upon motion of the debtor wherein the plaintiff must
prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued." It must be
emphasized that it is unclear whether the statutory provisions in
Mitchell comprise minimum due process requirements or
whether the lack of one or more of these elements render a statute
unconstitutional. Three cases decided since Mitchell illustrate
the inconsistent standards of due process which have resulted
from the Court's confusing treatment of Fuentes and inexact
statement of due process requirements. Furthermore, the situation is not clarified by the Supreme Court in the recent case of
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc."4
The first court to apply the Supreme Court ruling in Mitchell
was a three-judge district court in Ruocco v. Brinker." Under the
Florida mechanic's lien law, a lien was filed against the property
of homeowners for labor and materials. The court held that
Mitchell overruled the Fuentes requirement of a hearing prior to
deprivation of any significant property interest, stating that the
"once ominous spectre of the Sniadach-Fuentes doctrine has
faded into the past."9 The court viewed Mitchell as effectuating
" 'constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of
the parties.' "97 However, the court notes that it would have upheld the statute under Fuentes because the deprivation of property was de minimus, and no actual property was dispossessed. 8
Therefore, the court in Ruocco did not have to struggle with the
inexact due process guidelines of Mitchell.
The court in Garcia v. Krauss 9 compared the Texas sequestration statute to the sequestration statute in Mitchell and found
that the Texas statute did not provide the constitutional safeguards provided in the Louisiana statute. The Garciacourt indicated that the instant case would have been easily disposed of
13 According to the Court in Mitchell the fourteenth amendment rights of the debtor
are protected by the debtor's right to move for a hearing. The Louisiana statute requires
no specific time limit within which the motion must be heard, and in Mitchell the defendant's motion was heard in 11 days. At the hearing, according to the Louisiana statute,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued.
1495 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
'" 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
" Id. at 432.
'" Id. at 437.
" See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. The Ruocco court admits that if realty
or personalty had been dispossessed, the outcome might have been different. 380 F. Supp.
at 437.
"1 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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under Fuentes because no prior notice and hearing was required
by the Texas law. 1"0However, in Mitchell, according to the Garcia
court, the Supreme Court overruled the requirement of prior notice and a hearing and "balanced the interests of both parties in
their application of due process of law."' 0 ' The Garciacourt found
that the Texas statute did not provide for judicial supervision of
the issuance of the writ, nor were adequate facts required to be
alleged in the petition, nor was there an immediate opportunity
for dissolution of the writ.' °2 Like the Ruocco court, the Garcia
court was not forced to define what the Court in Mitchell considered minimal due process. However, both Garcia and Ruocco
noted that the Fuentes requirement of prior notice and hearing
had been overruled and that in Mitchell the Court had balanced
the interests of the creditor and the debtor in applying due process.
In Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co.'03 a three-judge court did
define the constitutional limits of Mitchell and found the New
York attachment statute unconstitutional. The Sugar court's
analysis confined Mitchell narrowly to its facts. The court implied that Mitchell presented minimum due process requirements
by stating that if a statute did not meet all the specific statutory
provisions upheld in Mitchell, it did not "squeeze through the
narrow door of constitutionality" of Mitchell and thus remained
"out in the unconstitutional territory charted in Fuentes.''04
Thus, unlike Garcia and Ruocco, the court in Sugar did not view
Fuentes as overruled but regarded Mitchell as insisting "on the
continued vitality of [the Fuentes] rule."'"5 The court acknowledged that the New York law substantially paralleled the Louisiana statute upheld in Mitchell'06 except for what the court considered two significant differences. First, the post-seizure hearing, although available, did not place the burden of proof upon
the plaintiff. Secondly, the attachment would be vacated only if
the attachment was "unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff,' '0 °7 not when the grounds upon which the writ is issued were
" Id. at 1257.
Id.
o2Id. at 1259.
103 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"3 Id. at 647.
'05 Id. at 650.
Io Id. at 648.
107

Id.
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not proven. Additionally, the Sugar court limited the Mitchell
holding, indicating that Mitchell could not be applied to attachment statutes because the plaintiff in Sugar had no creditor's
°8
interest in the property attached such as Grant did in Mitchell.
This confusion is not clarified by the Supreme Court's comments on Mitchell, Fuentes, and Sniadach in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 0 In this case the Georgia garnishment law allowed the garnishment of a corporation's bank account pending the outcome of a suit against it. The Court held
that Fuentes stood for the proposition that any significant taking
of property by the state, even if temporary, is within the purview
of the due process clause and there existed the right to a hearing
"of some sort.""' 0 This is the same account of Fuentes that was
given in Mitchell,"' and therefore, the conclusion that Mitchell
overruled the Fuentes requirement of prior notice and hearing is
consistent with North Georgia Finishing."' Thus, after holding
that Fuentes required a hearing "of some sort," the Court applied
the specific statutory procedures upheld in Mitchell fo the Georgia statute. The Court found that the Georgia law required only
conclusory allegations in the affidavit, no participation by a judge
and no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would
be required to demonstrate probable cause." 3 Thus, in North
Georgia Finishing, Fuentes was applied to require a hearing "of
some sort" and Mitchell was applied to determine what specific
procedural safeguards will withstand a due process challenge. It
should be noted that the application of Mitchell is not limited
here, as it was by the court in Sugar, to a situation in which the
creditor has an interest in the property seized, nor to a specific
kind of property such as a consumer's household goods. However,
the extent to which statutes must parallel the requirements in
Mitchell is still unclear. As Justice Blackmun comments in his
dissent the "commercial statutes of all other States . . . are left
in questionable constitutional status, with little or no applicable
Id. at 649.
10995 S. Ct. 718 (1975). Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Mitchell and
North Georgia Finishing. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan, who dissented in
Mitchell, voted with the majority in North Georgia Finishing.Justices Burger, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist, part of the majority in Mitchell, dissented in North Georgia Finishing.
1
95 S. Ct. at 722.
416 U.S. at 611.
"
Justices Stewart and Powell in their concurring opinions indicate that they view
the majority opinion as "resuscitating" Fuentes.
"1 95 S. Ct. at 722-23.
lOs
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standard by which to measure and determine their validity under
the Fourteenth amendment.""'
CONCLUSION

In Mitchell the Supreme Court has reversed the trend of the
Fuentes line of cases which required notice and a hearing prior
to any deprivation of property. The majority's holding that a
hearing is required only before final deprivation of property is
supported by cases widely recognized as exceptions to the requirement of prior notice and a hearing, and cannot be used as valid
authority. The Court expands the rights of the creditor protected
by the fourteenth amendment. The result is that now the test of
due process requirements under the fourteenth amendment is a
procedural balancing of the interests of the creditor and the
debtor.
Yet, the Court in Mitchell leaves unclear the extent to which
the opinion is a retreat from the due process requirements of
Fuentes. Likewise, which statutory provisions will fulfill due process requirements is uncertain. Cases have already inconsistently
interpreted the holdings of Mitchell, and to ensure uniformity
among the circuits the Supreme Court must clarify the ambiguities surrounding prejudgment seizure of property under the fourteenth amendment.
Mary M. Schwertz
Id. at 726.

COMMENT
REAL PROPERTY-MORTGAGES-Colorado's Curative Default
Statute-FosterLumber Co. v. Weston Constructors,
Inc., 521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
A Colorado statute enacted in 1965 enables mortgagors' to
prevent foreclosure by curing the default on which a mortgage
foreclosure action is based.2 Not until the recent case of Foster
Lumber Co. v. Weston Constructors,Inc.,' however, did a Colorado appellate court construe this curative default statute.4 Although the court in Fostermade a legally defensible construction
I "Mortgage" and related terms are used here generically and include "deed of trust."
For a discussion of the differences between a mortgage and a deed of trust, see G. OSBORNE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 17 (2d ed. 1970).
COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 38-39-118 (1973). The statute reads:

(1) Whenever the only default or violation in the terms of the note and
deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed is nonpayment of any sum due
thereunder, the owners of the property being foreclosed or parties liable
thereon shall be entitled to cure said particular default if, at least five days
prior to the date fixed for the foreclosure sale, such owners or parties give
written notice to the public trustee, sheriff, or other officer conducting the
sale of their intention to cure said default and violation and if, on or before
twelve o'clock noon of the date before the day upon which said sale is set,
the owners or parties pay to the officer conducting the sale all delinquent
principal and interest payments which are due as of the date of such payment exclusive of that portion of the principal which would not have been
due in the absence of acceleration, plus all costs, expenses, late charges,
attorney's fees, and other fees incurred by the holder of such note, deed of
trust, or mortgage as of the date of payment in connection with such proceedings for collection and foreclosure.
(2) Upon receipt by the officer conducting the sale of the said notice
of intention to cure the default and violation, such officer shall obtain in
writing from the holder of the note, deed of trust, or mortgage a statement
of all sums of principal, interest, costs, expenses, late charges, attorney's
fees, and such other fees as aforesaid necessary to cure said default and
violation. Upon payment of all withdrawal fees and costs plus an additional
thirty-five dollars public trustees' costs to the officer conducting said sale on
or before twelve o'clock noon as provided in this section, in the form of a
certified check or cash, all proceedings for foreclosure shall terminate. The
officer conducting the sale shall forthwith deliver said sum to the holder of
the note, deed of trust, or mortgage.
(3) Nothing in this section shall constitute a waiver of any right accruing after a subsequent violation of any covenant of said note, deed of trust,
or mortgage.
Some other jurisdictions have similar curative default statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2924c (West 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 86.760 (1974).
521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
1 At the time the statute was construed it was COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 118-9-18
(Supp. 1969).
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of the poorly drafted statute, dicta in the opinion support an
interpretation of the statute which would permit a mortgagee to
circumvent the statutory purpose. This comment will examine
that apparent inconsistency.

I. THE Foster OPINION
Foster conveyed property to one of the defendants in exchange for a promissory note secured by a first deed of trust. Two
other defendants subsequently assumed the obligation. When two
monthly installments were not paid, Foster filed an election and
demand for foreclosure, and a sale was set. Foster then discovered
that contrary to a covenant in the deed of trust, property taxes
for the preceding year had not been paid. One defendant attempted to cure the default by tendering the past due installments and receipts from the payment of the property taxes. Foster would not accept the tender and the public trustee refused to
foreclose, whereupon Foster brought suit.5
Foster did not question the mortgagor's right under the curative default statute to cure a default resulting from a failure to
pay past due installments of principal and interest. Instead, Foster objected to the public trustee's position that the statute also
cured defaults resulting from a failure to pay real property taxes
when due. Additionally, it was Foster's contention that even if
foreclosure of the deed of trust were barred, the curative default
statute did not prohibit a suit on the note. The court of appeals
held that (1) the statute applies to a default resulting from a
failure to pay real property taxes, and (2) a mortgagor's compliance with the statute precludes the mortgagee from pursuing an
independent claim on the note.
A.

Nonpayment of Taxes

In describing the type of default which may be cured, the
Colorado statute first refers to a default consisting of
I Foster's complaint had two claims, the first of which was for the amount due on
the promissory note secured by a deed of trust. The second claim was an action under
rule 106 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedureto compel the public trustee to conduct
a foreclosure sale pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust. The lower court dismissed
both claims of Foster's complaint by granting defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Because the court went beyond the pleadings and considered affidavits
submitted by the parties, the motion should have been treated as one for summary judgment. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 12(b). The court of appeals modified the lower court's order to
provide that summary judgment be entered in favor of the defendants and, as modified,
affirmed the lower court's judgment.
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"nonpayment of any sum due"' under the note and mortgage or
deed of trust, but then specifies only "delinquent principal and
interest payments . . . plus all costs, expenses, late charges, attorney's fees, and other fees incurred by the holder of such note.
S. ., as those sums which must be paid to effect the cure.' In
its appellate brief, Foster advanced several arguments to show
that the statute should not apply to the nonpayment of taxes.,
The court did not address itself to any of Foster's specific arguments on this point, but summarily stated that "the phrase 'any
sum due thereunder' is susceptible to an interpretation including
delinquent taxes."'' 0 The rule of construction that a remedial statute should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur* COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-39-118 (1973) (emphasis added).
Id.
The more clearly drafted California statute specifies a
default in payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or ...
failure of trustor or mortgagor to pay, in accordance with the terms of such
obligation or of such deed of trust or mortgage, taxes, assessments, premiums
for insurance or advances made by beneficiary or mortgagee in accordance
with the terms of such obligation or of such deed of trust or mortgage...
as one which may be cured. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (West 1974). The Oregon statute also
expressly permits the curing of the same defaults as those listed above in the California
statute. ORE. REV. STAT. § 86.760 (1974). The Illinois statute refers more generally to "a

default under the terms of the trust deed or mortgage." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
1 For instance, Foster correctly pointed out that the statute does not specifically refer
to taxes or insurance which, it said, "would have been easy to add." Brief for Appellant
at 10, Foster Lumber Co. v. Weston Constructors, Inc., 521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974). Foster also pointed to the language of the statute, which requires a "default or
violation in the terms of the note and deed of trust." Id. Because the obligation to pay
taxes was in the trust deed alone and not also in the note, as the conjunction "and" would
require, Foster argued that this type of default was not within the statutory language. Id.
Foster also cited the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, by which the inclusion of

the specified items of principal and interest would exclude the nonpayment of taxes as a
curable default. Id. at 11. While the technical problems in the statute on which the first
two arguments are based can most likely be attributed to careless drafting, rather than
to any intention on the part of the legislature to achieve subtle distinctions, the last
mentioned argument has more merit.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the "expression of one

thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1968). The
expressio unius maxim, while differing slightly from the one cited by Foster, is substantially the same, and comments about one would apply equally well, it seems, to the other.
The expressio unius maxim is not particularly "legal," but rather is the result of common
sense and general experience that When people say one thing they do not mean another.
2A J. SUmERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.24 (4th ed. C. Sands
1973). The maxim, however, is only an aid to construction and not a rule of law, and "can
never override clear and contrary evidences of ...[legislative] intent." Neuberger v.
Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
11521 P.2d at 1297.
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pose" would have adequately countered Foster's arguments on
this issue. While the court did not adopt that rule in reaching its
decision, it did reach the consistent conclusion that
[tlhe statute must be interpreted so as to carry out the general
legislative intent, which was to permit debtors to prevent foreclosure
of mortgages or deeds of trust in instances in which the creditor's
interests will not be jeopardized. 2

In this case Foster's interests were not in jeopardy because the
mortgagor did pay the unpaid taxes, and thus "[t]he lien for
unpaid taxes was. . . dissolved and any impairment of the creditor's collateral resulting from overdue taxes vanished."' 3
B.

No Action on the Note

In its second holding the court barred the initiation of an
action on the note once a mortgagor has complied with the statute. Because the effect of curing a default under the statute is to
make the mortgagee whole as if no default had ever occurred, the
court concluded that without the necessary element of a default,
the mortgagee had no basis upon which to declare an acceleration
of the note. Such a construction is essential if the statute is to
provide any substantive relief to mortgagors. As the court noted,
a contrary decision would permit a mortgagee to easily circumvent the effect of the statute and to achieve indirectly what it was
prevented from doing directly. 4
1 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 (4th ed. C. Sands
1974). A liberal construction is one which makes the statutory rule apply to more situations than it would under a strict construction. Id. Courts have generally given the term
"remedial" a limited meaning and have applied it to legislation that is not penal or
criminal in nature. The term is also used to describe legislation of a procedural nature
that does not affect substantive rights. Id. § 60.02. Colorado's statute meets both tests
and thus qualifies for a liberal construction. The statute is not penal or criminal in nature.
While it could be argued that the statute abrogates the mortgagee's right to foreclose, the
statute is merely a procedural postponement of the exercise of that right. A California
case, in applying its similar curative default statute, CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924c (West 1974),
said that the purpose of the statute is not extinguishment of the ultimate obligation.
Magnus v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. 2d 1, 208 P.2d 407 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949). The Colorado
statute does not affect the mortgagor's ultimate obligation to pay the debt.
"1

521 P.2d at 1297.

13 Id.
11 Permitting a mortgagee to sue on the note after the default which was the basis of
the acceleration had been cured would subject the mortgagor to liability for the entire
debt. The court said that this construction urged by the plaintiff would allow a creditor
to levy on the real property covered by the deed of trust after obtaining a judgment on
the note.
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II. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROBLEMS
No Right to Cure Without ForeclosureAction

A significant question regarding the scope of the statute arises from dicta in the Foster case. The court pointed out that the
statute applies only to foreclosure proceedings and that
"[s]tatutory coverage is therefore triggered by initiation of foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage or deed of trust."'" In Colorado, however, a mortgagee is not obligated to foreclose. It has the
independent remedy of pursuing an action on the note." Because
the Colorado curative default statute is limited by its language
to foreclosure proceedings, an interpretation supported by dicta
in the Foster case itself, the statute might have the anomalous
effect of encouraging a mortgagee to avoid its impact by bringing
an action on the note, rather than a foreclosure proceeding. In
that event, the mortgagor would have no right to cure the default,
which would have been curable had a foreclosure action been
elected by the mortgagee, and the mortgagor would be fully liable
on any judgment resulting from the action.
B.

Statutory Coverage When Foreclosure Follows Action on
Note

In order to give full effect to its remedial nature, the statute
should be interpreted to allow the curing of a default if the mortgagee first commences an action on the note, and even if it obtains a judgment for the entire debt, and then institutes foreclosure proceedings. Such an interpretation would permit the mortgagor to avoid foreclosure, which clearly is the statutory intent.
Although a mortgagor would still be personally liable for any
judgment on the note, the mortgagee would be prevented from
reaching the mortgaged property, except possibly in execution as
11521 P.2d at 1298. The court also said, "It is important to note... that by its terms,
the statute applies only to deeds of trust or mortgages 'being foreclosed' and that the
statutory mechanism for tender operates through the public trustees or other officers
'conducting the sale.'" Id.
' Foothills Holding Corp. v. Tulsa Rig, Reel & Mfg. Co., 155 Colo. 232, 393 P.2d 749
(1964); Greene v. Wilson, 90 Colo. 562, 11 P.2d 225 (1932); Folda Real Estate Co. v.
Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924). Some jurisdictions have a "one action rule,"
which differs from the law in Colorado by requiring a mortgagee to exhaust the security
by a foreclosure proceeding before the general assets of the mortgagor can be reached. G.
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 334 (2d ed. 1970). See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (Supp. 1974); MONT.REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-6001 (1964); NEv. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (Supp.
1973).
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a judgment creditor." A construction of the statute which would

allow the mortgagor to cure a default and prevent foreclosure
notwithstanding its personal liability on the debt would not be at
odds with the language of the statute, which merely refers to any
foreclosure proceeding. The applicability of the statute is not
restricted to foreclosure proceedings occurring before an action on
the note, and thus the statute should provide coverage when the
foreclosure proceeding follows the note action.
III.

SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS

Because these problems of construction and application are
due primarily to poor drafting, the legislature might consider
amending the curative default statute. Amendment could accomplish several objectives. First, it could dispel statutory ambiguity
and inconsistency of reference concerning the types of defaults
which may be cured. The language of the statute should be expansive enough to include, as a minimum, any type of default
which may be cured by the payment of money.'"
Second, amendment could make the curative right applicable when the mortgagee elects to first pursue an action on the
note. Upon a mortgagee's commencement of an action on the
note, a mortgagor should have the right to cure the default in a
manner similar to that provided by the statute for foreclosure
actions. A right to cure at this point would cut off any further
action on the note. Since the same default gives rise to both of
the mortgagee's remedies, foreclosure and an action on the note,
the mortgagor's right to cure the default should not depend upon
which remedy the mortgagee elects. This change could be
achieved only by statutory amendment, because, in this instance,
the restrictive language of the statute would preclude judicial
construction encompassing such an expanded curative right.
Third, the statute could be amended to limit the frequency
I7
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-52-102 (1973) provides that "[all goods ... and real
estate of every person against whom any judgment is obtained ... are liable to be sold
on execution to be issued upon such judgment. . . ." Id. § 13-52-105 (1973) states that
"[e]very interest in land, legal and equitable, shall be subject to levy and sale under
execution .... " Of course, if the mortgaged property qualifies for the homestead exemption, id. § 38-41-201 (1973) would limit a mortgagee's right to levy against that property.
"1 Additional defaults which could be included in the statute are a mortgagor's failure
to pay assessments, insurance premiums, or advances made by the mortgagee. The California statute, CAL. CtV. CODE § 2924c (West 1974), and the Oregon statute, ORE. REV.
STAT. § 86.760 (1974), both expressly include these defaults. See note 8 supra for the
pertinent language of the California statute.
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with which a mortgagor may avail itself of the benefits of the
statute, since a mortgagor's repeated use of the right to cure
defaults may place an unfair burden on the mortgagee. The curative default statute of Illinois' 9 seems to recognize the desirability
of granting mortgagors some relief without thereby unduly burdening mortgagees. That statute provides that
[tihe relief granted by this Section shall not be exhausted by a
single use thereof, but shall not be again available under the same
trust deed or mortgage for a period of 5 years from the date of the
dismissal of such proceedings.w

The use of such a limitation would achieve a more equitable
balance between the needs and rights of the parties.
Fourth, the statute could set a maximum attorney's fee
which may be included in the fees that the mortgagor must pay
to effect a cure.' Such a provision would prevent a mortgagee
from using prohibitive attorney's fees to discourage a mortgagor
from exercising its statutory right to cure. The additional fees
which a mortgagor must pay to cure a default are presumably not
punitive, but are intended only to compensate the mortgagee for
its actual costs in bringing a foreclosure suit. A statutory limitation on the amount of attorney's fees recoverable under the statute 2 could ensure that this provision is used for the purpose of
compensation only.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the Foster case the Colorado Court of Appeals construed
the remedial curative default statute and made a legally defensible construction insofar as the issues of the case required. Unanswered questions about the scope and operation of the statute
could be resolved by legislative amendment. Absent such action,
however, Colorado courts may face these questions in future
cases; should this happen, it is hoped that they will construe the
statute to further its remedial purposes.
Holly L. Carlson
"ILL.

ANN. STAT. ch. 95,

§ 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).

"Id.

21Mortgage loans falling within the scope of the UNIFORM CONSumER ClRDrr CODE

(U.C.C.C.) would be subject to COLO. REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 5-3-514 (1973), which limits

attorney's fees to a reasonable sum not in excess of 15 percent of the unpaid debt. Relief
under the U.C.C.C. is not intended to extend to the first mortgage market, however, and
the U.C.C.C. does not apply to the typical case in which the curative default statute is
invoked. See id. § 5-3-105 (1973).
" See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924c (West 1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 86.760 (1974).

COMMENT
PROPERTY -EMINENT DOMAIN-Trespass or Inverse
Condemnation:
Election of Remedies for Uncompensated Appropriation of Land
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).
INTRODUCTION

Inverse condemnation is a remedy available to an owner
whose property has been appropriated for a public use without
condemnation proceedings or the payment of compensation.' Initiated by the landowner rather than the condemnor, inverse condemnation is treated as if it were an eminent domain proceeding.2
Both actions follow statutory rules, but inverse condemnation is
commenced after the land is taken while eminent domain proceedings are initiated before the land is appropriated.3 The same
rules apply in both actions and the same issues, including
whether the taking is necessary and proper, are litigated.4
I Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 511 P.2d 517 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974). In Ossman the court of appeals defines
inverse condemnation as
an action brought by a property owner seeking just compensation for land
taken for a public use, against a government or private entity having the
power of eminent domain. [citations omitted]. It is a remedy peculiar to the
property owner, and is exercisable by the property owner where it appears
that the taker of the property does not intend to bring eminent domain
proceedings. The doctrine rests upon the theory that after property has been
devoted to public use by a condemnor, and public policy dictates that such
use should not be discontinued, the property owner is entitled to compensation.
511 P.2d at 519, citing Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39
Cal. Rptr. 903 (1964); Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough, 245 Cal. App. 2d 324, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 862 (1966); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964). For a
discussion of alternative remedies available to the uncompensated landowner-such as
injunction, mandamus, ejectment, tort, implied contract, and constitutional provisions-see Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated
Landowner, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 210.
1Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974); Stuart v.
Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152 (1916).
,Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974). See also
Stalford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 128 Colo. 441, 263 P.2d 436 (1953); Boxberger v.
Highway Comm., 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920 (1952); Swift v. Smith, 119 Colo. 126, 201
P.2d 609 (1948).
San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Noffsinger, 85 Colo. 202, 274 P. 827 (1929). For a
discussion of the elements of an inverse condemnation action and the proper procedures
to be followed, see Feder & Wieland, Inverse Condemnation-A Viable Alternative, 51
DENVER L.J. 529 (1974).
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In Colorado, owners seeking compensation for appropriated
land have had little success basing their action on a common law
theory.5 Actions based on different theories have in the past been
treated as if they were actually inverse condemnation suits.' This
exclusiveness, however, has rarely worked a hardship. Based on
the constitutional provision that "[pirivate property shall not be
taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation," 7 Colorado statutes8 and case law9 have usually provided
effective relief in the form of inverse condemnation.
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has recently held
that inverse condemnation is not the sole remedy available. In
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"0 the
court sanctioned trespass as an alternative remedy. The landowner may now elect to sue in trespass rather than inverse condemnation when a trespasser having the power of eminent domain refuses to initiate condemnation proceedings. This comment examines the factors to be considered in making an election
between the now available remedies and then assesses the impact
Ossman may have.
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
In July of 1967 while placing a telephone cable alongside a
highway right-of-way, defendant Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. laid part of its cable on land owned by the plaintiff
Emett Ossman. In doing so, defendant severed approximately
one-half acre from the rest of the plaintiff's tract. In June 1970,
when Ossman discovered what had happened, he immediately
contacted the defendant and demanded compensation of $1,000.
Subsequent negotiations between the parties as to the amount of
compensation proved fruitless when the defendant refused to increase its original offer of $42 for the land. After unsuccessfully
I.

5 See, e.g., Snowden v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 238 F. 495 (8th Cir. 1916); Sanger v.
Larson Constr. Co., 126 Colo. 479, 251 P.2d 930 (1952); Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo.
58, 156 P. 152 (1916); Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Doelz, 49 Colo. 48, 111 P. 595 (1910); Edwards
v. Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 114 P. 856 (1914).
1 In an early Colorado case the court said that an owner's suit for damages caused
by the appropriation of land is "akin to condemnation suits" and is to "be tried like a
condemnation suit." Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 70, 156 P. 152, 156 (1916).
COLO. CONST. art. I, § 15.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101 (1973).
Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974); Board of
Comm'rs v. Adler, 16 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621 (1920).
10 520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).
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requesting the defendant to condemn the land, the plaintiff
commenced an action in trespass.
In his complaint, Ossman sought damages for the trespass
and exemplary damages for defendant's wanton and reckless disregard of his rights and feelings. Mountain Bell pleaded as an
affirmative defense that Ossman was limited to the damages he
could recover in inverse condemnation. The trial court combined
the two theories by "instructing that a trespass existed as a matter of law, and by awarding the title to the land to Mountain Bell
"" Ossman received $1,942 for the easement and damage
...
to the residue of his land and $2,308 in exemplary damages.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court 2 by
holding that an entity possessed of the powers of eminent domain,
"if pursuing a public purpose (Colo. Const. Art. II § 15) cannot
be a trespasser.' 3 The proper remedy, the court said, was to treat
the defendant's counterclaim for inverse condemnation as a petition for eminent domain" and, upon request of the parties, the
trial court should then have
conducted an in limine hearing to determine if the taking was necessary and proper. If the in limine hearing resulted in a determination
that it was not necessary and proper, then plaintiff's trespass action
could be maintained, and trespass damages, not condemnation
damages, would be awarded. No transfer of title to the land taken

or easement would result."

Only if it were determined that the land could not properly be
condemned, the court of appeals held, could the plaintiff's trespass action be successfully maintained.
1 511 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
12 Id.
'3

Id. at 519. The court said that
[b]y our ruling, a trespass remedy would be available to [the landowner]
only if it were determined that [the condemnor] had no right under the
Constitution or eminent domain statutes to take private property, or that the
specific taking was unauthorized or unlawful.

Id.
14This petition, found in CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-102 (1973) applies,
[iun all cases where the right to take private property for public or private
use without the owner's consent or the right to construct or maintain any
. . . public or private work which may damage property not actually taken
is conferred by general laws or special charter upon any corporate or municipal authority. ...
Mountain Bell is conferred this authority as a "corporation ... seeking to secure a right... Id. § 38-5-107.
of-way for lines of telegraph, [and] telephone.
11511 P.2d at 520 (emphasis added).
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The Colorado Supreme Court reversed both lower courts."6 It
held that a landowner had the "right to elect to sue in trespass
under the circumstances" in this case and that there was "no
sound reason why a landowner should be limited to an inverse
condemnation remedy where a trespasserrefuses to promptly initiate eminent domain proceedings."'7 The court ruled that if the
landowner elected to pursue his trespass claim the issue of
exemplary damages, as well as any special damages, would be
submitted to the jury. The court explicitly held, however, that
trespass and inverse condemnation could not be maintained in
the same action because the latter, a special statutory remedy,
had features inconsistent with a common law action.' 8 Therefore,
the landowner must elect at the outset either trespass or inverse
condemnation.

II.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

The landowner's decision to elect trespass or inverse condemnation depends on factors that bar one remedy-such as sovereign immunity, acquiescence to the entry, or the statute of limitations-and differences between the nature and measure of damages of the two remedies that make one more attractive than the
other in a particular situation.
A.

Involuntary Election

1. Sovereign Immunity
If the appropriating entity is a governmental body, sovereign
immunity may bar tort recovery and limit the landowner to inverse condemnation. 9 The Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act 20 affects suits brought against an entity that is any "kind of
'

520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).

'I

Id. at 741 (emphasis added). As support for this statement, the supreme court

cited, inter alia, Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921);
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Hayes, 49 Colo. 333, 112 P. 315 (1911); Denver & S.F. Ry. v.
School Dist. No. 2, 14 Colo. 327, 23 P. 978 (1890).
IS Among the differences the court pointed out in the two actions were the common
law origin of trespass and the constitutional origin of inverse condemnation; the award of
exemplary damages in trespass under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (1973) that are
not recoverable in inverse condemnation; and the statutory rules, found in CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1-101 to -7-107 (1973), governing inverse condemnation that are not
applicable to trespass. 520 P.2d at 741-42.
" This comment is concerned only with appropriations made by state entities and
not with federal bodies whose liability is governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-80
(1970). See Feder & Wieland, supra note 4, 537-38.
'" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-101 to -117 (1973).
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district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of the
state organized pursuant to law"'" and this immunity extends to
"liability in all claims for injury which are actionable in tort. ' 2
The presence of the eminent domain statute is neither a waiver
of this immunity nor a consent to be sued in tort. 23 Thus, sovereign immunity could be asserted as a defense against a landowner
bringing an action in trespass.24 In contrast, the right of eminent
domain is based on the "takings clause" of the Colorado constitution and as this is the constitutional provision upon which inverse
condemnation is based, an action in inverse condemnation is not
subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. 5
Governmental bodies, however, are not the only entities having the power of eminent domain. The use of public rights-ofways is given to "[any domestic or foreign telegraph, telephone,
electric light power, gas, or pipeline company, authorized to do
business under the laws" of Colorado. In addition, these companies are "vested with the power of eminent domain, and authorized to proceed to obtain rights-of-way for poles, wires, pipes,
regulator stations, substations, and systems for such purposes
§ 24-10-103(5).
Id. § 24-10-106(1).
2 Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court of the United States, 207 F.2d 50 (10th
Cir. 1953).
1, The defense of sovereign immunity, however, may be waived by COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 24-10-104(1) (1973) which provides waiver
if a public entity provides insurance coverage . . . to insure itself against
liability for any injury or to insure any of its employees against his liability
for any injury resulting from an act or omission by such employee acting
within the scope of his employment ....
The liability resulting from this waiver is limited to "the amount of the insurance coverage
and shall be recovered from the insurer only." Id. § 24-10-104(2). See also id. § 24-10-116
which provides when the State is required to obtain insurance.
" CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15. Colorado courts have awarded damages caused by the
taking of property not ordinarily compensable in eminent domain proceedings and have
based recovery not on tort or common law theories, but rather on the "takings clause."
See, e.g., Roth v. Wilkie, 143 Colo. 519, 354 P.2d 510 (1960); Boxberger v. State Highway
Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); Board of Comm'rs v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194
P. 621 (1920); City of Colorado Springs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 P. 794 (1914); cf.
Hayutin v. Colorado State Dep't of Highways, 175 Colo. 83, 485 P.2d 896, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971); Troiano v. Department of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448
(1969). See also Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: Prescriptionfor
Regression, 49 DENVER L.J. 567 (1973), which argues that the exceptions to the sovereign
immunity barrier in these types of cases are based on the unconstitutionality of the
uncompensated taking of the property. For a further discussion of the use of inverse
condemnation as a means of avoiding the sovereign immunity barrier, see Oberst & Lewis,
Claims Against the State of Kentucky-Reverse Eminent Domain, 42 Ky. L.J. 163 (1953).
2' COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-101 (1973).
21 Id.
2
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" These companies, moreover, are liable for their torts and
...
are not protected by any statute. 8 Sovereign immunity, then,
does not bar common law actions, such as trespass, that a
landowner may elect to pursue against nongovernmental entities
appropriating land.
2. Acquiescence to the Entry
Acquiescence occurs when a landowner knows an entity with
the power of eminent domain has appropriated his land and he
does nothing to assert his right to the land.29 If a landowner allows
entry without demanding compensation 0 or requiring the initiation of condemnation proceedings 3 or if he simply does not interfere with the entry, 2 he will be held to have acquiesced. The effect
of acquiescence is to bar tort recovery and limit the damages to
the amount recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding.3 This
limitation of damages applies even if the person who acquiesces
34
to the entry was a previous owner rather than the present one.
Therefore, unless a landowner protests the presence on his land
of an entity with the power of eminent domain from the entry,
35
he will have acquiesced and be limited to inverse condemnation.

3. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations bars recovery for actions not
commenced within the statutory period after the cause of action
accrues. For damages resulting from a permanent trespass, such
as the construction of a building or the appropriation of an easement, recovery may be had only "for the injury done up to the
commencement of the suit." The cause of action accrues when
" Id. § 38-5-105. See also CoLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 which provides eminent domain
powers for the conveyance of water over private land.
2 See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sanger, 87 Colo. 369, 287 P. 866
(1930); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eyser, 2 Colo. 141 (1873); Wertz v. Holy Cross Elec.
Ass'n, 512 P.2d 286 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
" See generally Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152 (1916).
10Edwards v. Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 144 P. 856 (1914).
31 Snowden v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 238 F. 495 (8th Cir. 1916).
12 Rogers v. Lower Clear Creek Ditch Co., 63 Colo. 216, 165 P. 248 (1917).
3 See, e.g., cases cited in note 5 supra.
11Edwards v. Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 144 P. 856 (1914).
3
For an example of a case in which the landowner was held not to have acquiesced
because he protested from the beginning the presence of a trespasser with the powers of
eminent domain, see Denver & S.F. Ry. v. School Dist. No. 2, 14 Colo. 327, 23 P. 978
(1890).
31 City & County of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 127, 2 P. 6, 15 (1883). In Denver
City Irrigation & Water Co. v. Middaugh, 12 Colo. 434, 21 P. 565 (1889), the court said
that
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the damage first becomes apparent37 and the injured party's right
to bring an action is then limited by the 6-year tort statute of
limitations.3 If he fails to bring it within that time he will be
forced to use inverse condemnation, which has an 18-year statute
of limitations. 9
If the landowner fails to claim potential damages in a condemnation suit, then the 6-year tort statute of limitations might
bar all actions for additional damage to the land that are not
brought within that period. In Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v.
Majors,"0 the defendant condemned land for a canal bed running
through plaintiff's property to drain water from its reservoir. One
year when doing so it damaged plaintiff's property by letting too
much water flow through the canal and plaintiff sought damages
for the injury to his land. The court refused to allow him any
damages, holding that the original condemnation award had fully
compensated him and that the tort
statute of limitations applies to actions for damages where parties,
having the power of eminent domain take possession of land and use
it, with the knowledge of the owner, and he neglects to enjoin them
or fails to bring suit for damages within such statutory period
41

Therefore, the plaintiff was barred from recovering anything for
the additional damage to his land.
B.

Voluntary Election
A landowner whose choice is not precluded by sovereign

as to trespasses and nuisances that are not of a permanent character, damages can only be recovered for the injury sustained up to the time of the
commencement of the suit, but as to trespasses and nuisances that are of a
permanent character, a single recovery may be had for the whole damage
resulting from the act.
12 Colo. at 444, 21 P. at 569 (dictum). See note 53 infra.
11Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921); Middelkamp
v. Bessemer Irrigating Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909). In Middelkamp the court said
that "the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the lands were first visibly
affected.
...
46 Colo. at 113, 103 P. at 283.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-110(e) (1973).
31Id. § 38-41-101(1) provides that after 18 years "[n]o person shall commence or
maintain an action for the recovery of the title or possession or to enforce or establish any
right or interest of or to real property ....
0 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921).
" Id. at 593, 196 P. at 335, citing Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152
(1916); Middelkamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909); Denver
& S.F. Ry. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122, 95 P. 343 (1908). For further discussion of the use
of statute of limitations as a defense to claims for the uncompensated appropriation of
land, see Feder & Wieland, supra note 4, at 541.
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immunity, acquiescence, or the running of the statute of limitations is in the position of being able to elect trespass or inverse
condemnation. The primary consideration involved in making
this decision is the difference in damages the two remedies offer
that makes one more advantageous than the other.
1. Inverse Condemnation
In determining the "respective rights of plaintiff and defendant as to property taken, damages and benefits," the same rules
apply in inverse condemnation as apply in eminent domain. 2 The
measure of damages is the fair market value of the property 3 and,
in addition to this amount, the recovery of "damages, if any, to
the residue of such property" may be had." Against this, the
defendant may set off any improvements that specifically benefit
the land,45 although general benefits to the community at large
cannot be set off."
2. Trespass
In trespass the measure of damages is the difference in the
value of the land immediately before and immediately after the
injury." Where it will not accurately reflect the actual damages
suffered, this rule is not invariably applied. In such cases, other
evidence may be admitted.48 Exemplary damages can also be
recovered if the defendant acts in "wanton and reckless disregard
1

San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Noffsinger, 85 Colo. 202, 207, 274 P. 827, 829

(1929).
"
The fair market value of the property was described in Wassenich v. City & County
of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 466, 186 P. 533, 537 (1919) to be the price the "property would
bring if sold in the open market under ordinary and usual circumstances, for cash, assum...
This rule has been
ing the owner is willing to sell and the purchaser willing to buy.
followed consistently. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Vail Associates, 171 Colo.
381, 468 P.2d 482 (1970); Mack v. Board of County Comm'rs, 152 Colo. 300, 381 P.2d 987
(1963); Williams v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 195, 363 P.2d 171 (1961); Board
of Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 184 P.2d 142 (1947).
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-115(c) (1973).
," In Western Slope Gas Co. v. Lake Eldora Corp., 512 P.2d 641, 644 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973), the court described these benefits to be those "which accrue directly to the residue
of the tract as a result of the construction of the improvement and which benefit directly
and particularly the specific tract . .. .
41 Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d
283 (1940).
41 Freel v. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 208 F. Supp. 93 (D. Colo. 1962); State v. Nicholl,
150 Colo. 84, 370 P.2d 888 (1962); Dandrea v. Board of County Comm'rs, 144 Colo..343,
356 P.2d 893 (1960); Mustang Reservoir Canal & Land Co. v. Hissman, 49 Colo. 308, 112
P. 800 (1910).
4" Big Five Mining Co. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 73 Colo. 545, 216 P. 719 (1923). See
also Fort v. Brighton Ditch Co., 79 Colo. 462, 246 P. 786 (1926).
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of the injured party's rights and feelings."" Unlike inverse condemnation, intent or lack of intent will influence the measure of
damages in a trespass action,50 although an unintentional trespass does not preclude exemplary damages.5
Trespass seems to offer the better remedy because the measure of damages is more flexible, exemplary damages can be
awarded, and benefits to the residue of the taken land cannot
automatically be set off against the damage to the remaining
portion. Under trespass, there is the further advantage of the
possibility of damages which will continue accruing even after the
commencement of the suit. As was pointed out by the appellate
court's decision in Ossman, in a trespass award "[n]o title to the
land taken or easement would result. ' 52 Thus, the injured
landowner may be able to maintain a succession of actions as the
damages from the original trespass accrued yearly or bring a trespass action and then force condemnation by the trespassing entity

53

49 COLO.

REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-21-102 (1973).

Trespass liability arises even if the trespasser does not "intend to invade the other's
interest in the exclusive possession of his land. The intention which is required to make
the actor liable . . . is an intention to enter upon the particular piece of land in question
.
...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163, comment b at 294 (1965).
51 See, e.g., Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co., 129 F. 668
(8th Cir. 1904).
11 511 P.2d at 520. In reversing the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court did
not deal with the question of whether title to the land passed or not. Instead it found only
that the lower court committed error in holding that a "landowner should be limited to
an inverse condemnation remedy" in this sitation. 520 P.2d at 741. Because trespass is
an action designed to redress the tortious "injury to the person, property, or rights of
another," it seems clear that trespass does not pass title. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 1 at 956
(1954).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161(1) (1965) states that "[a] trespass may be
committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure. . . which the actor has
tortiously placed there, whether or not the actor has the ability to remove it." The Reporter further adds that this "confers on the possessor of the land an option to maintain
a succession of actions .... " Id. § 161, comment b at 290. However, this statement is
modified by a later comment which notes that this "rule as to continuing trespass does
not apply if the possessor has been fully compensated by the actor for his tortious conduct
.... " Id. § 161, comment d at 290 (emphasis added). See also id. § 160, comment I at
287-88. The Restatement's position appears consonant with Colorado case law. See, e.g.,
Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Bennett, 61 Colo. 111, 156 P. 604 (1916). In Beetschen v. Shell
Pipeline Corp., 363 Mo. 751, 253 S.W.2d 785 (1952), cited with approval in Ossman, the
Missouri Supreme Court adopted the Restatement's position and noted that it would not
allow continuous trespass actions where the landowner had been fully compensated. Because a trespass award may fully compensate a landowner for a structure, such as a
telephone cable, tortiously placed on the land, he might not be able to maintain successive
trespass actions even though he still retains title to the land. See text accompanying notes
53-55 infra.
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Which Remedy Should Be Elected?

Ultimately the election of remedies depends on the factual
setting of the appropriation. Trespass is clearly advantageous in
that it offers the possibility of exemplary damages and prevents
the setting off of benefits against damages to the residue. This
advantage, however, is minimal if the defendant has exhibited no
conduct warranting the award of exemplary damages and there
is either no benefit or no damage to the residue of the property
to be set off against each other. Similary, the more flexible measure of damages in trespass has little advantage over inverse condemnation damages if the difference in the value of the land
immediately before and immediately after the injury is the monetary equivalent of the fair market value of the land taken.
Finally, the advantages of trespass are illusory if the trespass
action is barred by either the sovereign immunity barrier, the
acquiescence of the landowner to the entry, or the running of the
statute of limitations.5 4 The choice of a common law remedy when
that action is barred for some reason may preclude recovery in
inverse condemnation as well. 5 5 Therefore, careful consideration
If, however, the Colorado courts would allow maintenance of continuous trespass
actions or a trespass action followed by ejectment or inverse condemnation, then trespass
would be clearly advantageous to the landowner because it would allow the landowner to
collect trespass, exemplary, and condemnation damages.
" See text accompanying notes 19-41 supra.
0 See, e.g., Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. See also cases cited note 41 supra.
There is also the possibility that collateral estoppel or res judicata will be asserted
by the appropriating entity if a trespass action is unsuccessfully brought by the landowner
who then attempts to relitigate the appropriation under an inverse condemnation theory.
In Waitkus v. Pomeroy, 517 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1973), the Colorado Supreme Court identified
the following tests as being determinative of whether res judicata as collateral estoppel
barred the relitigation of the issue:
First, was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Second, was there a final judgment on
the merits? Third, was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? And, fourth, did the
party against whom the plea is asserted have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior adjudication?
517 P.2d at 317, citing Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1945). See also Brennan v. Grover, 158 Colo. 66, 404 P.2d 544 (1965);
Murphy v. Northern Colo. Grain Co., 30 Colo. App. 21, 488 P.2d 103 (1971). Arguably
because the issue in trespass is whether there was a tortious entry on land and the issue
in inverse condemnation is whether there was an uncompensated condemnation of land,
collateral estoppel would not bar an inverse condemnation action by a landowner who had
proceeded unsuccessfully under a trespass theory. For a discussion of how a landowner
proceeding successfully under a trespass theory might be barred from recovery under
inverse condemnation, see discussion and authorities cited in note 53 supra.
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of the factual pattern in a particular appropriation is required
before an election is made.
Ossman
The effect of Ossman may well be to force entities endowed
with the power of eminent domain to promptly initiate condemnation proceedings and to strictly follow statutory requirements.
Before Ossman an entity that appropriated land could have
waited until the uncompensated landowner initiated inverse condemnation proceedings." It is to the advantage of the condemnor
to negotiate and attempt to settle out of court because in an
eminent domain action, even if promptly initiated, the condemnor is required to pay the landowner's litigation costs. 5
The ability of the landowner to now sue in trespass should
have the effect of forcing the appropriating body to commence a
condemnation action promptly. If it should refuse to do so, it
would be liable in trespass and be subject to possible exemplary
damages even though its entry on the land was unintentional and
in good faith.58 Because of the more generous measure of damages
and exemplary damages, a landowner would probably elect to
pursue trespass rather than inverse condemnation.59
A condemnor, even one already on the land, could begin
eminent domain proceedings by filing a condemnation petition
and thereby avoid trespass liability. 0 If the condemnor files this
petition, it is able to maintain possession of the property in question and all actions against it are stayed." Thus, a trespass action
III.

IMPACT OF

" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1-101 (1973) provides relief for a landowner whose
property has been taken in "all cases in which compensation is not made."
"7 Rullo v. Public Serv. Co., 163 Colo. 99, 428 P.2d 708 (1967); Denver Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d 283 (1940); Dolores No.
2 Land & Canal Co. v. Hartman, 17 Colo. 138, 29 P. 378 (1891).
-" This intent is not necessarily to trespass, but the intent to do the act that was a
trespass. Ansay v. Boecking-Berry Equip. Co., 450 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1971); Little Pittsburg Consol. Mining Co. v. Little Chief Consol. Mining Co., 11 Colo. 223, 17 P. 760 (1888);
Engler v. Hatch, 472 P.2d 680 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or Tors §
158 (1965). See note 50 supra.
5, See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
a COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-106 (1973).
" The statute provides that "upon the filing of the verified petition" contained in
section 38-1-102 (discussed in note 14 supra) and a deposit with the clerk of the court of
the amount the court in a preliminary hearing "determines to be proper compensation,"
the court shall authorize
the petitioner to take possession ..
and if already in possession to maintain
and keep such possession, and in all cases to use and enjoy such right-of-way
during the pendency and until the final conclusion of the condemnation
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commenced before the filing of the petition would be stayed until
the completion of the condemnation proceedings. The eminent
domain award, moreover, might remove the gravamen of the tort
claim. The taking of the land would in many cases be completely
compensated by the eminent domain award. The prompt initiation of the condemnation action by the filing of the petition might
2
possibly remove the grounds for exemplary damages.1
The impact of Ossman, then, would be to force the condemnor to follow statutory requirements rather than to delay action
by making the landowner take the initiative. By making trespass
available as an alternative, the Colorado Supreme Court is, in
effect, encouraging compliance with the present statutory
scheme.
CONCLUSION

Ossman raises many questions that will have to be answered
by subsequent litigation. It is not clear how closely the court will
limit this decision. If the court is simply reacting to the callous
treatment of Emett Ossman by Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co., then in the future it might not allow an election
where the appropriating body makes a greater effort to settle with
the landowner or at least promptly initiate condemnation proceedings.
In allowing the landowner to elect his remedy when his land
has been taken without compensation, the court has gone against
many of its earlier decisions. 3 The impact of this departure, however, may be lessened by future decisions and the fact that trespass, while offering many advantages to the landowner, is limited
by several barriers. In electing between trespass and inverse condemnations, these barriers as well as the advantages to tort recovery will have to be carefully weighed to determine which remedy
will provide the best relief for the injured landowner.
Charles P. Leder
proceedings, and the court shall stay all actions and proceedings against such
petitioner on account thereof.
Id. § 38-5-106.
62 Because the court in Ossman so closely links the conduct of the condemnor to both
the awarding of exemplary damages and the ability to elect trespass, it is possible that in
a situation in which exemplary damages are not awardable the landowner would be unable
to elect trespass as a remedy. For example, the court says that "Ossman had the right to
elect to sue in trespass under the circumstances here" and that "Ossman alleges conduct
which would justify an award of exemplary damages." 520 P.2d at 741 (emphasis added).
u Cases cited note 5 supra.

